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Abstract 
This thesis is a case study exploration of a group of 16-19 year old 
students' understandings of historical accounts. The thesis builds on 
prior research by the author, completed in the Institution Focused Study 
element of the EdD, and aims to add to existing understandings of the 
ways in which history students conceptualise historical accounts and 
controversies and the discipline of history. 
Twenty-four students in one institution, twelve in the first and twelve in 
the second year of their advanced level history studies, completed three 
written tasks over the course of an academic year. Twelve of the twenty-
four students, six from each year, were interviewed. The written tasks 
and the interviews were designed to generate data on student 
understanding of historical accounts. Each written task focused on paired 
texts in which two historians made differing claims about an historical 
topic and the students were asked to answer the same four questions in 
each task. The interview questions mirrored the written task questions 
but were general in nature, looking at historical disagreement rather than 
at a particular controversy. 
Data analysis focuses on the students' ideas about explaining why 
historical disagreements arise, one of the questions that the research 
instruments explored. Data is analysed qualitatively, through a process 
of inductive coding, and a model of five ideal typical approaches to 
explaining why historical disagreements arise is posited and tested 
against the data. The purpose of the analysis is to inform pedagogy and 
to suggest ways in which students' thinking can be progressed. The 
discussion of the data links the ideal typical model to existing research, 
practitioner and historiographic literatures on historical interpretations 
and implications for practice and for further research are identified and 
discussed. A heuristic, for use in teaching and assessment focused on 
historical accounts, is outlined. 
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2000 word statement 
My professional role has changed considerably since I began my 
EdD studies. How have my EdD studies supported my professional 
development and how have the various elements of the EdD programme 
had coherence? 
When I began my EdD studies I was a head of history working 
with 16-19 year old students following Advanced Level History courses 
and I also occasionally taught level 1 undergraduate courses focused on 
historiography. Over the course of my EdD studies my role and 
institutional context has changed a number of times and I am now a 
history education lecturer working with students following initial teacher 
training and masters courses. History and history education have been 
constants throughout these shifts of role and I have been engaged in 
teaching history or teaching how to teach history continuously since I 
began my EdD studies. With the exception of three early modules, my 
EdD studies have focused on history education and my Institution 
Focused Study (IFS) and Thesis both focus on the same aspect of history 
education (historical interpretations or accounts). These studies have had 
a profound effect on my thinking about history and about history 
education and also on my activities as a history educator. 
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Early work on the Foundations of Professionalism course 
engaged me with current debates on educational professionalism and 
helped me define and articulate a position on the nature and identity of 
teaching as a profession. This work on educational professionalism was 
closely linked with work, on Advanced Research Methods, that reflected 
on conceptions of educational knowledge and on the relationship 
between research and practice in education. The conception that I 
subscribe to, and that emerged from this reflection, foregrounds critical 
reflection and reflexivity, the integration of theory and practice and 
dialogue within a community of practice. 
My EdD studies have helped to define my thinking about 
educational professionalism and also supported the development of my 
own practice, as comments below (at pp.43-45) in relation to the 
dissemination of this thesis indicate. I have published a number of 
articles in Teaching History, a practitioner journal which I now co-edit, 
engaged in a range of activities in the history education community and, 
most recently, co-edited a volume of case studies of practice, based on 
collaborations between history education practitioners and academics, 
that aim to integrate theory and practice (Cooper and Chapman, 2009). 
All of this work has been informed by my EdD studies, from my first 
article (Chapman, 2003), which exemplified pedagogic approaches to 
interpretations informed by my work on my IFS, through to the book, 
which sets out to exemplify and theorise constructivist history pedagogy, 
a pedagogic approach that my EdD studies have been particularly 
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effective in assisting me to define and theorise (Chapman, 2009(a)) and 
which draws, in two case studies (Chapman and Hibbert, 2009; 
Chapman and Facey, 2009) on understandings of historical accounts 
developed here. This activity has emerged from my EdD studies, 
disseminated aspects of my EdD studies, and expressed the conception 
of my role as a history educator that I have developed through my EdD 
studies. 
An aspect of this activity, as is indicated at p.45 below, has been 
engagement in policy contexts. Again, this activity has been informed by 
the understanding of policy and policy making developed through my 
EdD studies and in particular through work on Curriculum Policy and 
Practice I, where I focused on models of how policy is made. Work on 
this module involved sustained reflection on the evolution of the 
National Curriculum in England (Phillips, 1998) and developed my 
understanding of the micro-politics of educational policy. I have 
engaged with aspects of curriculum and assessment policy, as a history 
educator, and endeavoured to advance models of history education 
grounded in research and practitioner reflection (Chapman, 2006(b)). 
This work has been an expression of the writing and community of 
practice focused activities referred to above: an edition of the journal 
Teaching History that I managed (Historical Association, 2007), for 
example, was very much intended as an intervention in policy debates, 
advocating the 'disciplined mind' (Gardner, 2000) and the contribution 
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of history as a form of knowledge in a context where competency based 
models of the curriculum (RSA, 2005) are increasingly influential. 
As has been noted, the impact of my EdD studies on my 
conception of history has been fundamental. My undergraduate and 
postgraduate studies were very much focused on metahistorical 
questions and, in particular, on the methodology of the history of ideas 
(Tully, 1992). I engaged with these questions during my Post Graduate 
Certificate of Education studies in 1992/1993, in the context of 
reflection on the nature and purpose of history education, and I was 
interested, in particular, in defining history's aims in a way that took 
note of postmodernist arguments about knowledge (Chapman, 1993). At 
that time and also at the assignment stage of my EdD studies I was 
persuaded by postmodernist arguments that modelled history as 
`discourse' rather than as 'epistemology' (Jenkins, 1991). My EdD 
studies at the assignment stage gave me opportunity to engage in greater 
depth with postmodernist arguments than I had been able to before and, 
in particular, with the work of Hayden White (White, 1973, 1978, 1987 
and 1999). 
Work on my assignment on the implications of postmodernism 
for history education, in Curriculum Policy and Practice II, was the high 
point of my interest in these arguments and my marker's comments on 
the assignment began a process of renewed reflection, particularly at the 
IFS and Thesis stages of the EdD, that has shifted my conception of 
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history back in an epistemological direction. Subsequent engagement 
with theory, and in particular with post-positivist articulations of 
historical knowing (Bevir, 1999; Lorenz, 1998(a) and 1998(b); Riisen, 
2005) has led me to develop a conception of historical knowing that 
accepts the inevitable embeddedness and positionality of historical 
knowledge claims, that is aware of the textual and rhetorical features of 
historical representation but that also takes seriously history's claim to 
articulate interpersonally defensible knowledge claims about the past. 
These are complex issues and I address them fully below in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis which attempts to articulate a model of historical knowing. 
The shift in my own thinking followed from a realisation that many 
postmodernist arguments against historical epistemology, whose 
opposition to positivistic conceptions of history I fully support, are 
themselves crypto-positivist (Lorenz, 1998(a); Riisen, 2005) in the 
assumption, found in the work of White in particular (White, 1973), that 
`facts' are givens but narratives are not. The shift in my thinking on 
these issues also followed from a broadening of my history education 
resulting from my EdD studies. Many of the insights that postmodernism 
develops are, as I discovered, articulated equally effectively and often 
more cogently by existing work in the philosophy of history: by work in 
the British idealist tradition (Collingwood, 1994; Oakeshott, 1991 and 
1999); and by constructivist models of historical knowing (Goldstein, 
1976 and 1996; Megill, 2007). My EdD studies, particularly in the thesis 
stage, were profoundly shaped by engagement with this tradition and by 
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an evolving commitment to a constructivist, rather than postmodern or 
deconstructivist, conception of historical practice. 
The main focus of my EdD studies, from the Institution Focused 
Study phase onwards, has been on historical accounts and 
interpretations. I have engaged with theorising on these issues in a 
sustained manner in both my IFS and my Thesis both of which have 
been concerned with understanding how 16-19 year old students 
conceptualise and approach historical interpretations and accounts. 
There have been notable constants as well as shifts in my thinking whilst 
working on these two pieces of research. The continuities are in the 
conception of accounts, and in a focus on the importance of historians' 
assumptions and apparatus to the enterprise of making meaning about 
the past (Chapman, 2001, p.6-7 and Chapter 3 below). The shifts have 
been related to the engagement with the work of Collingwood and also 
with the corpus of history education literature directly focused on 
historical accounts, discussed below in Chapter 3, much of which has 
appeared since my IFS was completed. As noted below (at p.24) I had 
not engaged with Collingwood directly during my IFS and, as a result, 
my understanding of key research traditions that build on Collingwood's 
work was only partial. Collingwood's model of the development of 
historical understanding (modelled at pp.57/8 below) and his conception 
of historical evidence and of the role, in constituting archives as 
evidence, of historians' questions and reading strategies, has had a major 
impact on my evolving understanding of what history is and, 
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consequently, a major impact on my understandings of what my students 
did when they answered questions that I asked them about accounts. It 
was evident, in the analysis of data in my IFS, that a key dimension of 
student thinking about accounts was the degree to which historians were 
modelled as either active or passive in the construction of accounts and I 
noted that understandings of evidence, questioning and sense making all 
had importance in progression in student thinking (Chapman, 2001, 
pp.45-55). This thesis explores and develops these perceptions in greater 
depth than it was possible to do in my IFS, informed by Collingwood's 
model of the development of thinking about evidence and by Lee and 
Shemilt's arguments about the theory-like, rather than story-like, nature 
of historical accounts (Lee and Shemilt, 2003 and 2004). 
My IFS and this thesis are closely related in terms of their 
instruments and approaches to assessing students' conceptions of 
historical accounts and the IFS functioned as a pilot for this thesis, for 
example by developing instruments. The two pieces of work differ 
dramatically in scope, however. Whereas my IFS explored the ways in 
which students explained the existence of differing accounts of the past, 
the ways in which students modelled logical relationships between 
accounts and how students approached adjudicating between accounts, 
this thesis focuses on one issue only and explores students' explanations 
for account differences. This restriction in focus is pragmatic. As is 
apparent below, I collected data on all these issues in the research phase 
of this thesis, however, constraints of space and the qualitative focus of 
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this study have necessitated a narrowing of focus. It is also apparent, 
from the analysis reported here, that a focus on explanation is an 
effective way into understanding student thinking about accounts, the 
key focus of this investigation. 
In addition to shaping my thinking about substantive matters, my 
EdD studies have also had a dramatic impact on my thinking about 
research methods and methodology. This has, of course, been a partly 
theoretical process and involved reading and thinking about 
methodology, particularly as part of the modules Methods of Enquiry I 
and II and Advanced Research Methods. However, the most instructive 
element has been practical. Although my theorising about both history 
and epistemology had made the limits of inductivism more than clear to 
me (Blaikie, 1993; Novick, 1988), I spent a great deal of time, despite 
this understanding, during the data analysis phase of my thesis, 
approaching my work in an inductivist manner, hoping for patterns to 
emerge from the data. As will be apparent from the methodology of this 
thesis, I have adopted an approach here that, although grounded in data, 
actively develops hypotheses and tests these against data. There is no 
great theoretical insight here, Popper's objections to inductivism and 
advocacy of 'searchlight' approaches to research, for example, are well 
known and have been for decades (Popper, 1979, pp.341-361). 
Understanding and the application of understanding are, however, 
distinct things. The process of working on my thesis data has helped me 
apply understandings of the importance of creative questioning to 
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knowledge construction, and appreciate the pertinence of Darwin's 
claim that "all observation must be for or against some view if it is to be 
of any service" (Charles Darwin, cited in Novick, 1988 at p.35). 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 The Focus of this Study 
This study is about historical interpretation, an important area of 
history education at school and university. The study addresses 
interpretation in a 16-19 context and understands historical interpretation 
as it is typically understood in that context, namely as historiography and 
as a dimension of the academic discipline called history.1 
Historical interpretation is a process of constructing meaning 
about the past. The process of interpretation yields a product: accounts 
of the past.2 Notwithstanding the aspiration to produce singular, 
definitive and "ultimate" history, shared by many historians at the start 
of the twentieth century (Carr, 2001, p.1), the expansion of the discipline 
of history during the twentieth century resulted in the proliferation, 
rather than the consolidation, of accounts of the past (Ankersmit, 1994). 
As we will see below, and as has been understood for much longer than 
is often assumed (Creighton, 1902), there are good reasons, linked to the 
nature of historical accounts, why we should expect such proliferation to 
continue. 
1 'Interpretations' are typically understood more broadly in earlier phases of English 
history education. At Key Stage 3, for example, the study of interpretation often 
involves popular cultural historical representations of the past, for example, film 
(Banham and Hall, 2003). 
2 The nouns interpretation/s' and 'account's' are used interchangeably throughout this 
thesis. 
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This study focuses on the plurality of historical interpretations 
and on explaining why historical accounts are plural. The purpose of the 
study is pedagogic, rather than historiographic, however, and these 
questions are posed in order to aid reflection on history students' 
understandings of the nature of historical accounts and of the discipline 
of history. These issues are explored in two ways: through a theorisation 
of historical practice, in Chapter 3 below, and through a case study of a 
group of 16-19 year old students' thinking about historical accounts, in 
Chapters 4 and 5 below. The methods used to construct this case study 
are discussed in Chapter 2. The implications for practice of the 
theorisation elaborated in Chapter 3 are identified in Chapter 6 where the 
outline of a 'heuristic' is sketched for use in assessing and developing 
students' understandings of accounts. 
1.2 Interpretation in English History Education 
Understanding historical interpretation is a key objective of the 
English school curriculum across Key Stages 1-3, GCSE and AS and A2 
(QCA, 1999, 2006, 2007(a) and 2007(b)) a focus on developing 
reflexivity and 'historiographical and methodological awareness' is a 
requirement of history first degrees (QAA, 2007, pp.5-6). 
However, in general, historical interpretation is reported to be 
"less well developed" than other aspects of historical teaching and 
learning (Ofsted, 2004, p.6) and "exploring interpretations" has been 
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identified as one of a number of "continued weaknesses" of history at 
Key Stages 3 and 4 and post-16 (Ofsted, 2007, p.14). Furthermore, 
studies of school to university transition (Booth, 2005; Hibbert, 2006) 
suggest that many undergraduate history students have a limited 
understanding of the importance of interpretation as a process (Hibbert, 
2006, p.268) and that many university tutors perceive first year 
undergraduates as having "a superficial, if any, grasp of historiography 
or reflexive sense of the discipline" (Booth, 2005 p.14). 
There is a considerable research and pedagogic literature on 
pupil understandings of historical interpretations and practitioners and 
academics continue to develop teaching strategies to engage pupils and 
develop their understanding of this challenging area of historical leaning. 
This study aims to contribute to that task.3  
The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority's subject criteria 
for history post-16 state that 
A level specifications should require students to comprehend, 
analyse and evaluate how the past has been interpreted and 
represented in different ways, for example in historians' 
debates and through a range of media such as paintings, films, 
reconstructions, museum displays and the internet.4 
(QCA, 2006, p.5) 
3 Relevant literature is discussed below at pp.58-64, 72-82 and 185-188. 
4 We can see the broader focus of interpretations, common at Key Stage 3, being 
introduced to A Level here. However, as the examples that follow suggest, A Level 
examiners still primarily understand interpretations in historiographic terms. 
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The requirement to address interpretations issues is interpreted in 
variable ways by exam boards as the following examples, from 
specifications current from September 2008, illustrate. 
Oxford, Cambridge and RSA Examinations (OCR)'s 
Specification B requires students to study 
how and why historians disagree about the past... 
This will involve studying: 
i. how historians work and how the nature of the 
discipline makes... different interpretations inevitable; 
ii. how and why different methodological approaches 
have led to different interpretations... 
iii. the contribution that different approaches and 
interpretations make to our understanding of the past... 
(OCR, 2008, p.34) 
The following illustrates assessment approaches proposed to 
assess these issues. 
(a) What can you learn from these extracts about the 
interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer 
to the extract and your knowledge to explain your answer... 
(b) When studying post-conquest England some historians 
have used a top-down approach while others have concentrated 
on... ordinary people. What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of these two approaches? (OCR, 2007, p.3) 
In contrast, Edexcel interpret the requirement to focus on 
interpretations through the following assessment objective: 
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Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, how 
aspects of the past have been interpreted and represented in 
different ways. 
(Edexcel, 2007(a), p.10) 
This objective is then assessed principally through questions that 
require candidates to compare... provided source material 
while exploring an issue of historical debate, and to reach 
substantiated judgements in the light of their own knowledge 
and understanding of the issues of interpretation and 
controversy. (Edexcel, 2007(a), p.'7) 
The following exemplifies such questions: 
`Very little was restored, and even less was settled.' 
How far do you agree with this judgement on the Restoration 
Settlement? (Edexcel, 2007(a), p.'7) 
As is apparent here, there are contrasts of approach to 
interpretations post-16, including an approach that focuses on 
interpretation in methodological terms, as a process, and an approach 
that focuses on interpretations as products, or as claims or 'judgments' to 
be tested and assessed.5  
5 The 'product' / 'process' distinction is developed in Stenhouse (1975). The contrast in 
approaches to interpretation is historic and reflects differences in focus associated with 
traditional and 'new history' approaches (Phillips, 1998). Prior to curriculum 
reorganisation in 2000/2001, a number of innovative courses existed at Advanced 
Level focused on developing history students' understanding of history as a discipline, 
including AEB 673, the Cambridge History Project and the London Syllabus E 
(Hibbert, 2006; White, 1995). The OCR Specification B represents a revival of 'new 
history' approaches post-16. 
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This study focuses on understanding interpretation as a process, a 
form of understanding that is arguably presupposed by understanding 
interpretations as products.6 
1.3 The Context for this Study 
This study has taken a considerable time to complete and its 
context has therefore changed significantly. The study's original and 
continuing contexts are identified below. 
When I began this study in the 2001/2002 academic year, I was a 
head of history in a sixth form college and my principal professional 
motivation for developing my understanding of historical interpretations 
was directly tied to that context: I wanted to understand how my students 
thought about historical interpretation so that I could teach them more 
effectively. 
My EdD Institution Focused Study (Chapman, 2001), which 
piloted methods of data collection used in this study, began the process 
of systematic reflection on my students' ideas about historical accounts. 
This thesis aims to develop and refine claims made there about 
"students' conceptions of the nature of historical accounts, and... of 
history per se" (2001, p.8). I have continued to work on aspects of the 
teaching and learning of interpretations since 2005, when I began to 
6 Interpretation is discussed and theorised in Chapter 3 below. 
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work in Initial Teacher Education rather than in 16-19 contexts, and this 
study has continued to have particular relevance to my professional 
concerns and activities as a history educator.7 
Reflecting on the nature and form of historical interpretation is 
not a simple matter and my thinking on these questions has changed 
considerably during the process of analysing the data reported below and 
as a result of thinking involved in that process. Recent literature in the 
philosophy of history on the nature and status of historical knowledge 
claims has been shaped by debates on history and postmodernism.8 
These are not issues that can be addressed, let alone resolved, here and 
they have been explored in existing history education literature 
(Brickley, 2001; Seixas, 2000; Yilmaz, 2007). This study is 'positioned' 
in these debates, however, and it is appropriate to indicate the 
assumptions operative below: this study approaches historical 
interpretation from a constructivist perspective according to which 
history is conceived primarily as a form of knowledge, rather than as a 
form of rhetoric, and according to which historical knowledge claims 
can be rationally and interpersonally constructed and defended on the 
See the 'Dissemination' component of Chapter 2 (at pp.43-45 below). 
8 The literature on postmodernism and history is vast and can only be gestured at here 
(for example, Ankersmit 1994, 2002 and 2005; Ankersmit and Kellner, 1995; Appleby 
et al 1994; Berkhofer, 1995; Callinicos, 1995; Evans, 1997 and 2002; Fay et al (Eds.) 
1998; Fernandez-Armesto, 2002; Furedi, 1991; Ginzburg, 1999; Jenkins, 1991, 1995, 
1997, 1999 and 2003; Jenkins et al (Eds.) 2007; McCullagh, 1998, 2003 and 2004; 
Munslow, 1997; Niethammer, 1992; Novick, 1988; Samuel, 1994 and 1998; White, 
1973, 1978, 1987, 1999 and 2007 and Windschuttle, 2000). 
21 
basis of reasoned explanation of the evidence from the past that remains 
in the present.9 
9 These propositions are developed in Chapter 3 below. Constructivist approaches to 
history are described in Ankersmit, 2005 (at pp.113-117) and developed in 
Collingwood, 1995, Goldstein, 1976 and 1996, Megill, 2007 and Riisen, 2001 and 
2006. 
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Chapter 2. Data Collection and Interpretation 
2.1 General Orientation 
This study is a case study and it has a qualitative orientation and 
an exploratory intention (Cohen and Manion, 1997, pp.106-125; Gibbs, 
2002, pp.1-5). 
The case study structure of the study follows from its origins as 
practitioner research (Robson, 1999, pp.445-463). This study, and my 
Institution Focused Study (IFS) that informs it (Chapman, 2001) focused 
on a key aspect of my practice as a teacher: developing my students' 
understandings of historical interpretation. 
The qualitative orientation of the study follows from its object: 
understanding student thinking involves engaging with rich examples of 
it and the methodology developed in this study involved sustained 
reflection on what students said. 
Developing understanding involves metacognition, however 
(Donovan et al 1999), and a hermeneutic circle. As Megill has put it: 
investigation will be prompted by the traditions, commitments, 
interests, and hopes of the investigator, which... affect what 
the investigator discovers... [and] the process of... research 
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and writing will change... the investigator... (Megill, 2007, 
p.87) 
Making sense of what my students said in reply to questions I 
asked them about historical interpretation raised complex questions 
concerning, for example, their conceptualisation of historical evidence, 
and exploring these questions involved questioning my own 
conceptualisation of this and related aspects of historical 
understanding .1° 
This study is exploratory in the sense that it provides a detailed 
exploration of the ideas that twenty four sixth formers offered when 
asked to explain variation in particular historical accounts and to explain 
historical disagreement in general. The study also theorises historical 
interpretation and the ideas that students need to master in order to make 
informed sense of what historians do. 
I make no claims for the general applicability of the empirical 
findings offered here: my respondents are not representative of 16-19 
history students nationally. However, I hope that the analysis offered 
below is useful as an example of sustained reflection on historical 
learning and the challenges that learning to think about historical 
interpretations present for students. The 'accounts heuristic', sketched in 
Chapter 6, is proposed in that spirit. 
10 Shifts in my thinking about evidence are apparent in contrasts between this text and 
my IFS: Collingwood is referenced once in my IFS (Chapman, 2001, p.43) and then as 
a secondary reference, whereas Collingwood's model of historical evidence is 
fundamental to the reflection that follows below. 
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2.2 Methodological Framework 
This study operates within a qualitative methodological 
framework and closely follows traditions developed in the history 
education research community. 
A number of studies have sought to model student thinking about 
the discipline of history by asking students to complete written tasks and 
interview tasks and then by making inferences from what students have 
said or done to the underlying constructs (Gardner, 2000, pp.253-60) or 
concepts of history that student performance is held to imply (Ashby and 
Lee, 2000). Studies that approach historical thinking in this manner in 
relation to accounts are discussed in Chapter 3 below. Inspiration for 
much of the theorizing below and in my IFS and for the methods of data 
generation developed here was provided by Project CHATA's research 
on accounts (Lee, 1997). 
The inference from performance to underlying conception can be 
theorised in various ways, for example, in critical realist terms (Blaikie, 
1993, pp.58-62; Harre, 2002). In any case, the logic is clear: hypothetical 
entities (students' conceptualisations) are posited to explain real 
phenomena (students' performance)." There are no doubt various ways 
11 A 'discursive' rather than 'cognitive' approach could be taken here (Hand and Gillet, 
1994, pp.18-37) and it is possible to model respondents as simply talking in different 
ways and deploying different linguistic 'tools' (Wertsch, 1998 and 2002) rather than as 
operating on differing conceptual assumptions. The two approaches are likely to be 
extensionally equivalent in pedagogic terms, however, since pedagogic interventions 
that aim to transform student discourse and that aim to transform student conception 
equally involve encouraging students to talk in particular ways (Woodcock, 2005). 
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in which such an strategy can be validated, for example, tacit 
conceptualisations posited to explain performance could be validated if 
they are 'fruitful' in generating new ideas and perspectives or 
`comprehensive' in explaining relevant data in defensible ways (Bevir, 
1999, pp.100-103)). I assume a pragmatic rationale here: the analysis 
that follows below is offered in the intention that it will be useful and 
develop 'conversation' about how to move students on (Rorty, 2000). 
2.3 Methods of Data Generation 
Two methods were used to collect data. The first method was 
piloted and applied in my IFS and then expanded and deployed here 
(Chapman, 2001, pp.11-15). 
(a) All participating students were asked to complete three pencil 
and paper tasks each consisting of a pair of historical 
accounts about the same issue. Students were asked to answer 
the same four open questions in each task. 
(b) Half the participating students were asked a series of 
questions, mirroring the questions in the written tasks but 
focused on disagreement in general, in individual semi-
structured interviews (Robson, 1999, p.231) once they had 
completed the written tasks. 
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All three written tasks presented students with conflicting 
accounts closely based, with one exception, on found texts. Texts were 
adapted so that they were of equal length (around 500 words) and could 
be easily read, compared and commented on by students in around 50 
minutes.12 These tasks are reproduced in Appendix 8.1 (pp.214-231). 
The intention was to present students with different kinds of 
conflict of interpretation in the three tasks. The first task focused on the 
Ranters. Students were presented with a descriptive account of the 
practices of the Ranters, on the one hand, and an argument that the 
Ranters did not exist, on the other.13 The second task focused on the 
Peterloo Massacre. Students were presented with a description of the 
events of Peterloo, focused on the experiences of protestors, in which the 
events were emphatically characterised as a 'massacre' and a description 
of Peterloo that was more broadly focused, that provided a context for 
the events and that clearly judged Peterloo not to be a massacre.14 The 
third task focused on Britain and the Holocaust.15 Students were 
presented with contrasting assessments of the record of the British public 
and government towards Jewish refugees and the Holocaust: the texts 
were consistent in many of their factual claims but drew contrasting 
conclusions, contextualised facts differently and made different 
12 The texts were presented with contextualising introductions and also with the 
authors' names and their titles of their texts: these items were added in response to 
comments about a need for further information by students who completed the IFS 
task. 
13 These accounts were based on Hill (1975) and on the arguments of Davies (1986). 
The account of the latter was created on the basis of a review of Davies' book (Aylmer, 
1987). 
14 These accounts were based on Thompson (1981) and Gash (1979). 
15 This task was re-used, with minor modifications, from my IFS (Chapman, 2001, 
pp.101-105). 
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assumptions about how British actions should be evaluated, the first text, 
for example, foregrounding an imperial context for British decisions.16 
All three account-pairs presented contrasting judgments but only the 
Ranter and Peterloo texts were flatly contradictory and they were flatly 
contradictory in different respects (on an existential and an evaluative 
proposition respectively). The texts differed in a number of other ways: 
for example, whereas the Peterloo texts involved descriptions of a 
discrete event, albeit at different levels of resolution and with different 
foci, the Holocaust texts were talking about an issue rather than an event. 
As well as articulating different claims about the past, the authors of the 
paired accounts in the three tasks conceptualised their topics in differing 
ways and made differing assumptions: how far would respondents show 
awareness of these dimensions of difference when explaining account 
variation? 
Students were asked to answer the same four questions in each 
task. The questions had been deployed successfully in my IFS and were 
re-used in these tasks and are stated in Figure 2.1. 
16 These accounts were based on Ceserani (1998) and on a review of Ceserani's 
arguments by Rubinstein (1999) and were presented as independent assessments of the 
issue. I use the word 'fact' advisedly throughout this thesis: facts are not givens but, as 
it were, `taken' - generally accepted claims that are, in principle, subject to revision 
(see Megill, 2007, p.99). 
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Figure 2.1 Written Task Questions (all tasks) 
(Chapman, 2001, p.14) 
Question One 
How do the two accounts differ? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Question Two 
How is it possible for there to be two such differing accounts of the 
same issue? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Question Three 
Can both accounts be true? 
If they can, in what ways? 
If they cannot, why not? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Question Four 
Is it possible to decide between the two accounts? 
If it is possible, how can this be done? 
If it is not possible, why is it not possible? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
The rationale for these questions is explained fully in my IFS 
(2001, pp.14-15). I will focus on the rationale for the second question 
only because, as is explained further below (pp.35-6), this thesis focuses 
on how students explained account variation, and therefore on Question 
Two only. 
Question Two asked respondents to explain how different 
accounts might come about: the intention was that students should 
develop hypotheses, rather than treat this as a factual question, and 
modal language was used to encourage this (Chapman, 2001, p.15). 
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Most students completed the written tasks individually in quiet 
environments (an office or classroom) and in a free period.17 The tasks 
were completed in the same order at roughly half-termly intervals in the 
second half of the winter term of 2001 and in the spring term of 2002. 
Most students completed each task in between 35-50 minutes. Students' 
answers were transcribed prior to analysis. 
The interview 'task' mirrored the issues raised in the written 
tasks but at a general level, focusing on disagreement not on particular 
texts. The first written question was not asked because there were no 
interview texts. A semi-structured interview method was adopted using 
the protocol reproduced in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 Interview Protocol 
Interview Protocol 
1. Explanations for differences in accounts 
Why do historians disagree? 
2. The implications of differences in accounts 
When two historians disagree, can they both be right? 
3. Adjudicating between accounts  
If you had to choose between two different accounts how might you 
do it? 
Follow up questions. Use summary to develop answers and follow up 
questions like "Could you tell me a little more about that?" Try to 
recap at the end of each question, summarising what has been said, 
and then asking 'Is there anything more you would like to add?' 
"As is noted below (p.43) two students completed the task at home. 
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The intention of the interview was to explore students' ideas in 
depth. Many of the interviews were conversational in nature, particularly 
the second year interviews, and the wording of the protocol frequently 
varied, although the foci remained constant. Follow-up questions and 
prompts were used during the interview in order to encourage the 
development of answers. Challenge was occasionally used also for this 
purpose. Summary was used to clarify students' answers as in the 
following exchange: 
Stop me i f I am getting this wrong. So far it's basically [that] 
your political views may drive you to take an extreme stance? 
yeah.18 
Edward Year 1 
Summary was also used to encourage students to develop or 
extend their answers as in the following example. 
Okay so there are some things that are related to evidence? 
Yes. 
... Or there's the possibility of personal bias? 
Yes. 
Are there any other reasons why people draw different 
conclusions ...? 
Dan Year 1 
18 Throughout this thesis, interviewer questions are denoted by text in italics and 
respondent comments by normal text and elisions made for presentational purposes are 
denoted by 
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The interview strategy is exemplified below in Appendix 8.4 
(pp.266-276) and in Chapter 5 where the data is explored in detail. 
Two additional questions were asked at the end of interviews as a 
result of comments that were offered by the first interviewee: this 
student commented on differences between history and their other 
subjects and also referred to their personal study research project.19 
Interviews were conducted after respondents had completed all 
three written tasks in the first half of the summer term, for second year 
students, and the second half of the summer term, for first year students. 
Interviews lasted 20-40 minutes, depending on the length at which 
respondents answered. Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. 
2.4 Methods of Data Interpretation 
Once all the data had been collected and transcribed the 
interview and written data sets for all questions were analysed using an 
inductive coding strategy associated with grounded theoretic approaches 
to data analysis (Blaikie, 1993; Gibbs, 2002; Strauss and Corbin, 
1998).2°  
19 The personal study question was only asked of Year 2 students who had completed 
this component of their studies. 
20 As is frequently noted, inductive coding is inherently problematic if understood in a 
pure inductivist manner, as seeing without preconceptions (Barton and Levstick, 2008, 
p.153; Chapman, 2001, p.11). Some elements of the data set were analysed using 
NVivo, when it was available to me, and others, including the data reported here, were 
analysed in Word using highlighting and text modification functions to code text. 
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It rapidly became apparent that the data set was too large and 
complex to report adequately in a qualitative manner in a short thesis 
and I decided to focus analysis on student explanations for variation in 
accounts and for historical disagreement: the rationale for this narrowing 
of focus is explained below (pp.35-36). 
2.4. i Data Description: Inductive Coding 
The coding process described below is exemplified in 
Appendices 8.3 and 8.5 and in the analysis of task responses in Chapters 
4 and 5 below. 
Written Data Coding 
The written data set was analysed first and read and coded in 
iterative cycles until a system of codes had been developed that could 
code the entire data set for the explanatory question: thirty four 
descriptive codes were developed. The intention of this coding process 
was to provide minimally theorised, high-resolution re-descriptions of 
ideas that students proposed at a level of generality that would allow 
similar ideas to be identified across responses. 
Once exhaustive low-inference descriptive codes had been 
developed, codes were grouped into broader categories on the basis of 
perceived similarities of content and six broad code categories were 
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developed. An additional 'minor codes' category was created to group 
ideas that appeared in small numbers of responses.21 These seven codes 
were then used to explore patterns in the data set as explained in the 
section that follows. 
A further reduction of complexity in the data was carried out in 
order to identify the relative weight that particular explanatory moves 
had in respondents' answers. All the code categories that were applied to 
each response were coded as having either 'major' or 'minor' 
importance in that response.22 
Interview Data Coding 
The interview data set was analysed using the code categories 
developed in the written data set coding and this proved straightforward 
to do.23  
The interview data set could not be analysed in the same manner 
as the written data, however: as has been explained, interviews involved 
a process of interaction with the interviewer and ideas appearing late in 
interviews do not, therefore, have the same status, as expressions of 
students' default or initial ideas, as ideas appearing early in the 
21 Minor codes are exemplified at pp.253-254 below. 
22 
 This process is exemplified at pp.259-265 below. 
23 A further two minor codes were added as noted at p.282 below. 
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interview.24 Interviews were therefore analysed ordinally and early-
appearing explanations for variation given a higher status when 
characterising respondents' thinking than late-appearing explanations. 
2.4. ii Data Analysis: Ideal Typical Explanatory Moves 
In my IFS I focused on progression, noting differences between 
first and second year responses and positing a progression model on this 
basis (Chapman, 2001, p.68). I elected not to take this approach in this 
study. I was struck more, whilst coding data descriptively, by similarities 
between particular student responses across years than by differences 
between year groups. There were also a priori reasons for not focusing 
on progression: curriculum change meant that the focus on 
historiography across the two years of advanced level study, that had 
been the norm for cohorts of students before 2000/2001, was no longer 
present and a sustained focus on historiography was only present in the 
final module of the second year course, by which point the written data 
tasks had been completed.25  
Instead of focusing on progression, therefore, I decided to focus 
on the possibility that students across the two years were explaining 
24 The notion of a 'default position' has been deployed by Lee (2005(b)) to analyse 
students' historical thinking and developed, for example, by Searle as follows: 
"Default positions are the views we hold prereflectively so that any departure from 
them requires a conscious effort and a convincing argument." (2000: pp.9-20). It is 
possible that the interview process scaffolded movement away from default positions 
for some students (see Chapter 5 below). Stern (2005) explores 'everyday' notions of 
interpretation in depth. 
25 As Stuart (Year 2) commented in his interview, in May 2002, explaining why he had 
not considered historiographic issues in his 'personal study': "You don't really learn 
history like that until now." 
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account variation in a limited number of broadly similar ways. Whereas 
the coding phase of data analysis had been 'inductive' the data 
interpretation phase posited a theory, grounded in perceptions of the data 
emerging during the coding phase, and set out to test the theory against 
the data. 
I posited a number of 'ideal types' of response to the task of 
explaining variations in accounts based on the six data codes generated 
in the descriptive data coding, and developed a schema to enable the 
development and grounding of an ideal typical model of 'explanatory 
moves'. This schema is explained below in hypothetical terms and is 
developed in detail, using the descriptive code categories in Chapter 4. 
As has been noted, descriptive coding yielded 6 main code 
categories and code categories were coded in terms of their 'major' and 
`minor' importance in respondents' answers. It was apparent from 
inspection of the data set that there were positive and negative patterns 
in the data, or patterns of presence and absence: many respondents made 
major reference to explanatory moves coded under one category, minor 
reference to moves coded under other categories and no reference to 
moves coded under still other categories. The schema (Figure 2.3) aimed 
to accommodate and to explore such patterns. 
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Figure 2.3 Schema of relationships of presence and absence 
-4 -3 -2 -1 
+1 
A B 
+2 
D E -C 
+3 
-E -B 
+4 
-D -A 
Positive numbers and the rows represent 'presence' in this 
schema and negative numbers and columns represent 'absence'. A 
respondent's explanations can be mapped onto this figure provided that 
we can identify explanatory moves that they make that are of major and 
minor importance and moves that they do not make. For example, if 
explanation '-F4' was the only explanatory move of major importance in 
a respondent's answers to questions then they would map onto the figure 
in cells '-F', `-D' and '-A'; or, to take a more complex example, if 
explanation '-F1' were of major importance in a respondent's 
explanations and if they made minor reference to all other ideas apart 
from '+4' then they would map onto the figure in cell 'A'. 
A number of relationships between respondents and in a data set 
can become apparent through this schema. Cells shaded in the same 
colour are directly contrary: a fact that allows respondents who make 
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opposite explanatory moves to be identified. It is apparent from the 
diagram also that cells above the black diagonal are contrary to 
corresponding cells below the diagonal, allowing a broad pattern of 
contrast to be identified between respondents who appear above and 
below this line.26 
The schema allows ideal types of response to explanatory 
questions to be postulated and then tested against real data so that the 
value of these response types can be assessed. These ideal types are 
posited for heuristic purposes only: they are not proposed as 
comprehensive descriptions of real data but rather as tools that enable 
data to be modelled. An ideal type has value, in this context, if it enables 
pedagogic reflection on how students approach account variation and on 
ways in which student thinking might be developed.27 Chapters 4 and 5 
develop an analysis of my respondents' explanations for account 
variation using this schema and assess and explore the pedagogic 
insights into student thinking that this kind of analysis yields. 
26 'Contrary' is used loosely here rather than in its strict logical sense (Copi and Cohen, 
1998, pp.226-237). 
27 Ideal typical analysis is discussed by Blaikie (1993, pp.178-9), Ringer (1997) and 
Parsons (1964, pp.13-28). 
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2.5 Institutional Context and Ethical Considerations 
2.5.a Participants 
Figure 2.4 summarises the respondents who took part in this 
study. The process of recruiting students to the study is discussed under 
ethical considerations below (pp.42-43). 
The data set for this study consists of task responses from 
twenty-four respondents, half of whom were first and half of whom were 
second year advanced level students attending the same institution. As 
Figure 2.4 shows, the respondents were following two courses based on 
the same exam specification.28 None of the students had directly studied 
any of the topics examined in the tasks as part of their course. 
It is apparent from the tables that more than twenty four students 
were recruited. Participants were volunteers and all those who 
volunteered were welcome to take part. Two first year students dropped 
out over the course of the project, however, and one second year 
interview was inaudible. Only data from students who completed all 
three written tasks was included in analysis, since the intention was to 
analyse students' responses across three tasks. 
Over two thirds of the history students in the institution were 
female and, although there were more girls in the written data sample, it 
28 The courses had different content but the same assessment structure. 
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is apparent that girls were under-represented there and much more so in 
the interview sample. One of the two courses (Course A) was slightly 
over-represented in the interview sample (one third of the history 
students in the institution were following this course). The students came 
from across the ability-range, however, high achieving students were 
markedly over-represented in the sample. 
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Figure 2.4 Respondents (By year and Course) 
Course A 
Year Gender Ranter Task Peterloo 
Task 
Holocaust 
Task 
Interview 
2 F 3 3 3 1 
1 F 4 4 4 0 
2 M 0 0 0 0 
1 M 2 2 2 2 
Total 9 9 9 3 
Course B 
Year Gender Ranter Task Peterloo 
Task 
Holocaust 
Task 
Interview 
2 F 4 4 4 2 
1 F 4 3 3 2 
2 M 5 5 5 4 
1 M 4 4 3 2 
Total 17 16 15 10 
All Respondents 
Year Gender Ranter Task Peterloo 
Task 
Holocaust 
Task 
Interview 
2 F 7 7 7 3 
1 F 8 7 7 2 
2 M 5 5 5 4 
1 M 6 6 5 4 
All F 15 14 14 5 
All M 11 11 10 8 
Total 26 25 24 13 
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2.5.b The Institution 
The institution in which data collection for this study took place 
was a co-educational high achieving state sixth form college in Surrey. I 
had worked in the institution since September 1993 and I had been Head 
of the History Department since 1996. 
There was a strong 'new history' tradition in the department and, 
prior to the 2000/2001 curriculum changes, historiography had been a 
key part of all our courses, however, in 2001/2002 we were running 
courses in which historiography featured principally in the final unit of 
the second year course only. All students completed a personal study in 
the second year of their courses and second year students, therefore, had 
experience of sustained historical enquiry. 
2.5.c Ethical Considerations 
My institution was philosophically, practically and financially 
supportive of my EdD studies. Access had been negotiated at the IFS 
stage of my studies and this was continued on the condition that findings 
were disseminated within the institution and that consent was sought 
prior to the publication of findings. 
Students were recruited to the study from classes that I taught, 
and informed consent was gained, through announcements in class 
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calling for volunteers and through the use of an information sheet in 
November 2001 and also, through requests for volunteers from within 
the group of students who had completed the written tasks at the 
beginning of the interview phase in the summer. 
All participants were volunteers and I made it clear that 
participation in the research was both voluntary and confidential in the 
sense that findings would be anonymised.29 I also made it clear that 
participants could withdraw at any time. One first year student chose to 
withdraw having completed the first written task and another withdrew 
from college for personal reasons. The timing of the research tasks 
reflected my responsibility to prioritise student interests: tasks were not 
set at times when key academic deadlines or examinations were pending. 
Interviews were conducted in quiet environments where students could 
speak freely without the interruption or scrutiny of other students. All 
tasks took place at times convenient to students and, in two cases, 
students completed written tasks at home. 
2.5 Dissemination 
Direct dissemination of the outcomes of this thesis through 
publication will depend on institutional approval and in the first instance 
dissemination will be directly.to the institution. 
29 All student names in this report are pseudonyms. 
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I have disseminated emergent theoretical and pedagogic aspects 
of this thesis in a number of ways. 
Two articles in the professional journal Teaching History 
(Chapman 2003 and 2006(a)) have disseminated teaching strategies 
developed through the processes of reading, reflection and data analysis 
that this thesis has involved and one article, written in collaboration with 
a colleague from the institution in which this study originated, has 
disseminated understandings of historical consciousness developed 
through this study (Chapman and Facey, 2004). I have also contributed 
short feature articles directly addressing interpretations issues that 
disseminate pedagogic approaches grounded in my theoretical work 
(Chapman, 2007 and 2008). 
My interest in developing student thinking about interpretations 
also runs parallel with an interest in developing online discussion in 
history and I have recently published a book chapter, partly based on 
collaborative work with a colleague from the institution in which this 
study originated (Chapman and Facey, 2009), that focuses on developing 
understandings of interpretation and that drew on insights developed 
here (Chapman and Hibbert, 2009). In 2007/8 and 2008/9 I developed 
these approaches further through work supported by a Higher Education 
Academy Teaching Development Grant that made direct use of 
instruments developed for this thesis to develop online interaction 
between advanced level students and academic historians (Chapman, 
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2009(c)). This project has allowed pedagogic approaches based on the 
thinking reported below to be developed and these are illustrated in 
Chapter 6 below. 
I have also disseminated approaches to interpretations 
pedagogy, through presentations and workshops at a number of 
conferences and events,3° and contributed to relevant discussions in 
policy contexts,31 drawing on understandings developed through this 
research process. 
I aim to disseminate this research further through continuing 
work on discussion boarding in history and, in due course, through the 
on-line publication of this thesis and through articles based on it in 
professional journals. 
30 Through workshops on 'Challenging Interpretations' at the Historical Association 
Conference for teachers in March 2007, at the Schools History Project conference in 
July 2007 and also through in-service training on this and other aspects of conceptual 
learning for North Tyneside District Council in November 2007 and January 2008. 
31 As Convenor of the National Academy for Gifted and Talented Youth's History 
Working Group in 2005-2007 (Chapman, 2006(b)) and in consultancy for the 
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority on revisions to the National Curriculum 
Attainment Target for History (in April 2007) and on developing Assessing Pupil 
Progress frameworks in history (in July, September and November 2008). 
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Chapter 3. Understanding Historical Accounts: 
Theoretical and Research Contexts 
3.1 The Historicity and Identity of the Past 
Central to an historical understanding of the past is an awareness 
of its historicity, which entails understanding a number of propositions 
about the past and the present.32 
Firstly, an historical understanding of the past entails the 
understanding that, at least where matters concerning culture and 
meaning are concerned, the past and the present are distinct and 
different: things that are in the present, or that were in the past, exist, or 
existed, contingently and therefore variably rather than necessarily and 
universally. 33  
Secondly, an historical understanding of the past entails 
awareness of the fact that the past exists (in so far as it can be 
understood as existing at all) only in the present and in the form of: 
32 I am using the term 'historical' normatively to denote a particular mode of 
understanding of the past, opposed, for example, to traditional understandings (Riisen, 
2005). 
33 This point is well captured in L.P.Hartley's observation that "The past is a foreign 
country" (cited in Lowenthal, 1996 at p.2006). The cultural restriction of this 
observation acknowledges the possibility of anthropological universals (Mithen, 2008). 
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1. often highly exiguous and contingent relics and reports 
from the past; 34 and 
2. contemporary constructions of the past shaped by present 
concerns and purposes. 
Two further understandings follow: an understanding that 
accounts of the past are inherently plural and an understanding of how 
the past can and cannot be known. 
Constructions of the past are never fixed and change continually 
as the present changes and are a product of interaction between present 
conceptions and concerns, which are contingent rather than necessary 
and therefore inherently variable, and relics and reports. 
Since the real past does not exist, knowledge of the past is 
inevitably knowledge of an absent and inexperiencable object 
(Collingwood, 1994; Goldstein, 1976 and 1996). Historical knowledge is 
structurally aporetic and not autopic: there is no experiential bridge (or 
`poros') back to the past and autopsy (or 'seeing for yourself) is not 
possible (Mukherjee, 2007, pp.98-99 and 117).35 Historians aim to make 
34 Relics and 'reports' (Bevir, 1999, pp.31-32; Shemilt, 1987) or 'sources' and 
`traces' (Megill, 2007, p.25) refer to surviving fragments of the past "not made with the 
intention of revealing the past to us" and fragments "intended... to stand as an account 
of events" respectively (Megill, 2007, p.25). The distinction overlaps, but is not 
equivalent to, the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' sources (Burrow, 
2007, p.463). 
35 
 Hopkins (1999) uses the conceit of time travel to demonstrate "the limitations of 
autopsy": even if it were possible to `go back' one could only witness the witnessable 
and, in any case, one would do so anachronistically (p.43). Lowenthal (1996) makes 
the latter point in relation to contemporary attempts to reconstruct the past 
`authentically' (p.210). 
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claims about the past but, perforce, they must do so indirectly and 
inferentially by constructing claims and creating models that 'explain 
the evidence' that remains in the present (Goldstein, 1976 and 1996).36 
An historical representation of the past is always a 'shaky inferential 
construction' (Megill, 2007, p.13) therefore and never a representation 
of experiential knowledge by acquaintance.37 As a result, historical 
knowledge is "counter-intuitive" and constructed in ways that conflict 
with everyday epistemological assumptions or "default positions" (Lee, 
2005(b)). Even if it were possible to experience the past directly, 
experiential modes of knowing would not help us: history is replete, and 
inconceivable without, a host of entities (from the Neolithic Revolution 
to '9/11') that we posit to make sense of the past but that were beyond 
the experience of contemporaries as such (Barca, 2002; Lee and 
Howson, 2006).38 
An historical understanding of the past also entails an awareness 
of the necessary role that constructing the past plays in all human 
projects and an awareness that all histories are human documents. To be 
human involves living in time, and all living in time, apart, perhaps, 
from in the immediate moment, entails narrative consciousness of 
36 As both Bevir and Goldstein argue, it is possible to evaluate the respective merits of 
competing historical accounts in terms of the degree to which they succeed in 
explaining the evidence (Bevir, 1999; Goldstein, 1976 and 1996). 
37 Knowledge-claims constructed indirectly and inferentially are not unique to history: 
as Hand shows, many forms of knowledge involve claims about entities that are 
posited to explain evidence that we can experience but that are themselves 
inexperiencable: "molecules and their behaviour are works of the human imagination, 
representing, one hopes, real productive processes" (Hari* 2002, p.2). 
38 Such entities are only conceivable after the fact (Danto, 1985) and many are 
inexperiencable as such - a point well made in Tolstoy's representations of battle in 
War and Peace (White, 2007). 
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past/present/future.39 Constructing the past is, therefore, a highly 
`serious business' and personally, collectively and inter-collectively 
consequential and contestable and there are as many pasts as there are 
present identity projects (Friese (Ed.) 2002; Lowenthal, 1998). 
No historical understandings are easily bought and an awareness 
of historicity is difficult for adults to achieve as much as it is for history 
students (Wineburg, 2001 and 2007).4° Research into student thinking 
about history suggests that students often have preconceptions about the 
historical past or about how it is possible to know it, grounded in 
everyday experiential epistemologies, that impede historical 
understanding and that need to be challenged if understanding is to be 
progressed.41  
As Lowenthal notes (2000, p.66), `presentism' is an important 
barrier to historical understanding and consists, in essence, in eliding the 
difference between past and present. Presentism takes many forms, 
including a disposition to use the present as a yardstick to evaluate the 
past in terms of our "politically correct shibboleths" (Wineburg, 2007, 
p.8) and a tendency to confuse current conventions with authenticity in 
representation (Seixas, 1993). 
39 Kosellek, 2004; Ricoeur, 1984, 1985, 1988, 2004 and 2005; Rtisen, 2001 and 2005. 
40 Awareness of historicity itself is a contingent historical development associated with 
nineteenth century European historicism (Iggers, 1997; Rossi, 2001). The extent to 
which it has a universal cultural application or is an expression "of the development of 
occidental cultures and societies" (Kolbl and Straub, 2001) is much debated (Guha, 
2003; Lal, 2003; RiIsen, 2001; Rilsen (Ed.) 2000). 
41 The importance of engaging with learners' preconceptions is well understood 
(Donovan et al (Eds.) 1999 and Gardner, 2000, pp.253-60) and an approach to 
historical learning that builds on understanding preconceptions is developed in, for 
example, Lee (2005(a)). 
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Two forms of presentism as continuity thinking are foregrounded 
in the literature: a positive form, in which past and present are thought 
of as essentially identical (Rtisen, 2005, pp.11-12 and 28-30) and in 
which the past becomes normative and a model for the present/future 
(Barton and Levstick, 2004, pp.54-65; Seixas, 2005, p.145);42 and a 
negative form, or "deficit" model of the past (Lee, 2005(a), p.45), in 
which people in the past who did not act as 'we' do are assumed to be 
essentially like us but lacking in resource or intelligence (Barton and 
Levstick, 2004, pp.212-213). 
More consequential than presentism for understanding student 
thinking about historical accounts is the suggestion that students treat the 
meaning of the past as "fixed" (Lee, 1997; Lee, 2005(a), p.59-62; Lee 
and Shemilt, 2003 and 2004). Nothing is ever fixed 'in the end' and all 
meanings, as matters of convention, are inherently contingent. In 
addition, even elementary facts are "meaningless unless... situated 
within larger frameworks" that give them "meaning" and these 
"frameworks are partially rooted in... the historian's present" (Megill, 
2007, p.27) which continually changes. Furthermore, many apparently 
simple descriptions are in fact evaluations and relative to evaluative 
frameworks: 
42 This form of thinking is as much as an adult educational strategy as a form of student 
thinking (Barton and Levstick, 2004, pp.58-59) and Seixas and Clark found no 
examples of 'traditional' thinking in their study of Canadian students historical 
consciousness (2004), however, Kitson and McCully (2006, p.32) and Barton and 
Levstick (2004, p.51-4) report examples that demonstrate identity thinking in which 
students use "we" and other linguistic markers to asserting past/present continuity. 
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[in] the historiographic context, facts are... conditioned by 
judgement... whether Louis XVI was murdered, executed, or 
even punished is a historical question; but the "fact" that a 
guillotine of a given weight separated his head from his body 
is not. (Koselleck, 2004, p.149) 
Without frameworks, concepts, criteria of meaning, and so on, 
there can be no history and all histories are, therefore, to be understood 
relative to the frameworks operative in their construction. 
As Lee and Shemilt argue, the notion that the past has fixed 
meaning is an example of an assumption that makes sense in everyday 
contexts, where frameworks are often givens: such assumptions are 
potential barriers to historical learning, however, and need to be 
anticipated and addressed. 
A window is broken or clothes are torn, so mum wants to 
know what happened. The question for the, child (and mum 
too) is simply whether or not she tells it like it was. From the 
child's point of view the past is known: it is given and fixed. 
Because mother and child are working with shared 
assumptions about what matters in the past, the past can 
become a touchstone for telling the truth; once it has 
happened, it cannot be changed, and there can only be one true 
account of it. (Lee and Shemilt, 2003, p.14) 
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3.2 Information, Inference and Evidence 
3.2.i Historical Evidence 
There can be no accounts without interpreters to construct them 
and there are many ways of making sense of relics and reports within 
and outside disciplinary history: "the same sources and the same set of 
events" therefore "lend themselves to a variety of interpretations" 
(Iggers, 2001, p.6776).43  
What is distinctive about disciplinary history's mode of 
approaching the archive? The answer to this question is relatively 
simple, as historians, unlike, say, geomorphologists, cannot point to a 
specific corpus of methods or concepts that define their practice and, 
given the fact that history, like other human sciences, has been subject to 
extensive "methodological differentiation" and "fragmentation" since 
the 1960s (Lorenz, 2001, p.6872): any definition of historical practice 
has, therefore, to be broad (Burke (Ed.) 2001; Cannadine, (Ed.) 2002; 
Fulbrook, 2002)." 
43 Even the identity of archival sources is relative to how they are interrogated (Lee and 
Shemilt, 2004, p.20). As Austin argued, speech is a way of 'doing things with words' 
and a speech 'act' may be considered as performing a number of discrete actions 
simultaneously — as doing something in saying what its says, by saying it, through 
saying it, and so on (Austin 1975; Thompson, 1981, pp.18-21): reading a report as a 
report therefore, depends upon a decision to treat it literally (in terms of what is 
reported in the act of reporting). 
" Arguably, also, there is little to differentiate historical practice from social science in 
general other than an almost exclusive concern with past objects: "all survivals of a 
`conserved past' have to be interpreted regardless of whether they are pots or texts, 
and... this task of recovering the past is conceptually and methodologically 
indistinguishable from mediating the frames of meaning found in coexisting cultures" 
(Giddens, 1984, p.35'7). 
52 
Disciplinary history asks questions (Levesque, 2008, p.117; 
Ricoeur, 2004, p.117) about the meanings of materials surviving from 
the past, which is, by definition, absent (Jenkins, 1991, p.6-9) and 
constructs accounts in answer to these questions.45  
History is... a problem-solving discipline. A historian is 
someone... who asks an open-ended question about past 
events and answers it with selected facts which are arranged in 
the form of an explanatory paradigm... The resultant 
explanatory paradigm may take many different forms: a 
statistical generalisation, or a narrative, or a causal model, or a 
motivational model, or a collectivised group-composition 
model, or maybe an analogy. Most commonly it consists not in 
any one of these components but in a combination of them. 
Always it is articulated in the form of a reasoned argument. 
(Fisher, 1970, p.xv) 
There is no limit to the questions that an historian might ask, 
which is, of course, one reason why what can be said about the past is 
inherently variable. There are, however, unanswerable questions: 
questions need to be delimited and the "impossible object is a quest for 
the whole truth" (Fisher, 1970, p.5); and archives set limits to the 
questions that can be answered.46 
There are no limits to the forms that historians' answers might 
take either, although historical answers have necessary features: 
45 
 As Lorenz notes, the relative importance accorded to interrogation and to 
composition has varied over time (Lorenz, 2001, p.6871 and p.6875). Innovative 
approaches to historical representation are discussed in Ferguson (2006), Fogu (2009), 
Harlan, (2007), Hopkins (1999), Kansteiner (2009) and Rejack (2007). 
46 Even if one compiled 'everything' about 'everything' one would be very far from 
knowing everything about it: the consequences of the past continue to unfold in the 
present and the future changes the meaning of the past (Danto, 1985). Kennedy 
provides a useful discussion of ways in which the archive delimits questions that can be 
asked (2007, pp.12-30). 
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accounts become historical, in the disciplinary sense, precisely by being 
structured around an 'infrastructure' of citation and argument, running 
alongside and supporting a 'superstructure' of substantive claims and 
narration (Goldstein, 1976, pp.140-143; Grafton, 2003, pp.231-233). As 
Evans observes: 
You have to be prepared to back all your ideas, and also you 
have to provide other historians with the means of disproving 
what you say. You have to have footnotes, which will allow 
your critics to... check out what you are saying, and say, 'Look 
this is not a legitimate interpretation'. (Richard J. Evans 
quoted in Kustow, 2000, p.28) 
It is history's infrastructure that makes history a discipline and 
that enables objectivity: it is perfectly possible, and indeed the norm in a 
diverse historical community of practice, to combine adherence to 'a 
broader historical framework, purpose and theory' (Leinhardt and 
Young, 1996, p.441) with a commitment to procedural objectivity 
(Fulbrook, 2002) and, as Bevir has argued, it is possible to specify 
norms of practice in the form of 'rules of thumb' that are procedural and 
formal rather than substantive and which can, therefore, be equally 
applicable to approaches with different substantive or paradigmatic 
commitments (Bevir, 1999, pp .100-103).47  
47 The extent to which a community of practice actually enables or constrains diversity 
and debate is, of course, open to debate (Jenkins, 1991, pp.24-31; Daddow, 2004). 
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Disciplinary historical practice has traditionally been conceived 
as a method, originating in nineteenth century philology (Evans, 1997). 
Lorenz summarises this historical method as consisting of: 
(a) ...techniques... to locate... relevant sources; 
(b) source criticism... by which the temporal and spatial 
origins of ... sources are established as well as their 
authenticity; and 
(c) interpretation, by which... information... from... sources 
is put together. (Lorenz, 2001, p.6871)48  
Studies of professional historians' readings of documents 
confirm the centrality of particular practices of reading to disciplinary 
historical thinking, and, in many respects, mirror this model (Wineburg 
1991, 1994, 2001, 2005 and 2007 and Leinhardt and Young, 1996). 
Wineburg and Leinhardt and Young confirm the importance of active 
questioning and particular heuristics or schema of contextualisation, 
sourcing, corroboration and classification to historians' reading 
strategies (Leinhardt and Young, 1996, p.447; van Drie and van Boxtel, 
2008, pp.92-5) and characterise historical reading as a iterative, 
recursive and intertextual process through which historians read and re- 
48 Source criticism, as Lorenz also notes, is further distinguished into "internal" and 
"external" criticism — the former focusing on features of the text itself and the latter 
focused on relationships between the text in question and other materials (Lorenz, 
2001, p.6871). There is more to be said than can be said here about this model of 
historical method (Iggers, 1997; Evans 1997). Von Ranke's conception of historical 
method also required comprehensiveness in reference to relevant documents and 
objectivity, for example. These requirements are complex and problematic in many 
ways (Novick, 1988) but can be coherently stated in post-positivist terms (Bevir, 1999). 
This characterisation of 'method' also says little about composition, which White 
(1973) argues involves processes such as 'prefiguration' and `emplotment'. 
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read documents, making interconnections between them, positing and 
revising meanings and contexts, and so on (Leinhardt and Young, 1996, 
p.445; Wineburg, 1991, pp.509-10). This process of recursive interaction 
between text and preconception instantiates the "hermeneutic circle" 
(Bernstein, 1983, pp.131-9; Megill, 2007, pp.86-88) central to the 
construction of meaning (Ricoeur, 2004; Stanford, 1986 and 1998). 
As Wineburg notes, historical reading is typically far removed 
from literal reading and aims to construct meanings that archival texts 
were often not designed to convey. Wineburg describes this reading as 
reading for "subtext" and as taking two forms (1991, p.498): reading for 
the rhetoric of the text or, in other words, reading texts as acts that 
sought to impact their past context of utterance, and reading texts as 
human documents, or as evidence of assumptions and beliefs that texts 
express but that may have been "unknown unknowns" to their authors.49 
In historical readings, 'What is going on?' is more important than 'What 
is happening?' and the literal is secondary to the inferentia1.50 Historical 
reading entails active questioning, creative thinking, model-building and 
knowledge construction. 
49 'Unknown unknowns' are discussed in BBC News Magazine (2007). 
5° The distinction between 'what happened' and 'what was going on' is Shemilt's and 
is adapted to a new context here (Shemilt, 2000, p.95; Kelly, 2004, p.3). 
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Collingwood drew a contrast between what he called "scientific 
history"51 and two further variants of history, when modelling the 
development of the discipline of history over time. Figure 3.1 
summarises Collingwood's analysis. 
Figure 3.1 Collingwood's Typology of Forms of History 
(Based on Collingwood 1994, pp.249-282) 
Type of history Raw materials Processes 
1. Scissors-and- 
paste history 
Reports 
The content of past 
reports consisting of 
statements about the 
past. 
Literal reading of past 
reports. 
Selection and 
combination / 
presentation of the 
content of past reports in 
accounts. 
2. Critical 
history 
As above and inferred 
propositions about the 
credibility of the 
authors of past reports. 
As above except that 
some content is excluded 
on the grounds that the 
reports in which it 
originates are not 
`credible'. 
3. Scientific 
history 
Relics from the past - 
e.g. archaeological 
remains. 
Reports The existence 
of past reports is data 
as much as the content 
of the reports (i.e. 
testimony is no longer 
privileged). 
Formulating questions 
about the past 
Reading reports and relics 
inferentially, as well as 
literally, in relation to 
questions. 
Constructing arguments 
using these materials in 
order to answer questions 
in accounts. 
Collingwood's model reprises and anticipates many of the 
considerations discussed above. It is also mirrored in research studies of 
51 Collingwood understands 'science' in the German sense here and expresses a 
commitment to "Wissenschaft" rather than to positivism (Evans, 1997, pp.73-74). 
57 
progression in student thinking and is worth exploring in full. For 
Collingwood, questions define historical practice.52 Historians resolve 
problems that they set themselves and these questions are never 
primarily about literal meaning. 
Confronted with a ready-made statement... the scientific 
historian never asks himself: 'Is this statement true or false?', 
in other words 'Shall I incorporate it in my history of that 
subject or not?' The question he asks himself is: 'What does 
this statement mean?' And this is not equivalent to the 
question 'What did the person who made it mean by it?' ... It is 
equivalent, rather, to the question 'What light is thrown on the 
subject in which I am interested by the fact that this person 
made this statement, meaning by it what he did mean?' This 
might be expressed by saying that the scientific historian does 
not treat statements as statements but as evidence. 
(Collingwood, 1994, p.275) 
3.2.ii Progression in the Understanding of Historical Evidence 
There is substantial evidence, from small and large scale research 
studies in a number of countries, suggesting that students in both 
primary and secondary stages of education can learn to think historically 
and inferentially about the past and also, crucially, that students often 
have misconceptions about historical knowing that can impede the 
development of historical understanding.53  
52 
 In Collingwood's "logic of question and answer" (Collingwood, 1939, pp.29-43; 
Gadamer, 2004, pp.363-371; Harris, 2005, pp.220-222) the "meaning" and the "truth" 
of a proposition "must be relative to the question it answers" (Collingwood, 1939, 
p.33). 
53 Ashby, 2005(a) and 2005(b); Barca, 2002; Barton, 2001 and 2008; Boix Mansilla, 
2001 and 2005; Kolbl and Straub, 2001; Lee, 2005(a) and 2005(b); Lee and Shemilt, 
2003 and 2004; Limon, 2002; Shemilt, 1980 and 1987; van Drie and van Boxtel, 2008; 
VanSledright and Frankes, 2000 exemplify or discuss this research. 
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Lee and Shemilt propose a progression model of the 
development of student thinking about historical evidence that draws on 
a substantial research base and in particular, findings from the Schools 
Council History Project (SCHP) evaluation study (Shemilt, 1980) and 
the Concepts of History and Teaching Approaches research project 
(Project CHATA). This model is outlined in Figure 3.2 below.54 
Figure 3.2 Progression in ideas about evidence: outline 
(Based on Lee and Shemilt, 2003, p. 114)55  
1 Pictures of the past 
2 Information 
3 Testimony 
4 Scissors and Paste 
5 Evidence in isolation 
6 Evidence in context 
Underlying this progression model are two important oppositions 
that the literature confirms are key in the development of historical 
understanding and that mark a shift from everyday experiential notions 
of knowing to historical notions of knowing: the opposition between 
experiential and inferential knowledge and the opposition between 
54 Data collection for SCHP evaluation took place in 1973-76 (Shemilt, 1980, p.10). 
During the interview phase, 167 15-year-old students were interviewed to explore their 
conceptions of historical method. Half the interviewees were and half were not project 
students (Shemilt, 1987, p.40). Project CHATA was funded by the ESRC and ran 
between 1991-1996 and focused on 7-14 year old students' metahistorical or second 
order ideas (for example about evidence, cause and accounts). A sample of 320 
students across the age range completed a series of three pencil and paper tests focused 
on explanation and enquiry involving paired stories differing in theme, tone and time 
scale and 122 students were interviewed (Lee, 1997, pp. 25-6). 
55 The model is reproduced in full in Appendix 8.6 (p.285). 
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information and evidence (Lee, 2001). As Lee and Shemilt note in their 
discussion (2003, pp.19-20), progression involves conceptual shifts. 
Firstly, from Information to Testimony: as far as the first two levels in 
the model are concerned history is about information. The second shift, 
between the fourth and the fifth levels, marks a transition from 
testimonial to evidential conceptions of historical sources. As far as level 
3 and 4 thinkers are concerned, historians collate 'truths' and at level 4 
these 'truths' are 'credible' claims excerpted from testimony whereas at 
level 3 the 'truths' are 'credible' testimonies themselves. In neither case 
do historians generate their own propositions, other than about 
credibility. The third shift occurs at the last two levels. Here history 
becomes creative: rather than generating claims by copying and collating 
elements of the archive, historians are understood as constructing their 
own claims by interrogating archives and drawing inferences and 
conclusions. Before level 5 students model historians as depicting the 
past in story-like collages of pre-existing truths and after it histories 
become more like theories than stories and theories that propose 
solutions to delimited problems that historians pose (Lee and Shemilt, 
2004, p.2'7). 
A wide range of studies confirms the dependence of student 
thinking on the ideas that this model proposes. As Kolbl and Straub put 
it, in their discussion group study of 13-14 year old German students' 
historical consciousness, "the topos 'to-see-something-with-one's-own-
eyes' is crucial for many students (2001) and Barca, reporting parallel 
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Portuguese studies of samples of 11-19 year old school students and of 
student teachers, suggests that this 'direct observation paradigm' 
(Atkinson, 1978 cited in Barca, 2002) underlies many history novices' 
conceptualisations of historical accounts: when asked to chose the best 
author to give an account of a past situation the school students 
expressed a clear preference for witnesses or agents whereas the trainee 
teachers, with greater exposure to historical study, expressed a clear 
preference for recent authors, indicating an understanding of the 
`mediated' nature of historical knowledge (Barca, 2002). Barton's 
interview and observation based study of American elementary school 
students' understandings showed that these students overwhelmingly 
modelled history as based on handed down experience and transcriptions 
of experiential knowledge (2008, pp.211-213), a form of thinking also 
apparent in the SCHP data (Shemilt, 1987, p.42). Boix Mansilla's study 
of sixteen exceptional 14-17 year old American students' ideas about 
standards of acceptability in history (Boix Mansilla, 2001 and 2005) 
provides further support for the proposition that many students think of 
historians as simply transcribing credible claims found in the archive 
(Boix Mansilla, 2005, p.106). 
The examples that follow exemplify the kinds of ideas that 
students operating at the higher end of the progression model deploy. 
The following response is from a CHATA interview with a 13- 
14 year old student. 
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Is there anything you have to be careful about when you're 
using sources to find out what's happened? 
You have to think about how reliable they're going to be... 
either if they're a long time after the event... there's going to 
be more passed on either by reading something or having a 
story told to you, which if its told you it's less likely to be 
accurate... and also if it's a particularly biased piece of 
evidence [we] might have to look at it and compare it to 
another piece of evidence, and it might not be much good on 
its own to get information, just opinion—it would only be 
good if you wanted an opinion of how people saw the event. 
Right. 
So you have to look at what context you're looking at the 
evidence in and what you want to find out from it. (Lee, 2005, 
p.56-57) 
As Lee notes, this student demonstrates three forms of 
sophistication: awareness of the need to ask questions of sources and 
that the value of a source is question-relative and "signs of recognising 
that we can ask questions... that... sources... were not meant to answer" 
(Lee, 2005, p.57). 
Shemilt cites the following as an example that may be 
understood, with due caution, as instantiating a highly sophisticated 
approach to evidence (Shemilt, 1987, p.57). 
How would you by to find out what those motivations were?... 
I'd think about the realistic possibilities – for example, for an 
invasion there's differences in ideas, natural resources... 
land... 
How would you come to a decision when you seem to have a 
lot of 'realistic possibilities'? 
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I'd study the backgrounds of the countries and you'd trace 
over previous disputes and find out what they were in need 
of... (Shemilt, 1987, p.57) 
It looks as if this student models historians as creating claims by 
asking questions rather than as transcribing testimonial 'truths' and it 
looks as if they model historians as interrogating claims (rather than 
witnesses) and developing situation models that enable questions to be 
answered (Wineburg, 1994, pp.88-9). 
Boix Mansilla (2005) provides a number of examples, such as 
the following, of students modelling historians as thinking evidentially 
rather than informatically or testimonially. 
Another good example is the American Revolution. Here you 
had these... mobs who were looting... And it appears that 
there is an implicit group... who were instigating the 
revolution... they do not come up but they seem to be there 
because there were... bonfires and drinking parties... that were 
sponsored by somebody... So then you have to look for them. 
You start identifying groups. (2005, p.107). 
This student clearly models historical knowing as the active 
and inferential process that Leinhardt and Young and Wineburg 
describe: enigmatic 'facts' (bonfires, looting) lead to hypothesis (the 
"implicit group") and to purposive questioning. 
Qualifications are necessary and some studies report ambivalent 
findings (VanSledright and Frankes 2000), nevertheless, it seems clear 
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that curriculum and pedagogy can make a difference to student 
understandings of evidence. Shemilt reported "dramatic" differences 
between SCHP and non-SCHP students' conceptions of "how historical 
knowledge is based and founded" (1980, pp.36-7 and 39), Boix Mansilla 
found "a strong association" between students' epistemological 'stances' 
and their backgrounds in science and in history respectively (2005, 
pp.112-3) and Barton (2001) reports dramatic differences in the models 
of historical evidence held by American and Northern Irish elementary 
school students observing that 
settings in the US tend to constrict children's understanding of 
historical sources and their use as evidence, while in Northern 
Ireland they help to expand that understanding. (Barton, 2001) 
64 
3.3 Understanding Historical Accounts 
3.3.i. Types of Claim and Types of Account 
As a number of authors have argued, disciplined historical 
discourse is a matter of making, sustaining and challenging claims about 
the past (Coffin, 2006 and 2007; Grafton, 2003; Megill, 2007): 
understanding the value of historical source material entails 
understanding the kinds of claim that it can be used to support (Ashby 
2005(b); Lee, 2005(a)); understanding historical accounts entails 
understanding that accounts are of different kinds and have a logic and 
that different types of account work in different ways (Lee, 2001 and 
2004). 
Accounts can be compared at a formal level in terms of generic 
`tasks' that they aim to accomplish (Megill, 2007). Megill argues that all 
historical writing involves four tasks that are, at least in principle, 
analytically distinct (Megill, 2007, pp.97-98) and that will have differing 
importance in accounts of different types. These tasks are summarised in 
Figure 3.3.56 
56 It is of course difficult to distinguish between these 'tasks' in practice: the 
distinctions are analytical and are offered as such (Megill, 2007, p.9'7-99). Similar 
distinctions have been advanced by Runciman (1983, pp.71-85) and by Coffin (2006). 
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Figure 3.3 The Four Tasks of Historical Writing 
(Based on Megill, 2007, pp.96-98 and adapted from Chapman, 2009(b), 
p.35) 
Task Explanation 
Description Describing an aspect of historical reality — telling 
what was the case 
Explanation Explaining why a past event or phenomenon 
came to be 
Interpretation Attributing meaning and significance to aspects 
of the past 
Argument / 
justification 
Justifying descriptive or explanatory claims by 
supplying arguments to support them 
Megill argues that these "tasks" correspond to distinct questions 
about the past — "What was the case?", "Why was it the case?", "What 
does all of this mean for us now?" and "How far can answers to these 
questions be evidentially sustained?"57 
This typology no doubt has faults, however, it does three 
important things: 
• it draws attention to the fact that historians make claims 
of different kinds and thus raises questions about the role 
that kinds of claim play in different accounts; 
• by distinguishing between tasks, the typology raises the 
question 'How are these different types of claim 
sustained?' and 'Are they sustained in the same way?'; 
and 
57 The first two questions are Megill's and third and fourth are my constructions based 
on interpretation of Megill's text. 
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• by categorising tasks into claims and support for claims 
the analysis focuses attention on questions like 'What is 
claimed?' and 'How far are claims sustained?' 
These points are highly consequential for thinking about student 
understandings. As Lee (2001) has shown, many students assume that 
historical accounts are made up of factual statements only and that 
assessing accounts amounts to assessing the facticity of their component 
statements. Accounts, however, organise factual statements in relation to 
questions and do so using concepts and criteria; furthermore, accounts 
organise their materials in different ways depending on the tasks that 
they are performing: all historical tasks involve concepts but concepts do 
different work in descriptions, explanations and interpretations 
(Cercadillo, 2001 and 2006; Lee 2001; McCullagh, 1984 and 2003). 
To describe something is to deploy conceptual categories: thus, 
to describe an event as a 'battle', for example, is to deploy a concept, to 
define it in particular ways and to use this concept to organise factual 
propositions about the event; to explain why an event took place is to 
invoke and deploy theories about how the world works, about the 
entities that exist in it; and so on. The same observation applies to 
justification: to support a claim is also to reveal assumptions about how 
historical claims can be supported. Furthermore, to ask a question is to 
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reveal assumptions about the kinds of question that historians should set 
out to ask." 
3.3.ii Paradigms and Paradigmatic Assumptions 
What an account is, then, is relative to what it does. What it does, 
however, is also relative to the criteria and conceptualisations that an 
account deploys or presupposes. 
The impossibility of simply passively mirroring some or all of 
the past without presuppositions has long been understood: 
Even the ordinary, the 'impartial' historiographer, who 
believes... that he maintains a simply receptive attitude; 
surrendering himself only to the data supplied... is by no means 
passive as regards the exercise of his thinking powers. He brings 
his categories with him, and sees... phenomena... exclusively 
through those media. (Hegel, 1956, p.11) 
Hegel overstates the case — historical knowing is a recursive and 
reflexive process and the encounter with the record can change 
`categories' (Megill, 2007, pp.86-88; Stanford, 1986 and 1997; 
Wineburg, 1991, p.509), the point stands, however: no perception 
without presuppositions. 
58 These issues are the staple of historical debate as three recent reviews, in a generalist 
journal, show: Hobsbawm's (2009) review of a work by Overy turns on questioning of 
the kind of question that Overy asks; Duffy's (2009) review of a work by Thomas 
turns on objections to the conceptualisation of religion organizing the book's claims; 
and Siegelbaum's review of a work by Figes turns on objections to Figes' substantive 
and methodological presuppositions (Siegelbaum, 2008). 
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No empirical activity is possible without a theory, or at least 
elaborate presuppositions behind it, even if these remain 
implicit... All historians have ideas already in their minds when 
they study primary materials — models of human behaviour, 
established chronologies, assumptions about responsibility, 
notions of identity and so on. Of course, some are convinced that 
they are simply gathering facts, looking at sources with a totally 
open mind and only recording what is there, yet they are simply 
wrong to believe this. (Jordanova, 2000, p.63) 
Historians' interpretive frameworks are frequently discussed in 
historiographic and history education literature59 and have been 
systematically analysed by Fulbrook (2000 pp.31-50) as "paradigms" 
and Leinhardt and Young's study of historians' readings of texts shows 
that readings are shaped as much by the "interpretive stance assumed" 
as by use of source reading schemata (1996, p.449). 
Fulbrook defines a paradigm as "a world view" entailing " a 
particular set of assumptions about the nature of the world, a 
corresponding set of analytical concepts for describing the world, and a 
number of hypotheses purporting to explain how the world" works 
(Fulbrook, 2000, p.31). 
Fulbrook distinguishes between "theoretical" and "meta-
theoretical" presuppositions: the former shape the logic of enquiry and 
answers to questions like: 'What questions are worth asking, about what 
data and at what level of analysis?' and 'What analytical tools should be 
used?'; the latter are commitments of a philosophical anthropological 
59 For example, Burke, 2001, pp.2-8; Callinicos, 1988 and 1995; Hexter, 1972 (pp.65- 
109); Limon, 2002; and Yilmaz, 2007. 
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nature and reveal presuppositions about the nature of humanity and 
about knowledge (Fulbrook, 2001, pp.34-5). 
As Jordanova's comment indicates, everyone has a paradigm: 
there is no alternative. Explaining what people did, at Glastonbury or 
Agincourt, entails an ontology that answers questions like 'What is a 
person?', 'What motivations do persons typically have and is there a 
hierarchy amongst these?', 'What constitutes and preserves collectivities 
of people?', 'Do collectivities have emergent properties?' and so on.60 
Answers to such questions have consequences and illustrate the nexus 
between methods, methodologies and paradigms. If, for example, 
collectivities are thought of as prior to and determining the actions of 
individuals and if, let us say, language is held to have primacy, then 
language will have priority in the attempt to understand collective 
behaviour and accepting this view will have consequences for archive 
selection, data collection, analysis and interpretation. 
The importance of paradigmatic frameworks in historical study 
cannot be overstated and is apparent in every sub-field of the discipline 
(Burke, 2001; Cannadine, 2002) from the history of ideas (Bevir, 1999; 
Tully, 1992) to the history of imperialism (Cain and Hopkins, 2001; 
Colley, 2002). Awareness of these issues is also necessary for 
understanding historiography at advanced level: thus, for example, 
understanding the historiography of Nazism raises theoretical and 
60 Questions of this kind are addressed in Giddens (1984) pp.41-64 and Anderson 
(1980). 
70 
metatheoretical questions about the merits of social scientific and high 
political approaches to the past in the form of the structuralist / 
intentionalist debate (Bauer, 2002; Kershaw, 1993; Layton, 2000) and 
understanding the historiography of Chartism means engaging with 
Marxist historiography and historiography influenced by the "linguistic 
turn" (Brown, 1998; Stedman Jones, 1984).61  
Two points are worth stressing, given the fact that students' often 
model differences in interpretation in terms of subjective distortion 
(pp.107-112 and pp.151-161 below). 
Firstly, a paradigm is not an avoidable bias: there can be no 
interpretations without categories and assumptions. 
Secondly, theoretical and metatheoretcial questions can be 
rationally debated and historical controversies often turn on these issues 
as much as on substantive matters: conceptualisations of historical data 
are not simply subjective impositions but proposals that are 
interpersonally tested through disciplinary conversation. 
Theoretical questions — such as the relative merits of 
`mircohistorical' and 'cliometric' approaches to the study of slavery — 
can be readily made accessible for students, as a recent report of 
61 These two topics are typical A2 topics and were studied by my respondents. A 
number of history education researchers have stressed the importance of a focus on 
methodological and historiographic dimensions of history in history education (for 
example, Limon, 2002 and Yilmaz, 2007), as has recent practitioner literature 
(Howells, 2005 and Hammond, 2007). 
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teaching strategies adopted with 13-14 year old students suggests 
(Hammond, 2007). Metatheoretical debates, for example about the 
relative priority of material interests in shaping human action, raise 
questions that arise in students' everyday experience, about which they 
are likely to hold views and which they can be encouraged to debate. 
3.3.iii Progression in the Understanding of Historical Accounts 
Again, there is substantial evidence, that suggests that history 
students can develop sophisticated understandings of historical accounts, 
that particular misconceptions are common in student thinking and that 
these misconceptions need to be challenged if students are to progress 
(Lee, 2001 and 2004). 
Thinking about historical accounts is clearly closely related to 
thinking about evidence, since historical accounts are constructed using 
evidence and since 
research suggests that the root of students' ideas about both 
concepts are some everyday preconceptions applicable (albeit 
in different ways) to both concepts (Lee and Shemilt, 2004, p. 
26). 
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Lee and Shemilt propose a progression model of the 
development of student thinking about historical accounts and this 
model is outlined in Figure 3.4 below.62 
Figure 3.4 Progression in ideas about accounts: outline 
(Based on Lee and Shemilt, 2004, p.30)63  
1 Accounts are just (given) stories 
2 Accounts fail to be copies of a past we 
cannot witness 
3 Accounts are accurate copies of the past, 
except for mistakes or gaps 
4 Accounts may be distorted for ulterior 
motives 
5 Accounts are organised from a personal 
viewpoint 
6 Accounts must answer questions and fit 
criteria 
The broad pattern of progression in the CHATA accounts data 
has been summarised as follows: over time, "a broad shift" is apparent 
in students' views of historians. From seeing historians as 
more or less passive story tellers, handing on ready-made 
stories or compiling and collating information, they move to 
thinking of historians as actively producing their stories, 
62 This model draws in particular on CHATA research on accounts reported in Lee, 
1997, 1998, 2001 and 2004 and Lee and Ashby, 2000. The progression model 
reproduced here is substantially the same as that reported in Lee 2004. Although the 
SCHP evaluation did not focus on accounts as such, data on student ideas about 
"evidence and methodology" in history was collected and analysed (Shemilt, 1987). 
63 The model is reproduced in full in Appendix 8.6 (p.286). 
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whether by distorting them for their own ends or legitimately 
selecting in response to a choice of theme (Lee, 1998, p.31). 
Underlying the model are the same oppositions that were key in 
the case of historical evidence (p.60 above): between experiential and 
inferential knowledge and between information and evidence (Lee, 
2001; Lee and Shemilt, 2004; Shemilt, 1987); however, a further 
distinction, highlighted in the discussion of evidence but that is 
particularly consequential for the understanding of accounts, is the 
opposition between accounts as copies of the past that should be 
assessed in terms of adequacy of representation and accounts as theory 
like structures that should be assessed relative to their purposes, the 
questions they ask and the criteria and concepts that they presuppose. 
Again, progression involves conceptual shifts (Lee and Shemilt, 
2004, pp.26-31). Firstly, a shift occurs between levels 2 and 3: students 
at level 2 think of accounts as varying because the touchstone of sound 
knowledge is experience and we cannot experience the past: at levels 1 
and 2, therefore, accounts are simply stories or guesses / matters of 
opinion without epistemological status. Secondly, a shift occurs between 
level 4 and 5: at levels 3 and 4 students think of the past as fixed, the 
past only happened in one way and the 'evidence' (where it is available) 
ought, in principle, to allow us to identify this 'one way' which accounts 
should in principle be able to depict, even if, in practice, archival gaps or 
biases prevent 'the true picture' from emerging. At levels 5 and 6, by 
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contrast, and just as was the case with evidence, students start to see that 
accounts vary as the questions that are asked about the past vary: at 
level 5 this is simply a subjective matter (people just happen to ask 
different questions, see different things as important and so on) whereas 
at level 6 account variation is a matter of necessity rather than subjective 
contingency and an expression of facts about accounts per se. In 
summary, for level 5 and 6 thinkers, histories are more like theories than 
stories. 
The scale of variation in the sophistication of students' ideas can 
be scoped by contrasting the following two interview excerpts, the first 
from an SCHP evaluation interview, exploring general ideas about 
historical methodology and the second from a CHATA interview, 
exploring why there might be different accounts of when the Roman 
Empire ended. 
You can't do an experiment... You just has to guess.... 
How would you distinguish between two guesses... 
You pick which one you like best... which is most interesting 
— or the one... for your (social) class. (Shemilt, 1987, p. 47) 
Why are there different dates? 
Because there is no definite way of telling when it ended. 
Some think it is when its city was captured or when it was first 
invaded or some other time. 
How could you decide when the Empire ended? 
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By setting a fixed thing what happened for example when its 
capitals were taken, or when it was totally annihilated or 
something and then finding the date. 
Could there be other possible times when the Empire ended? 
Yes, because it depends on what you think ended it, whether it 
was the taking of Rome or Constantinople or when it was first 
invaded or some other time. (Lee, 2005, p39) 
It is apparent in the first excerpt that this student operates at level 
2 and thinks of history less as a form of knowledge than an expression of 
subjectivity. In the second extract, on the other hand, we have a clear 
example of level 6 criterial thinking and a perspective from which 
account variation is perfectly natural and follows from the very nature of 
accounts: there can be no date for the end of the Roman Empire without 
criteria to operationalise the concepts 'Roman', 'Empire' and 'end' and 
it very much looks as if this student perceives this question as at least in 
part a theoretical question — the kind of question you resolve by debating 
concepts rather than by counting 'truths'. 
There is a significant research literature on accounts, much of it 
inspired by and methodologically close to the CHATA research. This 
literature is discussed below, in relation to students' ideas about 
explaining why different accounts may exist.64 The literature provides 
support for the CHATA progression models across a range of age groups 
and contexts. 
64 
 Barca, 2001 and 2005; Boix Mansilla 2005; Cercadillo, 2001 and 2006; Chapman, 
2001; Gago, 2005; Hsiao, 2005; MacDiarmid, 1994; and VanSledright and Afflerbach, 
2005 exemplify or discuss this research. Other work (such as Seixas, 1993), that is not 
directly focused on explaining variations in written accounts, is not discussed here. 
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VanSledright and Afflerbach (2005) report a small scale and 
exploratory study involving eight 8 to 9 year old American elementary 
school students. The students were given a collection of documents 
relating to the same topic, two of which were accounts, and asked to 
come to a view on the causes of a rebellion. VanSledright and 
Afflerbach report that their findings were "generally consistent" with the 
CHATA models (2005, p.15) and that these students were operating at a 
level that corresponded to level 4 on Figure 3.4. 
Gago (2005) reports a study of 10-13 year old students in one 
Portuguese school: fifty-two students took part in pencil and paper 
assessments and a sample of ten students were interviewed. The students 
were asked to examine two parallel accounts with differing theme, tone 
and scale and to explain how there could "be different accounts in 
history" (2005, p.86). Gago's findings are consistent with the CHATA 
progression model, with the majority of students reported as moving 
over time towards explanations for account variation that allow for 
legitimate activity by historians in shaping accounts, in the form of the 
expressions of opinion or historians' decisions (Gago, 2005, 92-4). 
Hsiao (2005) reports a study of 13-15 year old Taiwanese 
students' preconceptions about accounts, in a context where a prescribed 
textbook "plays a fundamental role" (p.54). As part of Hsiao's study, 
ninety-four students, across the 13-15 age-range, were asked to read 
variant textbook accounts of the same issue from different countries and 
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to explain why the accounts differed. Overall, Hsiao found some support 
for CHATA models and some awareness of "basic notions regarding the 
procedures behind historical accounts" (p.63): the largest category of 
explanation in the data set was "Author perspective", a category 
including both author "opinions and biases" and the selection of 
information (p. 60). 
Barca (2005) reports a large-scale study conducted in two 
Portuguese schools, one strand of which involved one hundred and 
nineteen students across the 12-17 age-range completing a pencil and 
paper task that involved competing accounts of reasons for the 
establishment of the Portuguese Maritime empire and in which students 
were asked to adjudicate between the accounts and justify their choices. 
Barca reports 
Some evidence of patterns running from an information-based 
mode... to a perspectival view... with intermediate levels of 
ideas tied to a naïve realism or skepticism, factorial 
aggregation... or a positivist... quest for consensus.... (p.74) 
Barca notes that "more complex ideas" emerged "at earlier ages 
in Britain than in Portugal" and points to differences in history curricula 
to account for this (Barca, 2005). 
Cercadillo (2001 and 2006) reports a large-scale comparative 
study of understandings of significance in England and Spain: seventy 
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two students in each country, in the 12 to 17 age-range and from a range 
of schools, completed two pencil and paper tasks each of which 
contained competing assessments of the significance of the same topic. 
Students were asked, amongst other things, to explain why these 
differing assessments might arise. A sample of students was also 
interviewed. 
As Cercadillo notes, significance raises accounts issues with 
great clarity because judgments of significance are always relative to 
criteria of significance and a frame of reference (Cercadillo 2001, p.120) 
and, as Lee et al observe, judgments of significance vary across types of 
significance, by the subject with reference to whom the judgment is 
made, by theme and time scale and by question (Lee et al 2001, p. 201). 
Cercadillo proposes a grounded progression model that supports 
CHATA conclusions about accounts. A key issue in progression was 
student awareness that judgments of significance are relative to frames 
of reference and that criteria of significance are multiple and relative to 
different types of significance, such as causal and contemporary 
significance (2001, p.140). Younger students tended to assess 
significance in contemporary terms (in other words, as fixed by the 
experience of people who experienced events). Cercadillo found 
differences by country with English students "reaching a higher order of 
ideas... at earlier ages" (2001, p.140) although this gap narrowed for 16-
17 year old students. 
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Boix Mansilla's study has already been described above (pp.63- 
64). The students taking part in the study were provided with two 
accounts of aspects of the Holocaust covering variant time periods, 
focused on different actors and offering differing causal explanations. As 
has been noted, Boix Mansilla identified two broad stances amongst 
respondents: on the one hand a stance that is characterized as historically 
"objectivist" and a stance that might be characterized as 'contemporary 
constructivist'. Boix Mansilla's findings are consistent with CHATA 
models — the latter position is characterized, by a recognition that 
delimited questions entail selection, for example (2005, pp.107-8). The 
"strong association" between students' stances' and their educational 
backgrounds has been noted above. 
My Institution Focused Study (Chapman, 2001) reported a case 
study of twelve 16-19 Advanced Level history students in one institution 
in which the students were asked to complete pencil and paper tasks 
relating to two competing accounts and, amongst other things, to explain 
why differing historical accounts were possible on the same issue.65 My 
findings were consistent with the CHATA progression model for 
accounts: a spectrum of explanations for variation was identified, 
ranging from explanation in terms of distortion and bias to explanation 
in terms of legitimate variation resulting from historians' assumptions. 
"Assumptions explanations" were more common in second year 
65 The task was an earlier version of the Holocaust Task used in this study. 
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responses (2001, pp.45-55 and 68-69) and, in this case, all students 
studied historiography as part of their course. 
Barca (2001) reports a study of eighteen undergraduate 
Portuguese trainee history teachers in which the student teachers were 
provided with two historical accounts relating to the same incident and a 
report that both accounts drew upon. Students were asked to identify 
differences between the two accounts and to rank all three documents in 
terms of their validity as explanations. Barca reports findings consistent 
with the CHATA model: students drew on a range of ideas from an 
"information category", corresponding to the lower levels of the 
CHATA model where students treat differences as apparent only and as 
a function of how stories have been told, through to an "historical 
ground category" that Barca suggests "might approximate to the 'nature 
of accounts' level" (Barca, 2001). At this level students accepted 
different accounts as expressions of different perspectives and thus, 
perhaps, as constructed in the light of different criteria. 
McDiarmid (1994) reports a small-scale interview based study of 
American trainee teachers before and after their completion of an 
historiography course. Sixteen students completed the course. 
The purpose of the study was to evaluate the impact of the course 
on students' understandings of history and history teaching. At the start 
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of the course, when asked to account for variations, in a set of accounts 
of the reconstruction, almost all students drew on the 
assumption that historians bring predetermined positions to the 
writing of... accounts...Bias can be traced back to the personal 
circumstances... of the historian" (McDiarmid, 1994, p.170) 
By the end of the course, McDiarmid reports that "at least three" 
students had moved away from this position (pp.172-3). 
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3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter set out to model the conceptions that understanding 
historical accounts entails. It is clear that understanding historical 
accounts is a complex matter and one that depends upon developing a 
concept of evidence and an awareness that claims about the past depend 
upon questions, concepts and criteria as much as 'facts' or 'sources'. 
Developing these understandings is no easy task and one that 
involves challenging everyday epistemological ideas. It has been 
suggested that it is critical in particular to develop understandings of 
both evidence and accounts that move students away from the notion 
that historians are simply story tellers telling it 'like it was' in a 
comprehensive way. Understanding both evidence and accounts involves 
understanding that meaning can only be made by asking questions and 
that historians offer reasoned answers to questions delimited by the 
focus that they have chosen to take and also by the concepts and criteria 
that frame their questions. 
Consideration of history education research on student 
understandings of evidence and accounts provides support for two linked 
progression models and suggests key indicators of progression in the 
understanding of these two metahistorical concepts, providing a basis for 
thinking about the ideas that my respondents brought to the task of 
explaining account variation and historical disagreement. 
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Chapter 4. Data and Discussion: The Written 
Tasks 
4.1 Introduction: Analysing the Written Task Data Set 
As will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter 2 above, 
twenty four students completed three written tasks over the course of a 
number of months and the written task data set consists of seventy two 
task responses, three for each respondent. The tasks each contained two 
contrasting historical accounts. The following question is the focus of 
analysis here: 
How is it possible for there to be two such differing 
accounts of the same issue? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
The written task responses were analysed through a process of 
inductive coding and thirty four high-resolution low-inference codes 
were devised to code the data set descriptively for this question. These 
codes were simplified and grouped under seven code categories on the 
basis of similarities between the explanations for account variation to 
which the codes made reference. 
The codes and code categories are exemplified and discussed in 
Appendix 8.3 (pp.244-265) and are also exemplified below as individual 
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responses are discussed and only a brief explanation of the code 
categories is appropriate here. 
The Author Bias code category identifies explanations for 
variation that suggest that account authors had preconceptions about the 
historical topics or personal or political agendas and that they imposed 
these preconceived meanings through their accounts by, for example, 
intentionally misrepresenting the record. 
The Author Interpretation code category identifies 
explanations for variation that suggest that the authors had made 
emergent sense of their archival materials in differing ways through 
processes of meaning construction. 
The Author Background / Beliefs code category identifies 
explanations for variation that suggest that account authors had differing 
backgrounds or differing beliefs and that this fact explained differences 
in their accounts. 
The Author Focus code category identifies explanations for 
variation that suggest that account authors had asked different questions 
and that this fact explained differences in their accounts. 
The two Source categories identify explanations for variation that 
suggest that differences in the accounts were explained by limitations in 
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the archive (such as a lack of sources), in the case of the Limited 
Sources code category, or because authors had based their accounts on 
different sources, in the Variable Sources code category. 
The Minor Codes code category identifies explanations for 
variation that figured in a small number of responses only, such as the 
suggestion that author incompetence or error explained differences in 
accounts.66 
Exploration of the data during the coding process indicated that 
references to particular explanations had variable importance within 
individual responses: individual responses were therefore coded taking 
note of the relative importance within each response of the explanations 
that were mentioned and these were graded as having either 'major' or 
`minor' importance in each response.67 
Exploration of the data during the coding process also indicated 
that a number of individuals offered similar explanations for account 
variation across more than one task. An analysis of the data set by 
individual was therefore undertaken. Figures 4.1 (a) and (b) present this 
analysis. 
66 These ideas had minor importance in the data set, however, these ideas often had 
major importance in individual responses. 
67 This process is exemplified at pp.259-265 below. 
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4.2 Explaining Account Variation: Patterns of Response 
Figures 4.2(a) and (b) allow individual responses to be analysed 
for consistency of approach, where consistency is defined as the 
repetition of the same move across two or more tasks. 
Twenty of the twenty-four students made reference to at least one 
idea across at least two tasks and twelve respondents displayed higher 
levels of consistency of approach than this. Two respondents in each 
year displayed no consistency across the three tasks and made different 
moves in each task. Negative patterns of consistency are also apparent: 
with one exception, respondents can also be grouped in terms of the 
moves that they did not make in any of their three task responses.68  
It is apparent that understanding patterns of consistency in this 
data set entails understanding patterns of presence and absence. As was 
explained in the Methodology Chapter (at pp.36-38 above), a schema 
was devised to represent such patterns: Figures 4.2(a) and (b) endeavour 
to map the data reported in Figures 4.1 (a) and (b) onto this schema and 
to model respondents' approaches in terms of explanatory moves that 
they did and did not make. 
The figures map the dominant moves that respondents made. A 
dominant move is an explanatory move that occurs in at least two of a 
68 The one exception is Beatrice, Year 1: she made every one of the major moves at 
least once. 
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respondent's task responses and that occurs more frequently than any 
other move that they make.69 Figure 4.2(a) identifies respondents who 
made one dominant move across at least two tasks. If the same two 
moves occur more than once and with equal frequency in a respondent's 
task responses, a respondent is described as making two dominant 
moves. Figure 4.2(b) maps respondents who made more than one 
dominant move across the three tasks. There were no examples of 
students who made more than two dominant moves across the three 
tasks. 
The majority of the data set can be mapped onto these schema: 
fifteen of the twenty four respondents (seven in Year 1 and eight in Year 
2) made one dominant move and four respondents (2 in each year) made 
more than one dominant move. However, four respondents (two in each 
year) made different explanatory moves in each task and one Year 1 
student made every major move at least once. 
69 The assumption is that frequent reference to a move is indicative of a commitment to 
explaining account variation in terms of the move. 
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The purpose of mapping responses onto this schema was to 
assess the extent to which respondents could be understood as 
conforming to ideal typical approaches to explaining account variation 
on the basis of moves that they made / did not make. Types are posited 
on the basis of the rows in the table: an ideal typical Author Bias 
respondent, for example, would make reference exclusively to Author 
Bias explanatory moves. Mapping real respondents onto the table allows 
the degree to which respondents approximated to ideal types of 
respondent to be assessed. It will also be recalled that the figure allows 
relationships between explanatory moves to be represented and 
identified and contrasting explanatory moves to be identified above and 
below the diagonal of black squares.7°  
What types of respondent and relationships between respondent 
types does Figure 4.2(a) suggest? 
It is apparent that one student (Jane, Year 2) appears to conform 
to the 'Author Bias' ideal type and that a number of other students 
approximate to that type: Mark (Year 2) and Edward (Year 1) appear in 
4 of the possible 5 cells in that row and Diana (Year 1) appears in 2 of 
the 5. 
The picture is less clear in the case of Author Interpretation: no 
student conforms to the ideal type or approximates to it to the same 
70 See pp.37-38 above. 
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degree as in the Author Bias row. Nevertheless, George (Year 2) and 
Alice and Elizabeth (Year 1) appear in 3 of the possible 5 cells of the 
row. 
The figure reveals a striking contrast between subgroups within 
these groups of respondents: the students in the yellow cells at the top 
left and the bottom right of the figure explained account variation in 
contrary ways, making at least two Author Bias moves but no Author 
Interpretation moves in their three task responses, on the one hand, and 
showing the opposite pattern, on the other. 
Three respondents approximate closely to an Author Focus ideal 
type, appearing in three or four of the possible five cells on the figure 
and one respondent appears in two cells. The Limited Sources and 
Author Background / Beliefs rows are sparsely populated, however: one 
respondent figures in two cells in the former and one respondent figures 
in one cell of the latter. The Variable Sources row is not populated. 
A further observation arises from the overall shape of the data: 
thirteen of the fifteen respondents mapped onto the figure appear either 
above or below the black diagonal of squares suggesting that we have 
two broadly contrasting approaches to explaining variation in accounts 
here, linked to Author Bias and Author Interpretation moves. The two 
exceptions do not challenge this suggestion: Vicky made Author Bias 
moves and Author Focus moves but no Author Interpretation moves and 
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Trina made Author Focus moves but neither Author Bias nor Author 
Interpretation moves. 
The figure gives us good grounds for positing three ideal 
explanatory types therefore: Author Bias, Author Interpretation and 
Author Focus. There are varying degrees of fit between respondents and 
these types but the pattern is there. There are much slighter grounds for 
positing two further types (Author Background / Beliefs and Limited 
Sources). 
Figure 4.2(b), it will be recalled, maps the moves of respondents 
who made more than one dominant move across the three tasks. 
With the exception of Hannah, who appears in the previously 
unpopulated Variable Sources row, all the respondents fall into types 
discussed above. Because they made more than one dominant move, 
however, these respondents cannot be singly typed: Ian, for example, 
made both Author Background / Beliefs and Author Interpretation 
moves in two tasks. 
The analysis suggested by Figures 4.2(a) and (b) gives qualified 
support for the construction of an ideal typical model of types of 
explanation for account variation: real respondents conform or 
approximate to three of the ideal types and there is a clear contrast 
between two of these types. 
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4.3 Accounting for Variations in Accounts: a Five-term 
Ideal Typology of Explanatory Moves 
I propose a five-term ideal typology of approaches to explaining 
account variation.71 The discussion that follows will test the value of this 
proposal, by exploring respondents' answers in detail and we have 
already seen that there are stronger grounds for positing some types than 
others.72 I propose that we think of respondents as explaining account 
variation by making explanations that fall under one or more of the five 
types identified in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 Schema of explanatory types 
Explanatory Type Definition 
1. Authorial explanation Explanation in terms of author 
backgrounds or background beliefs 
2. Archival explanation Explanation in terms of the variable or 
limited nature of the archive available to 
account authors. 
3. Impositionist explanation Explanation in terms of variations in the 
author activity of imposing 
preconceptions through representations 
of the past 
4. Hermeneutic explanation Explanation in terms of variations in the 
author activity of construing or 
constructing the meaning of the past. 
5. Inquisitorial explanation Explanation in terms of variations in the 
author activity of asking questions of the 
past. 
71 It is possible, of course, that more than five types would be required to model other 
data sets. 
72 The typological model is valuable to the extent that it enables pedagogic sense to be 
made of what respondents did. 
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I propose five ideal typical explanatory moves, collapsing the 
Variable and Limited Sources code categories into one Source code 
category, because the intention here is heuristic rather than exhaustive: 
there are good grounds, therefore, for applying Ockham's razor.73  
Three of the five types focus on author activities and two do not. 
The two types that do not focus on activity focus on different features of 
the authors of accounts: their identities and their resources. 
4.3.i Authorial Explanation: Historians' Identities 
An ideal typical authorial explanation for account variation 
would explain variation solely and exclusively in terms of authors' 
preconceptions and beliefs and / or account authors' backgrounds held to 
determine those preconceptions and beliefs. An ideal typical authorial 
respondent would explain account variation in all cases exclusively in 
authorial terms. 
None of the respondents conform to type and none of the task 
responses are ideal typical, in the sense of making major reference 
exclusively to authorial explanation. However, authorial explanation was 
Amy's sole dominant move; and it was also one of two dominant moves 
73 "It is vain to do with more what can be done with fewer" (cited in Russell, 1979, at 
pp.462-3). Very few respondents made exclusive major reference to these ideas and in 
addition, respondents, such as Vicky Year 2, who made reference to both ideas, did so 
equally. 
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for both Hannah and Ian. I will discuss Amy and Hannah's responses 
below. 
Amy made major reference to Author Background / Beliefs in 
her Holocaust and Peterloo responses: these two responses are discussed 
below. 
It is possible for there to be two such differing accounts because 
each was written by a different historian... each... has a different 
approach which can be influenced by their (1) original ideas, e.g. 
what they were looking for when researching their accounts, in 
turn affected by their education, status, ethnic group, etc. (2) their 
evidence — which archive they have looked into — giving 
different evidence, and the amount of sources they have looked 
at — and cross-referenced. (3) The fact that both sources are 
written with hindsight puts the accounts in a position where the 
only way to give an account is through interpretation. 
Interpretation of what happened, and how etc. Neither authors 
were there — experiencing it and so neither have had the same 
experience finding out about it (however... had both been there 
accounts would still differ as both historians are individuals). 
Amy Year 2 Holocaust 
This response was coded as explaining variation by major 
reference to ideas coded under the Author Background / Beliefs (her first 
five lines), Variable Sources (point (2) in her list) and They are 
Secondary Sources codes (the remainder of her response).74 Amy 
suggested that historians take different 'approaches' to the study of the 
past and that there are two issues here: differing 'original ideas' that 
drive research and differing backgrounds that 'affect' these differing 
74 
 They Are Secondary Sources is a Minor Code: these codes are exemplified at 
pp.253-4 below. 
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agendas. Her response displayed considerable sophistication and Amy 
was aware that historians actively look for things and that research is a 
process of interpretation, although Amy also clearly privileged 
experiential knowing. Authorial factors shape investigation and what is 
looked for but little was said here about how investigation might affect 
the interpretation of what is found. 
Amy's response to the Peterloo task is reproduced below. 
It is possible for there to be two such differing accounts because 
as with all historical events, inferences are made by historians. 
The person who is writing about the events will obviously be 
influenced by the kind of person they are. Their background 
interests and political views... will affect the way that they view 
/ interpret information & facts. E.P.Thompson's book "The 
Making of the English Working Class" is a clue to the fact that 
his interest lies within the working classes. He has chosen to 
specifically focus on them so it is fair to say they are his main 
interest, and this comes across in his extract, which clearly 
favours the people and places them as the 'victims' of the event. 
Norman Gash's extract on the other hand is taken from... 
"Aristocracy & the People" suggesting that it is the relationship 
between the two that he is focussing on. However from his 
extract we can infer he has more sympathy with the upper 
classes, especially... with the yeomanry and hussars... Another 
possible reason... is the possibility that not much reliable 
information is available on the event — so inferences have to be 
made in order to attempt to find out what happened. 
Amy Year 2 Peterloo 
Again, this response was multiply coded and Author Background 
/ Beliefs (lines 1-6), Author Focus (lines 6-10 and 12-14) and Author 
Bias (lines 9-10 and 14-17) were all identified as having a major 
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importance here.75 Again, Amy began by referencing authorial factors: 
historians draw conclusions (`inferences') when constructing accounts 
and these inferences are 'affected' by historians' identities (`the kind of 
person they are'). There are sophisticated ideas here. Historians' 
identities or preconceptions affect the way they 'view / interpret 
information & facts' causing them to focus on different things and to 
identify with different groups and position them accordingly in their 
accounts (e.g. 'as victims'). How preconception might impact reasoning 
was not fully explained here, however, and Amy's last two lines reveal a 
testimonial conception of evidence and imply that interpretation only 
arises where testimony is deficient. 
Author Background / Beliefs was a dominant move for Hannah 
in all three of her responses. Hannah's response to the Ranter task is 
reproduced in below. 
The two accounts are extracts from books written by two 
different historians, different people have different opinions and 
the way that they interpret information may be different also. 
However these two accounts are so completely opposite, I would 
say that the historians used differing evidence and sources when 
researching the Ranters. 
Also the second account seems more factual... and cynical while 
the first seems to be based on fact however guesswork has been 
used and gaps filled in. 
The first is more about the beliefs of the Ranters and the second 
is about whether this group really existed. 
Hannah Year 1 Ranter Task 
75 
 The last five lines of her response were coded as making reference to Limited 
Sources, however, this reference was deemed to be minor: it was her last suggestion 
and, in contrast to the other explanations, this explanation was offered as a possibility 
only. 
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The first paragraph of this response was coded as making major 
reference to Author Background / Beliefs, the second to Variable 
Sources, the third to Author Interpretation and the last as making minor 
reference to Author Focus.76 Hannah suggested that different opinions 
would lead to different interpretations of information but how opinions 
might yield these results was unexplained. Hannah repeated the same 
formulation in all of her three responses arguing, in her Holocaust task 
response, that "different people will never have the same opinion about a 
subject, people view things differently". An incomplete explanation 
clearly functioned as a default position here. 
It is apparent, from these examples that authorial explanation can 
be linked to sophisticated ideas but also that it appears incomplete as an 
explanation and that it appears alongside other explanatory moves. To 
invoke authorial explanation is also, very probably, to beg questions 
about exactly how author identities shape interpretive activities. One 
further example, from a response that was coded as making major 
reference to this move, is discussed below. 
The two writers may have opinions themselves on the situation, 
of which would be reflected within their books. These opinions 
would change the approach of which they would say whether 
Britain could have or should have done more to help the refugees 
of that time. 
Adam Year 1 Holocaust 
76 The reference to Author Focus was deemed to be minor because the suggestion is the 
last and the least explained of four. 
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We have a mechanism here: existing opinions shape judgments 
of possibility (what 'could' have been done) and normativity (what they 
`should' have done). This is clearly a potentially sophisticated position 
and one that recognises that historical judgments depend on principles as 
well as factual propositions, although how these principles would 
interact with documentary materials was unexplained. 
It is apparent, from the discussion of these task responses, that 
authorial explanatory moves have importance in them and that they have 
importance for some respondents in more than one response. It is also 
apparent, however, that none of these respondents relied exclusively on 
authorial explanation or conformed closely to an authorial ideal type. 
The move also tended to be non-explanatory: it either failed to fully 
explain variation or implied other moves. 
Positing an ideal typical authorial move is likely, nevertheless, to 
be pedagogically useful: these examples suggest that students who 
explain variation, in whole or in part, through author identities are likely 
to need to be encouraged to think about mechanisms and about how 
identity might impact inference. 
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4.3.ii Archival Explanation: Historians' Resources 
An ideal typical archival explanation for account variation 
would explain variation solely and exclusively in terms of limitations or 
variations in the archive available to historians and an ideal typical 
`archival' respondent would explain account variation in all cases 
exclusively in these ways. Archival explanation was a dominant move 
for three respondents but none conformed to type. Four task responses 
were ideal typical, however, and made major reference exclusively to 
archival moves. Two of these responses are discussed below. 
Kim explained variation in the Ranter texts exclusively in terms 
of the limitations of the archive. 
It's possible to have two such differing accounts... for the simple 
reason that most of the evidence came from hostile sources. This 
combines with the fact that what evidence we do have is not 
`direct' ... 
In other words, we have accounts of what Ranters believe in 
from the Ranters point of view, however, we only have hostile 
sources to tell us what the Ranters actually did. This is not 
helpful as it can be rightly argued that there were many during 
this period... who would... start stories of Ranters so as to 
condemn... Cromwell... for allowing them to exist. 
These factors plus the fact that there are very few reliable sources 
can easily lead to two opposing views being taken on the same 
issue. 
Kim Year 2 Ranters 
103 
Trina's response to the same task was coded as explaining 
variation through major reference to source variation and minor 
reference to ideas coded as authorial factors (reproduced here in italics). 
Both Account One and Two are written by two different 
historians, who it is possible to suggest, would have differing 
opinions. Noticeably, they are also written at different times... 
Account One was written in 1975 and Account Two in 1987. 
Perhaps, in this time difference there was room for differing 
opinions to come to light that perhaps would have influenced... 
the author of Account Two, or not been accessible to the author 
of Account One.... 
Therefore, both historians would have perhaps had a range of 
different and contradicting evidence and research to draw on, 
especially seeing as the two sources were published at varying 
times and the opinion of the historian, perhaps due to their 
political ideas, would have influenced how they interpreted this 
research. 
Trina Year 2 Ranters 
These observations were typical of those coded under Variable 
and Limited Sources.77 How did these references to archives explain 
account variation? 
Kim's response did not tell us how the conflicting and unreliable 
witness testimony might have translated into variable accounts and this 
element of her explanation was entirely tacit. Trina's Ranter response 
did not explain how variable sources might yield variable accounts either 
and, although her references to authorial issues gestured at this, it is not 
clear how these beliefs might impact interpretation. 
77 See pp.251-253 below. 
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It is apparent that purely archival explanation is essentially non-
explanatory in these cases and that further explanatory moves were 
presupposed here. 
Responses that treat archival issues hermeneutically will be 
discussed below. Two examples of responses that drew heavily on 
archival explanation but that suggested testimonial models of evidence 
will be discussed here. 
All of Ian's response below, apart from the second paragraph 
which was coded as making reference to Author Interpretation, was 
coded as explaining variation through the limitations of the available 
sources. 
It is possible for two accounts to differ so wildly over the same 
issue, but for it to happen there need to be special circumstances. 
This would probably revolve around the evidence. With a topic 
that is relatively limited, and... out of the public eye, evidence 
would probably be limited. When this evidence is too vague, or 
from a discredited author or even too controversial, it can 
provoke different reactions. 
Here we have a case of a discredited author — Abiezer Coppe, 
who is quoted as a major source in Hill, the author using him to 
prove two points in the short passage. Davis, however, discredits 
Coppe... Whereas Mr Hill believes Coppe's work, Mr Davis 
obviously does not, hence the obvious difference in their 
accounts... 
Ian Year 2 Ranters 
Ian's explanations implied that archives set clear limits to 
legitimate variation in accounts: this was a 'special' case and in run-of-
the-mill cases, presumably, sources constrain variation. It very much 
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looks as if Ian was operating Collingwood's 'scissors and paste' 
epistemology here, albeit with a 'critical' inflection (see pp.57-58 above) 
in which variation in accounts follows from variation in assessments of 
who to believe rather than variation in what historians construe reports 
to mean. 
Like Ian's, Ruth's response to the Ranter task was coded as 
explaining variation in terms of the limitations of the sources, with the 
exception of the second paragraph which was coded as making reference 
to Author Bias. 
When articles are being written about subjects such as the 
Ranters... there are very little records... and so it is difficult for 
either side of the argument to be accurately represented. Much 
information can also be manipulated... 
Also these writers are obviously passionate... and all want to 
prove their opinion, not disprove it. 
It also depends on who, when and where the supporting evidence 
is obtained, because that may have biased information in it. 
Ruth Year 2 Ranters 
Impositionist language is clearly present here and the language of 
interpretation and inference is absent: sources are treated as simply 
sources of 'information' rather than grounds for inference and meaning 
construction. 
Archival explanation, like authorial explanation, clearly has 
limits as an ideal type: few responses conformed to it and it is likely to 
have only limited work to do, therefore. Nevertheless, it is apparent that 
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archival explanation had some importance for respondents and that it 
was offered as sufficient explanation in some cases. There are likely to 
be good pedagogic grounds for positing an archival type: paradoxically, 
reliance on archival explanation may indicate tacit or undeveloped 
thinking about what historians' do with archives and, thus, indicate 
where teaching interventions might focus. 
4.3.iii Historians' Activities 1: History as Imposition 
An ideal typical impositionist explanation for account variation 
would explain account variation solely and exclusively in terms of 
authorial imposition of preconceptions through representation of the 
past. Such imposition could be conscious and deliberate or subconscious 
and unwitting and might result, for example, in the tendentiously 
selective representation or tendentiously positive characterisation of the 
past activity of a group with whom the historian identifies in the present. 
An ideal typical `impositionist' respondent would explain account 
variation in all cases exclusively in these ways. 
Some respondents conformed to type, or nearly so: Author Bias 
had major explanatory importance in all three tasks for Jane (Year 2), 
Mark (Year 2) and Diana (Year 1). Nine responses were ideal typical 
and made major reference exclusively to Author Bias. I will cite two 
examples of ideal typical responses. The first is completely impositionist 
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in approach and the second is dominated by an impositionist perception 
of historical practice, although it also contains minor reference to ideas 
coded under Author Focus, identified in italics. 
The two accounts differ because the two historians have 
opposing views. Account 1 is taken from... "The Making of the 
English Working Class" and consequently the historian is likely 
to take a positive view of the "revolutionaries" he describes; his 
loyalty to the working class exhibits what could be considered a 
socialist view. 
Account two on the other hand is taken from... "Aristocracy and 
People" consequently he is likely to have more sympathy for the 
Yeomanry who were of a higher class that those attending the 
meeting. Both have interpreted historical evidence to suit their 
own beliefs and purposes. 
Diana Year 1 Peterloo 
Diana approached the Peterloo Task in completely impositionist 
manner: the historians had agendas and wrote different accounts 
because they identified with a group in the past and presented history 
tendentiously expressing that identification. Precisely how imposition 
worked requires clarification: historians begin with "sympathy" and they 
produce works that "exhibit" this view by interpreting "evidence to suit 
their... beliefs and purposes" but what such interpretation involves is not 
explained. 
Diana's references to author bias in her other two responses were 
consistent with the stance she took here. In her Holocaust response she 
referred to the influence of authors' "preconceived ideas on the issue" 
and in her Ranter response she argued as follows: 
108 
I imagine these 2 accounts to be different primarily due to the 
fact that the historians have different purposes. Account 1 
WANTS the "Ranters" to be true in order to use them as material 
for his book... Similarly, account 2 WANTS the "Ranters" to be 
fictional in order for them to be used as proof of "Myths" in his 
/her book. Both need the story of the Ranters to fit their purpose, 
and have interpreted it to do so. 
Diana Year 1 Ranters 
In these examples Diana understood interpretation as a process of 
assimilation: authors knew what they wanted the story to be — their 
ideological or vested interests told them — and they made the archive tell 
it. How this takes place is not fully apparent nor is it apparent if there 
was a fixed meaning extant before manipulation began. It is clear, 
however, that historians' thinking is static in this process — accounts 
reflect static preconceptions and interpretation is about belief 
confirmation not belief generation. 
Diana did not rely exclusively on notions of bias in all her 
responses. She made reference in her Holocaust response, for example, 
to variable account "focus". As is the case of her Peterloo response, 
however, although she perceived the different foci of the accounts, she 
construed difference as imposition. 
It is difficult to determine why the two sources have such 
differing accounts. However there is an evident manipulation of 
statistics present in both. While source one considers the number 
of Jews arriving in Britain from Germany, Czechoslovakia and 
Austria... source two... mentions only the number of German 
Jews... thus supporting the writer's assertion that Britain did not 
accept German Jews into the country. Therefore source one is 
considering the Holocaust and its affects on Jews throughout 
the "Greater Germany" such as Austria and Czechoslovakia, 
whereas source two limits its evidence only to German Jews. 
Moreover one must consider the motivations for each historian's 
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conclusions, this too may have affected their manipulation of 
sources. 
Jane Year 2 Holocaust 
Jane's response to the Holocaust task, like Diana's, noted that we 
have accounts of different types focused on different things, however, 
again, these perceptions were interpreted impositionally: the historians 
were selective because they had preconceptions and selected and 
presented information tendentiously (the word "manipulation" occurs 
twice in her response). Again, as in Diana's case, Jane appeared to 
model account construction as assimilation. 
Jane's response to the Peterloo task was very similar to Diana's 
explanation for variation in terms of ideological parti pris. As in her 
Holocaust task, Jane recognised that the two authors were approaching 
the topic in different ways ("the subject matter of the two sources differ 
greatly"), again, however, difference in focus was construed as bias, as a 
matter of adopting, for example, a "pro-working class stance" and of 
presenting actors and situation elements in ways consistent with these 
stances. Again, like Diana, Jane interpreted the Ranter case in terms of 
vested interests linked to notions of audience — the authors were writing 
books of specific kinds and therefore needed to represent the past in 
ways that were consistent with these projects (so, in the case of Hill, had 
he "denied the existence of the Ranters... his narrative would not exist... 
so may not have been published"). 
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Mark made impositionist moves in all his responses. I will 
discuss one of Mark's responses in full to explore how he conceptualised 
imposition and explore a passage from another of his responses to 
demonstrate the degree to which his thinking was consistent across his 
written responses. 
It is quite possible to have 2 differing accounts as much of the 
evidence is likely to be influenced by subjective opinion and 
subsequently to some degree biased interpretations. 
Much of the historical evidence is likely to be primary accounts 
and slightly left/right biased depending on the political leaning of 
the individual. 
This problem is accentuated further in secondary evidence as not 
only is it subject to the original bias it is now also subject to the 
historian's bias. 
Due to the retrospective nature it is not possible to prove or 
disprove events 100% and it is very easy to manipulate them i.e. 
11,000 Jews settled and 55,000 entered. The second figure may 
not represent what is implied as it is possible 10,000 or 20,000 
entered purely as a stop over to another country. 
Mark Year 2 Holocaust 
Again, imposition works here through tendentious representation. 
The underlying logic of Mark's case is clear, however, and it is clearly 
informatic, rather than evidential. Mark appeared to think of historical 
knowledge in quasi-experiential terms: historical knowledge is based on 
reports that are biased by the preconceptions and commitments of the 
past informants, about whom we often know little; the experiences 
reported are past and cannot be re-assessed experientially; we are left 
therefore in a position where historians are free to exercise bias just as 
their dead, and therefore unaccountable, witnesses did. An almost 
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identical formulation was present in his Peterloo response where he 
argued as follows. 
[T]here are going to be subjective accounts which differ as a 
result of location, intentions and bias of the individual who 
recorded them... Bias is also a reason why the accounts may 
differ not only on the part of the historian but also on the part of 
the people present. It is quire obvious that the two historians are 
writing books on the two class groups and this is likely to have 
been a contributing factor to the distortion of the events. The 
historians want to present a romanticised picture of the classes 
and so interpret evidence differently. 
Mark Year 2 Peterloo 
There are good grounds for positing an impositionist ideal type: 
we have clear examples of respondents who consistently deploy 
impositionist explanations and there are also clear similarities between 
them. The notion of impositionism is also likely to be useful 
heuristically: it seems likely, from these examples, that impositionism 
works on autopic epistemological assumptions (p.47 above) and 
involves Collingwood's 'scissors and paste' thinking (pp.57-58 above). 
The pedagogic response indicated here is clear: impositionist thinkers 
need to develop their understandings of evidence. 
4.3.iv Historians' Activities 2: History as Meaning Construction 
An ideal typical hermeneutic explanation for account variation 
would explain variation solely and exclusively in terms of historical 
interpretation, understood as a process of meaning construction. 
Whereas impositionism conceives historians' meanings as resulting from 
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the one-directional action, of static preconceptions on the historical 
record, a hermeneutic approach conceives historians' meanings as 
emergent and the result of a dynamic interaction between historians' 
beliefs and the archive. 
Again, some respondents conformed to type, or nearly so. 
Elizabeth (Year 1) and Stuart (Year 2) made major reference to Author 
Interpretation moves in all tasks and made no major reference to Author 
Bias moves in any task. Responses that conformed to the ideal type were 
rare, nevertheless: Elizabeth, for example, made major reference to two 
ideas in two of her three responses and where she made major reference 
exclusively to Author Interpretation, minor reference was also made to 
other ideas. The following is a rare example of a response that 
conformed closely to the hermeneutic ideal type and was coded 
exclusively using the Author Interpretation code. 
The two articles do not completely contradict each other. 
The 1st article assumes [the] use of the witness accounts to 
write about the Ranters. 
2nd article evaluates the witness accounts to prove the non-
existence of the Ranters. 
It is possible for there to be two different accounts. The 
difference of the accounts is a result of the interpretation of the 
witness accounts. 
If someone believes that [the] witness accounts were not a 
result of the disassociation of [the] Ranters [that] people tried 
to achieve and [that] they were valid, then the stories of 
Ranters could have been believed. 
Peter Year 2 Ranters78 
78 The words in parenthesis have been added to Peter's response to make its logical 
structure clearer. 
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Although there are ambiguities and elisions in this response, it is 
clear that variation was exclusively explained here in terms of decisions 
made in the process of constructing meaning. Account variation arises, 
as Peter said, "a result of the interpretation of the witness accounts". It is 
not a matter of preconceptions being imposed but of differential 
conclusions emerging as "a result" of interpretive assumptions. Meaning 
emerges through the interaction of assumption and archive and 
conclusions are shaped by assumption not pre-empted by imposition, as 
the "if... then..." logic of Peter's final paragraph shows. 
Similar ideas were apparent in a number of responses, such as the 
following: 
[I]t very much depends on how one perceives the evidence...the 
author of Account 1 believes that the existence of the "Ranters" 
in the play proves their actual existence... the author of account 
2 may have perceived their appearance in a play as nothing more 
than the fiction that plays often are. 
Alice Year 1 Ranters 
A similarly hermeneutic model of account construction is 
apparent in the following example, that was typical of Elizabeth's 
approach across the three tasks. 
The two accounts are written by completely different people with 
different views. No two people have the exact same view and 
interpret information in different ways. The ways authors 
interpret information affects their beliefs. 
The two writers may have had access to different accounts which 
would have consequently provided them with differing 
information on which to form conclusions. 
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Both accounts agree that evidence is 'minimal' and much of that 
is from hostile witnesses. It seems the two writers have 
interpreted this in different ways; one questioning the evidence, 
one cross-referencing. 
Both writers would have differing opinions on other events at 
that time that might have affected the way they interpreted the 
information, and their views on the topic. 
Account one is based solely on 'radical ideas during the English 
Revolution' and so would deal with the beliefs of the 'Ranters' 
explaining their 'radical ideas'. Account two, however, deals 
specifically with the 'myth' around the Ranters. Each piece was 
written for a different purpose and this explains the differences. 
Elizabeth Year 1 Ranters 
This response was multiply coded — as making major reference to 
ideas coded under Author Interpretation (in paragraphs one and three), 
Variable Sources (in paragraph two) and Author Background / Beliefs 
(in paragraph four) and as making minor reference to ideas coded under 
Author Focus (in paragraph five). It is clear, however, that Elizabeth was 
thinking hermeneutically. The word 'interpretation' occurs four times in 
her ten sentences and it is clearly understood as an interaction between 
ideas historians hold and data they examine. The form of Elizabeth's 
reference to variable sources differentiates her approach from 
testimonial approaches: for Elizabeth source materials were not 
testimony to be 'believed' but materials that yield "information... on 
which to form conclusions" and history was a matter of belief generation 
not preconception confirmation; as Elizabeth put it, in diametric 
opposition to an impositionist formulation, the "ways authors interpret 
information affects their beliefs." 
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It is apparent that Elizabeth's thinking was shaped by two 
propositions that are best described as hermeneutic, namely the 
propositions: 
1. that historical meaning emerges as sense is made of 
source materials; 
2. that the process of interpretation is inherently variable — 
because human beings are subjects who make meaning in 
variable ways. 
There are problems with this second proposition, of course: 
historians are not merely atomic individual subjectivities and 
interpretation has inter-subjective and conceptual dimensions.79 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that Elizabeth thought of interpretation as a 
process through which meanings are construed and constructed. 
Stuart's responses to all three tasks were remarkably consistent 
in form and the principle that interpretation is person relative was 
present in all them (as he noted in his Peterloo response, the historians 
had "interpreted... sources in different ways as every historian does"). 
Like Elizabeth, he suggested that historians use different interpretive 
strategies and also that historians make sense of individual factual 
propositions in different ways: 
79 Elizabeth was thinking, therefore at level 5, in Lee and Shemilt's accounts 
progression model (pp.73-74 above). 
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[T]he facts are just interpreted in different ways... just because... 
there were some anti-Semitic sections... does not meant that 
there could not have been pro-Jewish feeling too. The discussion 
of the censoring of news broadcasting during the war does not 
rule out pro-Jewish feeling in Britain... the anti-Semitic element 
could have been limited to just a few. 
Stuart Year 2 Holocaust 
Like Elizabeth also, Stuart invoked a range of ideas, including 
archival considerations such as the following — 
The fact that the sources were written 11 years apart also 
suggests a reason why they could be different as new evidence 
could have been introduced or old evidence disregarded. 
Stuart Year 2 Peterloo 
Although he referenced a range of considerations, Stuart clearly 
approached account variation in a hermeneutic manner, as the following 
response indicates. 
It is possible for there to be two such different accounts of the 
same issue because different people interpret evidence in 
different ways. 
Account one has accepted the sources at face value, believing 
exactly what they say about the Ranters. Account two however 
seems to have tried to look deeper into where the evidence comes 
from, the authors, their backgrounds and the number of sources, 
which has allowed him to come to his conclusion. 
It seems to me that such a different view can arise on one issue 
because there are few sources and so little evidence of the 
Ranters existence. 
The accounts were also written at different times, between 1975 
and 1987 new evidence could or could not have changed the way 
the situation looked and could be interpreted. 
Stuart Year 2 Ranters 
Stuart explained account variation here in terms of the individual 
construction of meaning through differential interpretive strategies: he 
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had one historian treat archival materials uncritically as testimony and 
the other question and contextualise sources; claims emerged from and 
follow engagement with the archive ("looked....which has allowed... 
conclusions"). Stuart was also aware that historians operate in contexts 
and that their presuppositions are not simply subjective whims: historical 
meaning arises through interaction between sources and historians' 
discourses and evidence can change perception.8°  
Approaches very similar to these examples can be found in the 
responses of respondents typed in different ways. Christine, for example, 
who conformed closely to the inquisitorial type in two of her task 
responses, responded to the Ranter task almost exclusively in 
hermeneutic terms. 
It is possible for there to be 2 such different accounts on the same 
argument due to the same evidence being interpreted in 2 very 
different ways. Account 1 uses the content of the evidence to 
show how many people were opposed to Ranters and concludes 
that therefore due to a highly publicised opposition that it must 
have been a major problem in order for it to be spoke of so much. 
As these accounts are against the Ranters they all show them in a 
bad way, focusing on the most outrageous parts of their beliefs. 
So account 1 concludes they were a large movement, with 
extreme beliefs who were hugely opposed as this is the only 
content of the evidence available. 
Whereas account 2 looks at the reliability and the roots of the 
evidence and what this can tell us about the Ranters. Account 2 
therefore shows that to begin with a lot of evidence of the Ranter 
movement was in the press, which would obviously 
sensationalise the truth in order to produce better stories. In turn 
these press reports were taken as fact causing many people to 
believe the movement was very big. This created huge 
80 On first inspection, Stuart and Ian (see p.105 above) were thinking in very similar 
ways However, Stuart talked in ways that connote meaning construction 
(` conclusion... interpretation') where Ian used the language of 'belief, which implies a 
testimonial approach. 
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opposition, causing written evidence to be opposed to the Ranters 
and exploiting the worst parts of a movement which was actually 
a myth created by the papers. 
The two accounts are so different as they both focus on different 
aspects of the evidence. Account 1 looks at the content of the 
evidence whereas account 2 looks at the origin and reliability of 
the evidence, causing them to conclude two totally different 
arguments. 
Christine Year 1 Ranters 
All but the last paragraph of Christine's response, which was 
coded under Author Focus, was coded using the Author Interpretation 
code category. There are many similarities between Christine's thinking 
here and the examples discussed above. Christine was clearly thinking in 
terms of emergent meanings. Whereas Stuart, for example, simply noted 
that authors had made different interpretive decisions, Christine explored 
the assumptions that they made in detail and showed how they led to 
variant meanings. Christine clearly thought that historians ask genuine 
questions and that these questions yield variable answers. Interpretation 
did not just involve inference (rather than imposition), it involved chains 
of inference, and conclusions conditioned by the reasoning rather than 
by the identities of their authors. 
Again, there are good grounds for positing a hermeneutic ideal 
type: we have clear examples of respondents whose explanations 
conform to type with consistency and there are clear similarities between 
them. It is also likely to be pedagogically useful to posit the type. 
Although these respondents recognised that history involves inference 
and meaning making, there is more to interpretation than generic 
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subjectivity. These students needed to know more about the role of 
concepts and traditions of enquiry, for example, and to engage further 
with history as a discipline. 
4.3.v Historians' Activities 3: Questioning History 
An ideal typical inquisitorial explanation for account variation 
would explain variation solely and exclusively in terms of the enquiries 
that the authors of accounts were pursuing when constructing their 
accounts, and explain variation in terms of the proposition that the 
authors are simply trying to do different things. In other words, an ideal 
typical inquisitorial explanation would explain variation solely by 
making reference to ideas identified by the Author Focus code and 
explain variation by saying 
• that historians have focused on different aspects of the 
past and / or 
• that historians have asked different questions of the 
same aspects of the past. 
An ideal typical inquisitorial respondent would explain account 
variation exclusively in these terms across all the three tasks. 
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No respondents conformed to type, however, two respondents 
made major reference to ideas coded under Author Focus in all three of 
their task responses (Vicky, Year 2 and Christine, Year 1) and two 
respondents (Frank, Yearl and Trina, Year 2) made major reference to 
ideas of this type in two of their three task responses. With the exception 
of Trina, however, all these respondents made major reference to other 
ideas also. Two of Trina's responses conformed to the inquisitorial ideal 
type, however, and showed this move operating as a sufficient 
explanation. 
Although the two accounts are not written at particularly 
different times... the titles of the two books... are perhaps a key 
to their differing accounts. 
Account One is "The Making of The English Working Class". 
This would coincide with the fact that Account One focuses 
largely on the fault of the middle class... In contrast, Account 
Two comes from "Aristocracy and People", which would 
perhaps be more focused on the upper middle classes or 
aristocracy's role in the event rather than the plight of the 
working class. 
Therefore, I believe that the fact that the two accounts are 
approaching the "Peterloo" event from the viewpoints of two 
differing classes allows for the two differing accounts of the 
same issue. 
Trina Year 2 Peterloo 
Although the two accounts seem to differ in their perception of 
Britain's role... in the 1930s period, both accounts are written in 
1999 and therefore presumably would benefit from the same kind 
of primary and secondary evidence and research. However, 
Account One is an article from the "Modern History Review" 
and therefore perhaps would have less room for constant debate 
surrounding this issue and would perhaps need to make... 
broader and sweeping statements regarding the treatment of Jews 
during the Holocaust. Whereas Account Two is an extract from a 
book debating specifically Britain's role in the Holocaust and 
therefore would perhaps be more focused [on]... the actual role 
of Britain in the Holocaust rather than any other country's role. 
Trina Year 2 Holocaust 
121 
Both responses modelled history as driven by questions and 
assumed that historians may entirely legitimately focus on differing 
issues, scrutinise different sources and articulate different claims. The 
task texts were modelled as answering different questions which we 
might construe as 'What role did the Middle Class play in Peterloo?' and 
`What role did the Aristocracy play in Peterloo?' and 'How were Jews 
treated during the Holocaust?' and 'What role did Britain play in the 
Holocaust?' The contrast with Jane's response (p.110 above) is striking: 
both respondents noted the same fact (differential focus) but Jane 
understood focus variation as manipulation. 
As was noted above, all of Christine's responses made major 
reference to inquisitorial ideas. The following was typical of her 
approach which was very similar to Trina's. 
Both accounts were written after the event at the same time, 
meaning neither is first hand evidence, which means it is easy for 
their opinions to be bias[ed] due to differing accounts they have 
heard. 
Account 1 is from a book looking generally at modern history 
whereas Account 2 has had more in depth research into the 
situation and could therefore gain a more rounded and less biased 
view. The situation can be seen in two very different lights as 
demonstrated by these accounts, this may be due to focusing on 
various aspects of what was or was not done to help. For 
example, Account 1 being a book on modern history from around 
the world may have concentrated more on comparing what 
Britain did to help in comparison to other countries. Whereas 
Account 2 may have concentrated on what more Britain could 
have done and not what they did do. The accounts differ as they 
take two different perspectives and concentrate on the differing 
points, which they feel are most important. 
Christine Year 1 Holocaust 
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The first paragraph of Christine's answer was coded as making 
minor reference to ideas coded under the They Are Secondary Sources 
and Variable Sources codes and material in the final three sentences of 
her response was coded as making minor reference to ideas coded under 
Author Interpretation as well as to ideas coded under Author Focus. The 
bulk of her response was coded under Author Focus. Christine suggested 
that an historian's focus might lead to differing ways of framing an 
issue, which in turn could lead to further differences in the questions that 
are asked and the comparisons that are made. This is clearly a 
sophisticated explanation for account variation and arguably a more 
sophisticated explanation than Trina's. 
Christine's response was remarkable also for containing a 
mixture of sophisticated and unsophisticated ideas. As we have seen, 
Christine clearly understood that history is constructed through 
questions, in the light of assumptions and so on. On the other hand, as 
her first paragraph above suggests, Christine also talked in ways that 
implied experiential thinking. The former set of ideas are dominant here, 
as elsewhere in her responses, and it is probable that her thinking has 
outgrown simpler but persistent default positions. 
Frank made major reference to inquisitorial considerations, 
coded under Author Focus, in two of his three responses and the 
following was typical of his approach. 
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It is possible for there to be 2 differing accounts on the same 
issue because each account although on the same issue focuses 
on different aspects. 
The first account seems to be more about British peoples' help 
and acceptance of the Jewish refugees, fund raising and home 
taking in refugees. Whereas account two focuses on some people 
who did not have such an accepting attitude, which could be 
because, according to the document, the British government did 
not fully inform the public of the situation in Germany. 
Each account has truth in it but account one is more positive to 
the attitude of the British people whereas account two gives a 
very mixed report. 
Frank Year 1 Holocaust 
Although elements of the final paragraph were coded as making 
minor reference to Author Bias, this response was almost exclusively 
coded using under Author Focus. Unlike Christine, who linked 
differences in content focus to differences in question focus, Frank 
simply suggested that account differences followed from differences in 
the content focus: no rationale was offered for content choices. 
Vicky, like Christine, made reference to ideas coded under 
Author Focus and also to a large number of other explanatory moves. 
Unlike Trina, Christine and Frank, however, Vicky combined major 
reference to ideas coded under Author Focus with major reference to 
ideas coded under Author Bias. 
They were written by different historians who would have had 
different purposes to their accounts. Account one for example, is 
from a book called "The Making of the English Working Class" 
and so naturally focuses on the role of class in Peterloo. 
The accounts were written on different dates, 1968 and 1979, this 
could affect the amount of evidence and research available to the 
historians. 
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The historians could be of different skill levels, this would affect 
the quality of their accounts. 
The authors could be biased and so only portray the event how 
they want others to see it and not what actually happened. 
The type of evidence could affect the accounts i.e. descriptive 
secondary evidence could make an account more unreliable. The 
authors are probably tailoring their accounts for different 
audiences. 
One historian could be incompetent and not have done thorough 
research. 
Vicky Year 2 Peterloo 
It is difficult to interpret Vicky's responses: she tended to 
provide ad hoc lists of possible explanations and it is hard to gauge the 
importance of any one explanation. This response was multiply coded 
using the Author Focus (paragraph 1), Variable and Limited Sources 
(paragraphs two and five), Author Error (paragraphs three and six), 
Author Bias (paragraph 4) and Audience codes (paragraph seven).81 It is 
clear, however, that inquisitorial considerations were key to Vicky's 
thinking: in all her responses her first move was to refer to variable 
`focuses' (Holocaust Task), 'purposes' (Peterloo Task) or 'objectives' 
(Ranters Task). It is also apparent that Vicky's reference to bias is 
simply one of a list of possible explanations and that she did not 
construe variable focus as a form of manipulation. 
Again there are good grounds for positing an inquisitorial ideal 
type: we have clear examples of respondents whose explanations 
conform to type. Again, there are lacunae here, however: it is not clear 
from the cases discussed why historians might want to ask different 
81 
 Author Error and Audience are Minor Codes. Minor Codes are exemplified at 
pp.253-254 below. 
125 
questions. As was the case with hermeneutic explanation, the pedagogic 
implications are clear: students who explain variation in this way are 
likely to need to know more about history as an interpersonal practice, to 
understand paradigmatic dimensions of enquiry, and so on. 
4.3.vi Atypical Respondents 
It will be recalled that there were five respondents who could not 
be mapped onto Figures 4.2(a) and (b) and who therefore were literally 
`atypical' since typicality was posited using those figures: 
• four respondents (Adam and Dan in Year 1 and Mary and 
Peter in Year 2) responded to each task in a different 
way; and 
• one respondent (Beatrice Year 1) made every move at 
least once. 
It will also be recalled that one of the respondents (Jenny Year 
1), who could be mapped onto Figure 4.2(b), was atypical in a looser 
sense: her response broke the pattern of contrast that held for the 
majority of respondents by simultaneously making major reference to 
impositionist and hermeneutic explanatory moves. 
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These respondents clearly do not conform to any type. How far 
can their explanations for account variation nevertheless be understood 
in terms of ideal typical moves? 
Two students (Adam, Year 1 and Peter, Year 2) explained 
variation in all three tasks without making major reference to 
impositionist explanations. 
We have discussed aspects of Adam's Holocaust response above 
(pp.101-102) and it was clear that he explained variation in the 
Holocaust accounts by making 'authorial explanation' moves. In his 
Ranter task response, Adam explained variation as follows. 
Both sources have said that they have found little evidence upon 
the subject of the Ranters. When there is not much to go on, there 
would always be a question upon how and whether these people 
existed. This is where the two conflicting views come from. 
Whereas Hill argues towards their existence, Davis argues 
against. This means that their views are always going to have the 
opportunity to clash. 
An example of this is that of the evidence they have got. Hill 
uses it to back up his evidence compared to Davis who decides to 
say it is useless and just dismisses it. 
Adam Year 1 Ranters 
The first four lines of this response were coded under Limited 
Sources and the remainder under Author Interpretation and it is apparent 
that Adam's explanation for variation in the Ranter case can be 
understood in terms of the archival and hermeneutic explanatory moves. 
It is clear from this response that historians can do different things with 
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sources and advance opposite arguments and that lack of evidence is a 
permissive condition for this. 
In his Peterloo response, Adam considered variable evidence as a 
possible permissive factor but dismissed this and explained variation as 
follows: 
There are a few similarities of the two accounts which illustrate 
some truth is written. These points may have then been played 
upon by authors or storytellers creating two different accounts. 
Adam Year 1 Peterloo 
It is possible that Adam thought that where the evidence is 
plentiful and reliable, difference could only be a matter of presentation. 
Adam's position here is reminiscent of explanations in terms of 'telling' 
identified in the CHATA data set (Lee, 1997, pp.31-32). The response 
was unusual here, however: no other respondent explained variation in 
this way.82 It is apparent, nevertheless, that two of Adam's three 
responses can be understood in terms of the ideal typical moves 
proposed above, and there is no suggestion of manipulation or 
imposition in his responses. 
We have already discussed Peter's Ranter response above 
(pp.113-114) and it will be recalled that variation was explained 
hermeneutically. What can be concluded from his remaining responses? 
Peter explained variation in his Peterloo response in terms of the 
82 Storytelling is a Minor Code. These codes are exemplified at pp.253-254 below. 
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limitations of sources ("lack of evidence"). Peter explained variation in 
his Holocaust response as follows. 
Account two points out that the British involvement with the 
Jewish people is poorly understood. This could be the reason 
why the accounts are different. Either account may contain errors 
or misinterpretation. 
Another possible reason why these accounts differ could be that 
they highlight and talk about different things. For example 
account one does not look into media but account two does. 
The articles may also differ because of the aim of the book. 
Account two is a book dedicated to Britain and the Holocaust 
and account two is a general history book, therefore the aim is 
different. Therefore detail is likely put on different things. 
Peter Year 2 Holocaust 
Peter's first explanatory move was coded as a minor reference to 
Author Error. The remainder of Peter's explanation clearly explained 
account variation in inquisitorial terms, in terms of differences of Author 
Focus. 
It is apparent, that like Adam, Peter can be understood as 
explaining account variation by making ideal typical explanatory moves 
and it is apparent that, like Adam, he made no major reference to 
impositionist moves in any of his responses. 
Dan (Year 1) and Mary (Year 2) explained variation in different 
ways in all tasks and did make major reference to impositionist 
explanations in at least one task. 
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Dan explained account variation by reference to ideas coded 
under Author Interpretation and Author Background / Beliefs in his 
Ranter response, to ideas coded under Author Bias in his Peterloo 
response and under Author Focus in his Holocaust response. We appear, 
therefore, to have a respondent who draws on hermeneutic, archival, 
impositionist and inquisitorial moves varying approach by task. I will 
examine the language that Dan used to explore historians' activities is all 
three responses to explore Dan's understanding of historians' activities 
more fully. 
In Dan's response to the Ranter task he contrasted the claims that 
the historians' made and he then explained this difference as follows: 
These two contrasting opinions about the same text could be due 
to the historians' personal opinions. They may have been taught 
about the subject during their education, or have knowledge from 
elsewhere, which could bias their opinion before even starting to 
look at the evidence. 
The difference could also be due to their personal empathy, or 
lack of it, towards Ranter beliefs. An atheist may be more likely 
to accept, and believe that there was such a group than a religious 
practiser. 
Dan Year 1 Ranters 
Dan explained variation here in authorial terms: historians 
existing opinions and beliefs remain static in their encounter with 
evidence and shape the conclusions they advance. 
In his Peterloo response Dan considered the possibility that the 
"historians had the same evidence...yet they interpreted it differently" 
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but argued that it was impossible to tell from the texts. His positive 
proposal was straightforwardly impositionist: historians begin with 
preconceptions and manipulate narration to conform to preconception. 
Another reason could be that the historians were approaching the 
event with the intention of encountering different views... 
Account One... part of "The Making of the English Working 
Class" may have been written... to make it appear that the 
working classes were suffering from cruel oppression and class 
hatred, yet... emerged victorious... 
Dan Year 1 Peterloo 
In contrast to his Peterloo response, which perceived differences 
of focus as differences in bias, Dan's Holocaust response noted that the 
two texts had a different "purpose" and "cover" a different "range of 
topics" and he clearly felt that this accounted for the differences in the 
texts. However, Dan concluded by explaining variation in terms of 
imposition, suggesting that 
One was looking for evidence to support the view that Britain 
held little blame, whereas the author of Account Two may have 
been looking more critically upon the government's actions. 
Dan Year 1 Holocaust 
Although Dan's moves vary by task, it is apparent that he 
conceived historical knowing in impositionist terms: interpretation is 
referenced but the language of interpretation is absent. 
Mary's explanations for account variation in the Ranter task were 
coded as making major reference to Author Interpretation and Limited 
Sources, in the Peterloo task as making major reference to Author Focus 
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and in the Holocaust task as making major reference to Author Bias. Her 
Peterloo and Holocaust answers were very similar, however, in that she 
also made minor reference to Author Bias in the former and minor 
reference to Author Focus in the latter. Again, I will examine the 
language that Mary used to characterise historians' activities in order to 
model her understandings more fully. 
Mary's Ranter response had hermeneutic themes. Mary 
explained the variation in her Ranter response in the following way. 
Whereas source 1 is taking the small sources they have and 
expanding them, 2 is questioning. It's merely a question of how 
sources are examined. 
Mary Year 2 Ranters 
Mary thought of historians as actively making sense of the record 
of the past and as reading it in different ways. Mary's Peterloo response 
supported this suggestion, demonstrating a clear awareness that the 
account authors were focusing on different things. 
The two accounts are arguing with different objectives. 1 is from 
a book "The Making of the Working Class" which is probably 
about their repression over the years and is bound to side with the 
workers... rather than discuss the aristocratic / working class 
problems... it chooses to highlight the problems found between 
the middle and working class. Source 2, however, is coming 
from the Aristocratic perspective... This is why its main debate 
is whether the magistrates made the correct decision... 
Mary Year 2 Peterloo 
It is apparent, however, that focus was conceived as side-taking: 
indeed, for Mary, difference in focus was "bound" to lead to bias. 
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Side-taking, rather than focus, was Mary's explanation for 
variation in the Holocaust task: Mary noted that the authors were 
"talking about different things" but construed this as tendentious 
selection and presentation: 
They are... manipulating the language they use and the figures to 
suggest their opinion... trying to be negative and saying 'only 
11,000... being positive by saying 'at least 55,000... both 
sources have taken the facts their way. By... including the... 
Austrian and Czech Jews they make it seem... big amount... 
Also source 2 does not say what action... after 1939, it only 
deals with the fact that it wasn't publicised... 1 does mention 
this. 
Mary Year 2 Holocaust. 
It is apparent that in these two tasks Mary understood variation in 
impositionist terms. Other processes, such as questioning, were 
referenced, but impositionism clearly played the key role. 
Beatrice made reference to all the explanation types at least once 
in her task responses and had two dominant moves, referring to ideas 
coded under Author Bias in her Peterloo and Holocaust responses and 
under Author Background / Beliefs in her Ranter and Holocaust 
responses. I will focus below on her Ranter and Holocaust responses: 
the contrast between the two is indicative of the range of her ideas and 
illustrates tensions in her thinking. 
Beatrice's Ranter response is reproduced below. 
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The two accounts occur due to the different interpretations made 
by the two historians. The two have looked at the evidence, and 
formulated different ideas. 
The lack of evidence also caused different interpretations to be 
made. It could have meant they did not exist, or that many 
dismissed the movement. 
The sources are also written in different times... Perhaps some of 
the evidence was shown to be unreliable. The accounts are also 
different, because of the different backgrounds of the historians, 
which may cause them to interpret the information differently. 
The issue is also less clear because of the time period. 
You could believe or not in the Ranters depending on the way in 
which you looked at the activities going on during that period, 
making the group 'Ranters' seem more or less likely. 
Beatrice Year 1 Ranters 
There are clearly hermeneutic ideas here: the historians have 
`looked' and then drawn conclusions and assumptions about context 
condition their judgments. 
Beatrice's Holocaust response began in ways that contrasted 
dramatically with this approach, however. 
Bias from the author and having access to different information 
will change the end conclusion from the author. 
Account 1 does not blame England for not helping. I believe that 
it is significant that it is by "Rubinstein" a traditional Jewish 
name, perhaps this person does not want to believe badly of one 
of the allies. 
Source 1 does not look into detail of British reaction to the war —
perhaps if it had done so a different opinion would have 
emerged. 
I also think that source 2 focuses more on German Jews or this 
seems to be implied — whereas source 1 talks about Jews saved 
from many regions of Europe. 
Beatrice Year 1 Holocaust 
The first half of this response is clearly impositionist: 'bias' and 
what historians 'want to believe' shape histories, however, the second 
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half reads very differently: enquiry replaces preconception and historians 
`look into' and 'focus' on variable issues. Beatrice's responses appear 
inconsistent therefore and one response appears internally inconsistent. 
It is possible, but no more than that, that the first half of her Holocaust 
response was a default position and the second half a reflective one. 
Jenny was unusual in making three dominant moves: making 
major reference to ideas coded under Author Interpretation and Limited 
Sources in her Ranter response, under Author Bias and Limited Sources 
in her Peterloo response and under Author Interpretation and Author 
Bias in her Holocaust response. Jenny's responses are of particular 
interest because they contrast and because her Holocaust response 
simultaneously made hermeneutic and impositionist moves, upsetting a 
contrast apparent in the majority of responses. 
Jenny's Ranter response is reminiscent of responses that we have 
examined already. 
It is possible to have 2 such differing accounts because the 
people who wrote them interpreted the resources... available 
differently. They both used similar sources, and both said that 
evidence was scarce... but the first account showed more of what 
was in them, and the 2nd seemed dissatisfied with them and 
commented more on their reliability that what they said. The 2nd 
account has then used the sources as examples of the hysteria of 
the time... It is possible for there to be... such differing 
accounts... because the reliability of the sources is questionable. 
Jenny Year 2 Ranters 
Jenny' response was coded as under Limited Sources and Author 
Interpretation. It is worth noting, however, that most of what Jenny said 
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focused on testimony and making judgments of credibility and on 
`showing' what was in a source rather than on the inferential 
construction of claims. 
Jenny's Peterloo response was structurally very similar to her 
Ranter response. 
The historians are also responsible for the difference, as they can 
exercise their personal opinions on the matter, choosing to show 
sources which best support them, as there is obviously a choice 
of differing ones. 
Jenny Year 1 Peterloo 
Again, we have the language of ostention - sources 'show' things 
— rather than the language of inference and history is construed as a 
rhetoric of claim-validation rather than a process of claim-development. 
When the underlying model of historians' activities underlying 
Jenny's Ranter and Peterloo responses is considered, then, the responses 
appear structurally similar. 
Jenny's Holocaust response needs to be cited at length, given its 
unique status in the data set. 
It is possible because either the accounts... differ in their 
interpretation of events and are subjective or they simply 
highlight whichever facts strengthen their case. 
Whilst account 1 shows British public opinion... account 2 
shows government knowledge... These opinions differ but could 
both have happened simultaneously because the government did 
not necessarily make the information it had public. While 
account 1 talks about the "growth in British hostility..." account 
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2 reminds us that "ministers feared a generous response". These 
ministers could have been overruled; if a minister fears 
something, that is not the end of it. 
Account 1 makes Britain sound better by stating the number of 
Jews from many different countries allowed into Britain, but 
account 2 makes Britain sound worse by only stating the amount 
of German Jews, which of course will be a smaller number. It 
also describes the numbers with "only" making sure the readers 
knows that Britain was not generous... 
[T]he accounts... differ so much because each historian has 
simply picked up the facts that support their argument and 
ignored those that do not. Neither of them have acknowledged 
the other opinion and argued against it. 
Jenny Year 1 Holocaust 
Some elements of this response (the second paragraph) were 
coded under Author Interpretation and some elements (principally the 
final paragraph) were coded under Author Bias. There is also material 
here that was coded under the Storytelling code (in the third paragraph). 
What actions did Jenny have historians take here? Historians 
were described as 'showing' things or said to 'talk of things; historians 
were described as manipulating representations through, for example, 
tendentious `highlighting'; and historians were described as selecting 
information tendentiously (picking only 'facts that support their 
argument'). It is clear that Jenny was making impositionist moves here. 
Although Jenny referred to interpretation, it was not modelled 
hermeneutically: interpretation was a matter of ostention and sources 
were sources of information rather than sources of inference. 
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4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has proposed and explored the value of an ideal 
typical schema of explanatory moves by applying the schema to model 
respondents' approaches to the written tasks. This ideal typical schema 
is heuristic only: the purpose is to aid comprehension of 'what is going 
on' in the student responses not to provide an exhaustive description of 
`what is happening' in the responses. 
Some of the ideal types are better supported in the data than 
others. We have good grounds for positing three ideal typical respondent 
types — impositionist, hermeneutic and inquisitorial. It is also apparent 
that there is a clear contrast in the data set between respondents who 
approximate to the impositionist type, on the one hand, and respondents 
who approximate to the hermeneutic and inquisitorial types on the other 
and that we can postulate a master opposition between impositionist and 
non-impositionist approaches to explaining account variation. The 
archival and authorial ideal types, are poorly instantiated in the data set: 
however, although we cannot posit respondent types we can posit 
response types; respondents make explanatory moves of these kinds 
even if they were not perceived as sufficient explanations. It is also 
apparent that where students did not conform to ideal types their 
responses can be understood as approximating to one or more ideal 
typical move. The schema therefore has application in modelling 
explanations of various kinds. 
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The ideal typical analysis echoes many conceptual contrasts 
identified in existing work on progression. The impositionist and 
hermeneutic ideal types, for example, are logically linked to contrasting 
conceptions of evidence, the former to testimonial and inferential 
conceptions of evidence corresponding to levels 3 and 4 in Lee and 
Shemilt's evidence progression model (pp.59-60 above) and to 
Collingwood's 'critical history' (p.57 above) and the latter being 
logically linked to level 5 on Lee and Shemilt's model and to 
Collingwood's 'scientific history'. 
It is also apparent from the discussion above that, although some 
respondents conform to the hermeneutic ideal type, these students retain 
a fundamentally personal and subjective conception of account variation 
in which interpretation is person relative and not theory, concept or 
criterion relative and it is apparent that these students are operating, 
therefore, at level 5 in Lee and Shemilt's accounts progression model 
(p.73 above). 
Types can be posited on two levels, then: at respondent level, 
where they have drawn attention to some clear patterns in this data set, 
and at the response level, since it is apparent that all the responses can be 
analysed using the five ideal types. The ideal typical schema is also 
likely to be useful pedagogically and diagnostically. As we have seen, 
reliance on particular ideal typical moves looks like being a clear 
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indicator of where teaching interventions might focus: on developing 
understandings of evidence, in the case of respondents whose responses 
conform to the impositionist ideal type; and on developing knowledge 
and understanding of interpersonal aspects of the discipline of history 
and of the importance of theory, concepts and criteria, in the case of the 
respondents conforming to the hermeneutic and inquisitorial ideal types. 
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Chapter 5. Data and Discussion: The Interview 
Task 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has posited an ideal typical model of 
explanatory moves and shown it to be analytically robust and 
diagnostically useful as a tool for thinking about student understandings. 
This chapter will test the robustness of the ideal typical against the 
interview data set and use it to explore respondents' thinking, as 
revealed by a richer data set. I will address the following three questions 
in the discussion that follows: 
• How far are respondents' approaches to explaining 
account variation in their interview responses consistent 
with the approaches that they adopted in their written 
tasks? 
• What light do interview responses shed on my 
respondents' understandings of historical accounts? 
• What limitations in my respondents' thinking do the 
interview responses reveal? 
The first question will be dealt with discretely and the second 
and third questions will be considered jointly. 
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5.2 Analysing the Interview Data 
It will be recalled that respondents were asked to answer the 
following question in their interviews: 
Why do historians disagree? 
The question was intentionally broad and, unlike the question 
posed in the written tasks, the question was a general question about 
historical disagreement rather than a specific question about account 
variation. 
As has been noted, at pages 34-5 above, the interviews involved 
a process of interaction in which, in some cases, respondents' ideas 
changed and developed. The typing of responses that follows will note 
the order in which particular moves appear in interview responses and 
type respondents in terms of an initial or 'default' position. 
Interviewees were volunteers and the sample is not representative 
of the written data sample: none of the respondents who were typed as 
making inquisitorial explanations in their written tasks volunteered. 
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5.3 Consistency Across the Written and Interview Tasks 
The interview data was coded using the codes and code 
categories developed for the written task data. It proved straightforward 
to code student responses using this coding system, although it was 
necessary to create two additional minor codes to code ideas that 
appeared in the interviews but not in the written data. Figure 5.1 presents 
the results of this coding. I will site one example of a coded response 
here to exemplify the process.83  
Ruth's interview response was coded as explaining disagreement 
in terms of Author Background / Beliefs, Author Bias, Author 
Interpretation and Author Psychology (in that order). The psychology 
code was a Minor Code that took account of reference to author 
psychology in two interviews and this category is explained further 
below." 
Ruth's interview began in the following way. 
Why do historians disagree? 
I think it's a lot to do with like individual... opinions... 
Because...people have different opinions with politics... and I 
think people view things in the way they want to see it... the 
historian will look at things like events in the way they 
perceive it and quite often they can... distort the information 
83 
 Further examples will be discussed below, where respondents' ideas are explored 
more fully, and the interview data coding is explained in Appendix 8.5 (pp.277-283). 
84 Minor Codes are listed at pp.282-3 and 253-4. 
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or... get what they want from the information to suit their way 
of thinking. 
Right, so... political views shape how they see the past? 
Yeah but it might not just be their political views, I mean for 
example their upbringing. 
How might that work then? 
I don't know. It... shapes someone. Some people... are quite 
negative some are quite positive and they are going to look on 
a situation in light of their past experiences and the way they 
see things. So... different historians... are all going to have 
different experiences and different ways to interpret it... and 
so they are going to see an event in a different way and they 
are going to see evidence in a different way. 
Ruth Year 2 
Ruth's initial answer clearly explained disagreement in terms of 
authorial factors which were held to operate in a classic impositionist 
manner (` distort... information... to suit'): interpretation was, 
metaphorically at least, a matter of perception and authorial 
preconceptions function like lenses that cause things to be 'seen' in 
distorted ways. 
Ruth's default position clearly conformed to the impositionist 
type, however, at times, later in the interview, Ruth also used the 
language of interpretation and these passages were coded in hermeneutic 
terms. 
The facts don't change. A fact is a fact and if it's true its 
always going to always stay true but you can always interpret 
it in different ways. 
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Could you explain that to me? So two different people could 
agree about the facts but interpret them in different ways. 
Could you give me an example? 
Erm... [Long pause] No. 
What you are saying is that the facts don't change, but what 
you think of them, the way you interpret them is going to be 
affected by who you are. 
Yeah. 
Could you give me an example of that? 
Say someone's been killed and the fact is they are dead okay, 
but people could interpret the way they are dead in two very 
different ways. Like someone with a negative attitude or very 
sort of suspicious is going to think 'murder' and someone else 
might just think 'natural death' or like suicide or something 
like that do you know what I mean. 
Ruth Year 2 
As is apparent from the pauses and interviewer interventions in 
this passage, Ruth experienced some difficulty when asked to develop 
and explore her explanations and it is likely that we were reaching the 
limits of her thinking about this topic here, nevertheless, she clearly 
referenced an interpretive process.85 It is apparent, however, that Ruth's 
default position was to think dispositionally or attitudinally about 
interpretation which she conceptualised as personal and affective rather 
than theoretical and conceptual. 
Ruth's last observation was developed further as follows, in 
terms that were coded as 'psychological' explanation: 
85 Ruth's comments are reminiscent of Kosellek's (at p.51 above). 
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People have always got... their own needs and desires and 
they are going to want to satisfy that in the way that they 
examine things. So if they... look at a piece of evidence they 
are not... going to go totally against what they believe and... 
they are going to try to make it work towards what they want 
because it's will satisfy them more. 
Ruth Year 2 
I cite this example to demonstrate how responses were coded and 
also to draw attention to the significance of the ordinal presentation of 
codes in Figure 5.1 below. Ruth's initial response to the question was 
straightforward to code, however, her position developed, in interaction 
with the interviewer, and additional explanations for disagreement 
emerged. 
In the analysis below (Figure 5.1) ideas that respondents 
proposed early in their interview will be used to identify respondents' 
default positions on historical disagreement. Further emergent ideas that 
develop during the interview will be considered in the subsequent 
discussion. 
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As the figure indicates, half the respondents explained 
disagreement by making reference to ideas coded under Author 
Background / Beliefs and Author Bias in their first two explanatory 
moves. Reference to Figure 4.3(a) and (b) and to the discussion in 
Chapter 4 indicates that with one exception, George Year 2, these 
respondents were typed as explaining account variation in impositionist 
terms in their written task responses: we can say, therefore, that five of 
these six respondents are broadly consistent in their approaches across 
both data sets. 
Two respondents explained variation by making reference to 
ideas coded under Limited or Variable Sources and Author Bias in their 
first two explanatory moves. Mark explained variation in terms of biased 
or partial source materials and authorial bias and his initial position was 
entirely consistent with the approach that he adopted across his three 
written tasks. Ben explained variation in terms of limited sources, author 
error and author bias (in that order).86 Ben's interview response was 
largely inconsistent with his written data responses (as Figure 4.3(a) 
shows, Author Interpretation was his dominant move in two of his 
written responses). 
The remaining four respondents explained disagreement in their 
initial explanations in non-impositionist terms. Adam and Stuart 
explained variation by making reference to ideas coded under Limited or 
86 The 'Author Error' code is illustrated in the discussion of Ben's interview (pp. 173-
177 below). Minor Codes are listed at pp.282-3 and 253-4. 
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Variable Sources and Author Interpretation in their first two explanatory 
moves; Elizabeth explained variation by making reference to ideas 
coded under Limited or Variable Sources and Author Background / 
Beliefs in her first two explanatory moves; and Peter explained variation 
by making reference to ideas coded under Author Background / Beliefs 
and Author Interpretation in his first two explanatory moves. Author 
Bias figured in three of these four responses but late in the interviews 
and in response to questioning aiming to develop initial responses. It will 
be recalled that these respondents were typed as making either clearly 
hermeneutic or consistently non-impositionist explanations for account 
variation in their written responses: their interview and written data 
responses are therefore broadly consistent. 
Ten of the twelve respondents were consistent in approach across 
both data sets where their initial interview responses are concerned. The 
typing of respondents in Chapter 4 is therefore confirmed by the 
interview data: the majority of respondents approached the interview 
task in ways that might have been predicted on the basis of their written 
task responses. 
A number of additional observations follow from Figure 5.1. 
It is apparent that inquisitorial explanatory move figured in only 
one of the twelve interview responses: it will be recalled, however, that 
the interview sample was not representative of the written data sample. 
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It is also apparent that seven of the twelve respondents made 
reference to both Author Bias and Author Interpretation in their 
responses, an observation that argues against the suggestion in Chapter 4 
that these modes of explanation contrast strongly. This can be 
considered a task effect, however: respondents were asked to suggest 
additional explanations to those that they initially offered during the 
interview and respondents whose initial position is to reference Author 
Interpretation (such as Stuart) made reference to Author Bias late in their 
responses: the contrast claim stands, therefore, for respondents' initial 
positions on disagreement. This claim is further supported by the fact 
that four of the six respondents whose initial positions were authorial 
and impositionist made no reference to ideas coded by Author 
Interpretation in their interviews. 
It will be recalled that the discussion in Chapter 4 argued that 
although there were grounds for positing authorial and archival 
explanatory types, these forms of explanation for variation were 
essentially incomplete. Figure 5.1 indicates that both explanatory moves 
are prominent in the interview data set. As the discussion below will 
show, however, these ideas worked in combination with other moves 
and did not stand alone as explanations for variation. 
This chapter will analyse the interview responses in detail. I will 
focus on three features of responses in particular and explore: 
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• the forms and limits of impositionist explanations; 
• the forms and limits of hermeneutic explanations and 
• explanations that foregrounded archival explanations for 
historical disagreement. 
The themes that I am foregrounding reflect instructive features of 
respondents' answers from a pedagogic perspective and allow key 
issues, such as conceptions of evidence, to be considered. 
5.4 Impositionist Explanations for Historical 
Disagreement 
The interview data set contains many examples of impositionist 
explanation. All respondents, with the exception of Peter in Year 2, 
made some reference to ideas coded under Author Bias and seven of the 
twelve respondents made reference these ideas in their first or their 
second explanatory move. Six of the twelve interview respondents' first 
two explanatory moves made reference to ideas coded under Author 
Bias and Author Background Beliefs and historical disagreement was 
essentially a function of imposed authorial preconceptions for these 
respondents. This section of the discussion will focus on those 
respondents who made particular reference to impositionist themes; 
reference will also be made, however, to impositionist explanations 
offered by respondents whose initial positions were hermeneutic. 
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I will focus in particular on two respondents (Jenny and Kim) 
whose responses differ greatly in sophistication and allow the range 
covered by an impositionist stance to be indicated. 
The opening section of Jenny's interview is reproduced below. 
Why do historians disagree? 
... Well if it's about two different sides of an event then they 
could just have come from... different sides or they could have 
been educated in the manner of the two... sides... they could 
have just grown up thinking two different things... 
Could you give me an example? 
Like the Peterloo Massacre. 
Right. 
Or like if two different countries had been at war someone 
who had been educated in one country could grow up thinking 
completely different things from the other side. 
Right. Are there things where there aren't two sides that there 
might be disagreement about? 
Well... they just have different beliefs. Depending on how 
they want to interpret the sources, they could interpret them to 
fit their beliefs, well not entirely but to an extent. Yeah when 
they are just trying to get across their beliefs. 
Okay so you could have this idea of taking sides. Are there any 
other reasons why people might draw different conclusions or 
come to different assessments other than being one-sided or 
having something to prove? 
Well if they just have interpreted things, like not with a certain 
hypothesis but if they just happen to see it differently. Like the 
same as the one before but without a set out plan. 
So without intending to see it differently they just do? 
Right. 
Jenny Year 1 
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The extract suggests that, although Jenny was reluctant to claim 
that historical disagreement was a simple matter of deliberate 
imposition, she understood historical interpretation in impositionist 
terms as an expression of identity or personal agendas. 
My next question asked Jenny to explain the reference to 
"interpretation" in her previous answer. 
Could you tell me a bit about this idea of interpretation? 
Could you give... an example... or explain what it means to 
interpret things differently? 
Well it could be to do with... The way sentences are written. 
Right 
Or something, just the way the words are placed they can kind 
of lean towards certain things, like, yeah, if you just want to 
break it down to how they have used the language and stuff 
Right 
Jenny Year 1 
At first it looks as if Jenny was moving into hermeneutic territory 
here, however, it becomes apparent that Jenny understood interpretation 
as shaping sense rather than as making sense. 
[I]t can kind of be moulded... or just they could take different 
parts. Like if you have a whole lot of writing or an account of 
a diary entry or something. 
Right. 
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You can just take different parts that just agree or just take on 
part that just agrees with what you are saying and ignore the 
other bits. 
That's coming back to the idea of being one-sided isn't it? 
Yeah. 
Jenny Year 1 
For Jenny, then, historical disagreement was either arbitrary or 
driven by conscious or unconscious imposition of preconceptions and 
agendas and imposition operated through selection — tendentious 
selection of materials or selective 'seeing'. 
Similar explanations for disagreement appeared in many 
responses, alongside a range of other moves: three examples follow. 
Some way into his explanations for variations for accounts Adam 
(Year 1), observed that 
Some people may want to... be patriotic and make their 
country look good and stuff and may already be biased in a 
way and...try to swing the data and make it look good for their 
country. 
Mark (Year 2) made similar suggestions: 
[A] German historian is not going to... want to accept that his 
country were responsible for killing millions... and... the 
British cream over the idea of colonisation, what they did to 
Africa and places like that. 
George (Year 2) provided theoretical motivations for imposition: 
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If you are a Feminist then you are going to see the Suffrage 
movement in a much different way to if you are a conservative 
man. If you set out to try and show that men were dominating 
and repressing women and it was right and proper for women 
to stand up and try and get the vote then you are obviously 
going to try and interpret the information that you are given as 
that perspective. You're not going to say this is what I set out 
to do and then start looking at things. You're going to see what 
you want to see. You're going to take the information and 
present the information that upholds your side of the argument 
and conveniently ignore anything else. 
We have already seen that Ruth suggested that historians are 
driven to impose meaning by psychological need. Edward (Year 1) 
developed psychological explanation for imposition in a number of 
directions: 
Perhaps some historians are out there to make this claim for 
themselves, to make themselves famous maybe... It's also 
perhaps the need to get clarity about something. So this is it, 
this happened, I say this happened, look at my example, 
everyone learn from that... 
The motors of imposition vary between these examples but the 
mechanisms seem constant: interpretation is tendentious selection or 
presentation. 
Impositionist approaches no doubt have application and it is easy 
to find cases where historical writing has been shaped by author bias.87 
87 Allegations of bias are common in historiography (for example, Thompson, 1994, 
pp.168-192, Lindgren, 2002 and Evans, 2000, pp.116-128); as these examples show, 
however, the interpersonal nature of historical practice places constrains on 'seeing 
what you want to see'. 
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However, there are serious limitations to the impositionist model of 
historical interpretation. 
Firstly, reference to individual biases foregrounds individual 
subjectivity and thus fails, as Goldstein put it, 'to attend to history as a 
discipline, seeing instead only historians in conflict' (Goldstein, 1976, 
p.132). 
Subjectivity clearly plays a crucial role in history and, as Schama 
puts it "claims for historical knowledge must always be fatally 
circumscribed by the character and prejudices of its narrator" (1991, 
p.32). However, as has been noted in Chapter 3 (pp.53-54), history is an 
interpersonal practice and texts become historical not by being authored 
but by being structured around an 'infrastructure' of citation and 
argument, running alongside their 'superstructure' of substantive claims 
and narration (Goldstein, 1976, pp.140-143; Grafton, 2003, pp.231-233). 
By definition, then, history constrains subjectivity and to foreground 
subjectivity is to underestimate the disciplinary nature of the historical 
enterprise. 
Secondly, impositionist explanations presuppose but do not 
provide a theory of interpretation. To make tendentious selections from 
sources to support presuppositions one has first to perceive meaning in 
the relics and reports surviving in the present: there has to be meaning 
before it can be manipulated. There is little explicit discussion in these 
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responses of how meaning might arise and, as we will see further below, 
impositionism and 'scissors and paste' thinking are often connected. 
Kim's interview was very probably the most sophisticated in the 
data set. Kim articulated a developed theory of interpretation and one 
that made plentiful contrasts between historical knowing and other forms 
of knowledge. However, Kim's underlying model of historical sense 
making ultimately appears to have been impositionist. 
Kim (Year 2)'s starting point was that history is about judgment 
— about evaluating the actions of other people. 
Why do historians disagree? 
Probably because they are human... Well we all make 
judgements... depending on our own beliefs and values... so 
the same would apply to how we judge other peoples' actions 
and that's what history is, basically, the actions of other 
people. It's not so much about things as in science... You can't 
really judge an atom because it just is whereas you can judge 
Napoleon because he existed, he had his own values and 
judgements and it's really easy to super-impose our own ones 
on top of theirs so that's why you can have lots of different 
interpretations of the same thing. That would be my reason. 
For Kim two worlds of meaning were involved in historical 
interpretation, the world/s of past actors, who have their own 'values and 
judgments' and the world/s of historians who similarly have 'beliefs and 
values', and historical disagreements arose because individual 
historians' beliefs and values' differed from those of past actors and 
other historians. Although this may be an over-interpretation, it looks as 
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if Kim modelled historical writing as the re-evaluation by historians of 
decisions made by past actors, in the light of historians' criteria of 
evaluation and, as will appear below, of what historians now know in 
their present. 
Kim explicitly used impositionist language to describe the 
interactions between these two worlds of meaning: historians "super-
impose" their value orientations on the past actors that they write about 
and the interactions between the historian and the past are one-way, 
preconception acting on the archive but not vice versa.88 It is apparent, 
however, that Kim was not thinking in terms of deliberate and witting 
distortion: she set out with the premise that history is an activity of a 
particular kind (judging what other people have done) that cannot be 
conducted without criteria of judgment (beliefs and values): it was not a 
matter of historians recognising actions shaped by past 'values and 
judgments' which they then deliberately construed in anachronistic 
terms; it was rather that historians construe meaning using their own 
categories. 
I challenged the idea that history was simply about judgment — 
offering explanation as an alternative also — to which Kim replied: 
Yeah but it is still in the same way because you could explain 
the actions of an atom in a way that would mean that everyone 
could more or less agree on it because you can say it acts... in 
88  It is worth noting that Kim does not rule out non-imposition, since to say that 'it is 
really easy to super-impose' anachronistic values is not to say that it is impossible to 
avoid such imposition. Kim's interview responses, however, focus on imposition and 
do not address the possibility of non-imposition. 
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like a rational logical way... by a set of rules. There is no set 
of rules for human actions. So I wouldn't say judge but 
explaining it would still impose your own values and how you 
view things because we have hindsight and which obviously 
the people living at the time wouldn't. 
For Kim cognitive activity involved procedures: scientific 
interpretation was the application of laws and rules and historians could 
not have these, she argued, because of the nature of their object; instead 
they use variable values and theories to make sense of the actions of past 
actors.89 There is clearly a hermeneutic insight here and one that echoes 
debates on the role of interpretation in the human sciences (Callinicos, 
1988). 
Kim also referenced hindsight and, presumably, the fact that the 
meaning of things past is inherently open because conditioned by 
subsequent events: as well as having different theories and values, 
therefore, historians had information about consequences, that they 
could draw upon when evaluating past actions, that could not have been 
available to past actors. 
Modes of historical reading, drawing upon reflexivity about 
historical knowing, followed from Kim's model of how historical 
accounts were created. 
You know everybody, all history students get taught how to 
analyse sources. Well you don't have to learn that skill in science 
89 I 
construe Kim's 'how you view things' to denote theories about how the world 
works. 
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or maths. In Chemistry I get given a set of results... the model 
results... that theoretically you should get... In history I don't 
have a nice model theoretical set of results to which I can work... 
It is simply a case of 'okay his opinion is this, his approach is 
this, he's a Marxist he would take this view, he's right wing he 
would take this view', therefore... how much value should I 
place on this source, for this particular argument coming from 
this approach. It's much more complex and you don't have any 
straightforward evidence most of the time because, you know, all 
evidence can be interpreted. 
Since, for Kim, historical interpretation involved the 
interpretation of the past by the imposition on it of variable values and 
theories in the present, understanding historical writing entailed being 
reflexively aware of the values and theories that had been used to create 
it. 
It is apparent, from the above, that Kim had a very sophisticated 
understanding of historical writing. It is equally apparent, however, that 
there were a number of problems with Kim's ideas, as they are stated 
here. 
On the one hand, although Kim did not acknowledge that there 
was more to historical interpretation than evaluation, Kim clearly 
understood history as primarily about judgment. Explanation and 
description are no doubt impossible without tacit evaluation but they are 
in principle distinct from evaluative judgment (Megill, 2007). There are 
also alternative accounts of why things happen in history (for example) 
and rival explanatory theories are not in the first instance evaluative 
theories (Callinicos, 1995, pp.95-109). What appears to be missing from 
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Kim's responses is an account of the theoretical equipment that 
historians would need in order to describe, explain and so on (Megill, 
2007), and these operations are logically prior to evaluation. 
On the other hand, ultimately, for Kim, history was about the 
imposition of judgments on the past. Kim is not alone in talking in this 
way, of course and there is a very real sense in which history does 
indeed entail imposition of precisely this kind.90 However, the ideas that 
historians bring with them to the archive are neither monolithic nor 
impervious to revision. As Richard Evans' explains: 
Of course you set out with all sorts of assumptions... you go 
into the archives with a set of these ideas, derived partly from 
your reading of the secondary work, and then... you start 
reading through the files... Ferdinand Braudel has a wonderful 
image. He says that theory for historians is like a boat that you 
send back down the river of time. Eventually it will founder on 
the rocks of evidence, but you see how far you can send it. 
(Richard J. Evans, quoted in Kustow, 2000, p.28). 
90 This is a key theme in postmodernist critiques of historical practice (Daddow, 2004; 
Jenkins, 1991). 
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5.5 Hermeneutic Explanations for Historical Disagreement 
As Figure 5.1 indicated, historians' background beliefs played an 
important role in non-impositionist explanations for disagreement, as 
well as in impositionist explanations. Authorial explanation played a key 
role in the initial responses of both Peter and Elizabeth and was linked, 
in Elizabeth's case, to archival explanations for disagreement. Non-
impositionist explanations for disagreement also combined reference to 
archival factors and hermeneutic factors, as the coding of Adam and 
Stuart's responses shows. As Figure 5.1 suggests, references to 
hermeneutic themes were not confined to respondents whose initial 
response to the interview questions was hermeneutic — indeed, as will 
become apparent below, the most developed discussion of how sources 
can be interrogated appeared late in Mark's interview, which began in an 
impositionist manner.91 The discussion that follows examines some 
straightforwardly non-impositionist explanations for disagreement as 
well as hermeneutic elements of responses that were predominantly or 
initially impositionist. 
As was the case with the respondents discussed in section 5.4, 
there are clear limitations to the conceptualisation of historical 
interpretation offered by the respondents discussed below: the discussion 
will identify where respondents do and where they do not appear to have 
the tools to hand that they need to make sense of what historians do. 
91 
 Mark's initial response to the interview question is discussed at pp.177-178 below. 
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Both Adam (Year 1) and Stuart (Year 2) explained historical 
disagreement by making initial reference to hermeneutic and archival 
factors. I will discuss each interview in turn. 
Why do historians disagree? 
I think some people give their different interpretations from 
different sources and, they all have their different theories and 
they put this on paper and stuff and that's why you've got 
different ideas. 
Could you take me through some of that in a bit more detail? 
So you were saying that they will interpret things differently? 
Interpret sources and stuff. 
And you mentioned different theories, so could you take me 
through that in a bit more detail? 
Well if the source is quite general and isn't specific enough 
then they may think that in a different way another historian 
would and the problem is they conclude things already. 
Right 
And they... use other sources and data to back up the 
conclusions they have already got. 
Adam Year 1 
This is a compact explanation and there are problems with 
seeking to draw too much from it. Nevertheless, there clearly is a 
hermeneutic process here. Adam started with sources and this is where 
Adam saw historians' ideas as originating. For Adam, and in clear 
contrast to the impositionist proposition that historians' conclusions 
precede this encounter, historians examined sources and then began to 
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form ideas. These ideas were likely to be highly variable where the 
record was thin. Once historians have formed their initial ideas they 
return to the archive and interpret what they then see there in the light of 
the conclusion that they have already formed and Adam's language 
implied imposition from here on. It is clear that Adam saw meaning as 
constructed through a process of interaction between an archive and an 
historian rather than something that historians preconceive and rigidly 
impose. 
Like Adam, Stuart's response began by making reference to 
archival considerations. 
I am interested in why historians disagree. Can you give me 
your thoughts on that? 
Because they will be looking at many different types of... 
Some historians will look at some types of document and 
others will look at different ones and even if they look at the 
same ones they will interpret them differently because it's the 
very nature of a document that you can interpret it differently, 
because different people are looking for different things. 
Could you explain that a bit to me? So, basically, different 
documents or the same documents. Why is it inevitable that 
people interpret them differently? Could you give me some 
examples of that? 
There could be bias. So if you are biased towards a certain 
thing you might look for the positives in something which you 
might see as overshadowing the negatives or if you were just 
looking for different things, if you were looking for more 
social things, other people might look for more political things 
in a document then you are going to come up with some 
differences. 
Right. Okay... Are there any other factors? 
Political, social pressures, the society you are living in, or is 
that the same as bias? I don't know you might interpret 
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something differently if there is a different climate of feeling at 
that time towards something, so... if there's an anti-communist 
feeling you might just be predisposed to... follow that feeling 
Stuart Year 2 
Stuart's initial answer clearly showed hermeneutic and 
inquisitorial awareness of the nature of historical interpretation: for 
Stuart, documents did not speak for themselves and had to be made to 
speak and historians approached documents with questions and might 
seek out different documents depending on their questions. His response 
did not give us detailed insight into why this might be, however. Stuart 
suggested two explanations for enquiry variation: an impositionist 
explanation, in which bias drives tendentious selection and an 
underdeveloped theoretical explanation, in which historians look for 
different categories of evidence or at different aspects of evidence. It is 
possible that we had reached the limit of Stuart's thinking here and it is 
equally possible that his responses could have been developed further by 
more effective follow up questions (such as 'Why might historians look 
for different kinds of thing?'). 
Peter's (Year 2) response raised similar issues, by talking about 
the fact that historians often chose to approach data or problems in 
different ways. It was clear, however, that Peter has only a very general 
explanation available for why historians might make such choices. 
Peter's response begins with a principle — reminiscent of many of the 
comments in the written task data. Historians may disagree, Peter argues 
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Because things can be interpreted in different ways. Some people 
may have different beliefs and therefore they look at things and 
someone may look at things a different way to another person 
Peter gave a number of examples, drawn from everyday life, 
before giving the following example in reply to request to be more 
history specific. 
Well evidence can be interpreted in different ways, for 
example the Gestapo in Germany was very short numbered 
and some people could say they could still terrorise because 
there's people in camps, but Gellately said well they can't 
because it's structurally impossible. People have different 
opinions and will interpret evidence in different ways so 
opinions can be different. 
Peter then glossed this example with the observation, 
[I]f it is a source or evidence it... people can interpret it in 
different ways because people have different thinking methods 
and no one's the same. 
Peter Year 2 
Peter was clear here about the fact that history involves argument 
and his example showed how a fact can be interpreted to support more 
than one inference — in this case a fact about the Gestapo (they 'were 
very short numbered') that, in conjunction with assumptions that Peter 
did not reference here, can yield the conclusion that terror was 
`structurally impossible' or that, when interpreted in conjunction with 
other facts (there were 'people in camps') can yield another conclusion. 
This is an important insight and clearly recognises that facts do not 
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`speak for themselves' or even speak at all without intervention.92 
However, Peter's explanation of the fact that historians can use the same 
fact about the past to ground variable inferences is vague at best 
(`different thinking methods' of what nature?): further observations, that 
Peter did not deploy here, about the ways in which historians' theoretical 
frameworks and concepts shape and enable their interpretation of data 
need to be adduced to fully make sense of his example. It is apparent 
that Peter was aware that the meaning of the data depends upon the 
apparatus that historians bring to bear on it but it is equally apparent that 
he lacked an analytical vocabulary to develop this awareness. 
Similar references to theoretical dimensions of historical 
interpretation were apparent in comments in Mark's interview. 
... a Nazi sympathiser is likely to have a different perspective 
to say a communist... because they've got their own bias, their 
own political views which influence their opinions. 
Right. And you are saying that comes through in the sources? 
Or is it in the historians' writing as well as the source 
material? 
C 
Yes depending on what sort of ... Like there's strituralists, 
intentionalist historians who put more weight on different 
opinions. 
Both Mark and Peter glossed complex theoretical questions, that 
ultimately relate to philosophical and methodological propositions as 
well as to political and moral stances (Kershaw, 1993, pp.5-15), in terms 
92 Student debate focused on this issue is exemplified in Chapman and Hibbert, 2009, at 
pp.141-142 and teaching strategies to engage students with assumptions are discussed 
in Chapman, 2006(a). 
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of everyday ideas: in Peter's case in terms of generalised subjectivity 
and in Mark's case in terms of opinion and bias. 
Mark returned to similar ideas later in his interview and again 
understood theoretical questions in essentially personal terms. 
It just depends on subjective ways of analysing... stuff. They 
might analyse things differently and put more weight on 
different evidence.... 
Could you explain why that is? It is a rather interesting idea... 
why is it that they give different weight to different things, why 
do they analyse things differently? 
Some people might give more weight to accounts by everyday 
people and they might see them as the unbiased accounts and 
put more weight on it and other people might put more weight 
on say Nazi reports. 
So is it to do with historians' evaluation of the evidence then? 
Yes. 
Why might they put more weight on one kind? Top-down / 
bottom-up evidence for example? Every day sources versus 
government sources? Why might they make the decision that 
government sources were more reliable?93  
Well because it depends on the historian. For example in our 
class we all do the same coursework but we all come up with 
different conclusions from the evidence we have read. We 
have all had the same sources the same material but we have 
all come up with different conclusions and also a lot of it can 
be influenced by preconceptions. Before studying it you've got 
preconceptions of what happened and also your opinions on 
things. Like before you study Nazism you might have 
preconceptions about the Nazis or preconceptions about 
Communism. 
Mark Year 2 
93 This is a poorly phrased and possibly leading question and 'reliability' is not the 
issue here, however, Mark appeared to cope. 
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On the one hand we have a sophisticated description of different 
things that historians may do, including the claim that historians may use 
different methods and / or analyse different archives. On the other hand 
we have relatively nave explanations of why historians might do things 
differently, including everyday subjectivity and the notion of 
preconception (which would probably lead us back to the idea of 
imposition). What was missing here? On the one hand, the notion of a 
rationale for choices of methods, or, in other words, the idea that 
methods may be linked to methodology or to assumptions about how the 
world works that lead historians to chose methods of different kinds and 
/ or to select archival material of varying types. It is notable, in fact, that 
Mark's historians did not choose to do things differently and simply did 
things differently in an apparently arbitrary way without any clear 
rationale: "it just depends on subjective ways of analysing... stuff" 
Elizabeth's response developed hermeneutic insights in a 
different direction, referring us to many of the issues we have 
encountered already but also to the activity of interpreting documentary 
text. 
Why do historians disagree? 
Historians have access to different sources. 
Right 
Sources differ and it depends on where they take their 
information from and how many sources they take their 
information from 
169 
Right 
As to the different views they have 
Right 
And it also depends on the way they have thought about the 
topic before they started studying it. Because if they already 
have an idea or a view on something then the way they 
interpreted the sources would be different. 
Okay 
And people don't interpret sources in the same way and so 
they pull out different ideas from the sources 
Right... So you might come along and pick out different 
sources to study the past and then people interpret sources in 
different ways 
Yes 
What does it mean if you interpret something? 
...Some people might read into something more than others 
and some people take things at face value whereas others will 
like 'read between the lines' and take out ideas that aren't 
explicit in the writing. 
Elizabeth Year 1 
In contrast to Jenny's account of reading, in which historians 
simply selected and moulded text, Elizabeth talked about different ways 
of reading — depth and surface reading (or perhaps inferential reading) — 
and clearly showed that she did not construe historians as using 
documents in a simple 'scissors and paste' manner. Again, however, this 
observation was under-theorised and no indication was given of why 
historians might adopt different reading strategies. 
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The most sophisticated and detailed account of the kind of 
reading that historians can engage in was found in Mark's interview. As 
Figure 5.1 indicates and as is discussed further at pages 177-178 below, 
Mark's initial position on historical disagreement was impositionist in 
character. Mark began his interview with the same approach that he had 
taken in his answers to the written tasks (and even using some of the 
same phrases) but subsequently, and in response to interviewer 
questioning, Mark went on to develop observations that clearly showed 
that he recognised that meanings can emerge through research as much 
as be imposed by researchers. 
I am still intrigued by this question of why people analyse 
things differently. 
Well... some people might be more critical, whereas some 
people might take a source and take it on face value other 
people might take certain aspects of a source. Say if it's a 
report... and it is going one way, it might infer something 
else. One small aspect might stand out to someone else and 
they might draw on that as opposed to what the source is trying 
to sum up. Like it could be a source about Hitler's daily life 
and it could be going towards his dislike for the Jews that 
might be where the source is going but one historian might 
read into it that he spends three hours in the morning reading 
newspapers as opposed to what the source is actually trying to 
tell. It depends how you analyse it. People read in things 
differently. 
So you can use the same piece of information to draw quite a 
lot of different kinds of conclusions depending on... 
And also the way it is written. 
How does that come into it then? 
Well not necessarily the source itself but the structure of the 
source, how it is written, the tone of the source: that can infer 
more than the actual content. 
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Right. 
How it's written... it could be quite aggressive towards the 
Jews, or it could be that from the structure of the source you 
could tell more about the situation than the actual content 
which could be quite bland. 
Mark Year 2 
This passage contrasted dramatically with Mark's thinking 
elsewhere in his interview and written tasks. It will be recalled, and as 
we shall see further below, that Mark' initial response when asked to 
explain variation or disagreement was an impositionist explanation 
linked to a 'scissors and paste' testimonial theory of evidence (pages 
111-112 above and pages 177-178 below). It is quite clear, however, that 
this default position was in tension with the sophisticated notions of 
reading presented here. He was referring here to the notion of 'reading 
against the grain', or of making meanings from testimony or data other 
than the meanings that those who constructed it intended to 
communicate. In other words, Mark articulated an inferential or, in 
Collingwood's terms, 'scientific' reading of sources even though his 
default position on historical reading was a scissors and paste and 
testimonial one: Mark's practice, therefore, conflicted with his theory of 
practice.94 
5.6 Informatic Explanations for Disagreement. 
94 Collingwood's ideas are described at pp.57-58 above. Reading evidence against the 
grain is discussed and exemplified in Mukherjee (2007). 
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As Figure 5.1 showed, reference to Author Background Beliefs, 
(or Authorial explanations for disagreement) in respondents' initial 
responses to the interview question was found in responses categorised 
as impositionist and in responses categorised as hermeneutic. Previous 
sections of this chapter have explored how these ideas fitted together. As 
Figure 5.1 also showed, reference to ideas coded under Variable Sources 
and Limited Sources in respondents' initial responses to the interview 
question occurred in two cases categorised as impositionist (Mark and 
Ben) and in two cases categorised as hermeneutic (Elizabeth and Peter). 
We have already discussed Elizabeth and Peter's interviews (at pp.165- 
167 and 169-170 above). The ways in which archival explanations relate 
to impositionist explanations for historical disagreement will now be 
explored. 
It is clear from a number of Ben (Year 1)'s comments during his 
interview that he modelled historians' practices in an impositionist 
manner as the following passage demonstrates. 
[T]he historian, like all the other historians who had written 
before him, is probably going to write from a certain angle and 
perspective. And even now about the Second World War a 
historian who is English would write completely and totally 
pro-English but a Nazi... or even someone who lived in 
Germany would probably make Germany out to be not such a 
bad country... and show different points... you can't help but, 
when you are spending a lot of time on a subject, take a certain 
side. You are going to form your own ideas from it all and 
that's maybe based on your upbringing and your own ideas 
that you already have... 
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Ben's interview, however, began with other considerations and, 
as Figure 5.1 shows, his initial response began by discussing archives 
and their limitations, and, uniquely in the interview data set, Author 
Error. 
Why do historians disagree? 
Okay. I would say that reasons why historians disagree is well 
firstly that they obviously are historians because they weren't 
around at the time. 
Right. 
And they are basing what they do know on sources that have 
been written by past people who were around at the time and it 
is very debatable... how reliable they are and whether it is 
totally true or not and a historian can easily misinterpret 
something that is false to be true... while the historian who is 
perhaps true and does have the right view does not have the 
evidence because these people aren't around anymore. 
Right. 
In order to be able to prove them to be totally wrong. 
Okay, so is that basically just an evidence issue? It is in the 
past, it's gone, we have only got bits of it left and they're not 
necessarily... 
Yeah. 
Why is it? Can you tell me a bit about this reliability idea? So 
the bits that were left may not be reliable you were saying: 
you might be mistaken therefore about what was going on? 
The only example that comes straight to mind was that there 
was a diary entry by Hitler claiming that he never wanted a 
war and he never wanted any of this to happen. Whereas 
someone who was pro-Nazi... may to support their views use 
this and say that this is true because this was written by Hitler, 
he never wanted it, he was pushed by the Allies of the First 
World War or something... but it is still a source.... It's a 
question of whether it was valued or not and whether if he 
was... I would say that Hitler was obviously lying and that he 
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wanted to make them... He didn't want to go down as evil as 
he has done. 
Ben Year 1 
It is apparent that Ben's formulation of the historians' 
epistemological predicament tended to a testimonial position: given that 
the 'ideal' mode of knowing (direct experience) is not possible, 
historians must rely on witness reports by those who had direct 
experience, reports whose truth-value remains questionable. In this 
situation, we can expect historical disagreement to arise for two reasons: 
historians' errors (mistaking a false report for a true one) and historians' 
biases (distorting the assessment of testimony). 
I asked Ben follow up questions to probe and develop these 
ideas. The first question addressed the archival problem and Ben's 
answer demonstrated the extent to which his historical epistemology 
depended on experiential / testimonial models of knowing. 
Does that mean it's much easier to write recent history then? It's 
not so long ago: there should be more 'stuff'? 
I would say perhaps that's true because more recently we have 
better methods of archiving, of keeping track of everything that 
happened, and also, seeing as it wasn't all that long ago, we can 
still see clearly some of the direct results of historical events... if 
you are talking about medieval times it is very difficult because 
the direct evidence of what happened isn't really clear anymore 
and we have to rely solely on texts written a very very long time 
ago... We don't have relatives, much older relatives, who might 
know them or something like that, because it's such a long time 
ago so I would say perhaps it was a bit easier to find out a lot 
more about more recent history rather than medieval history or 
ancient history. 
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It is apparent here, from Ben's decision procedure for verifying 
claims (asking people who experienced events), that he was thinking in 
experiential / testimonial ways about historical knowing. My second 
question aimed to explore the issue of tendentious testimony.95  
You were saying that people often have motives for what they 
say and that sort of thing and therefore we shouldn't take what 
they say at face value. But if we know this doesn't that help us? 
If we know that... [Long pause] 
If we have as a general principle 'whenever you are looking at 
a source, consider the possibility that they are up to 
something'. 
Yes we can see that but obviously if every single one of them 
is like that you always have to take one side eventually. 
Right. 
If you have 100 sources each and everyone has got their own 
agenda. 
Yes. 
And you're going to be taking to one side and your mind's 
going to swing to one way of thinking whereas a different 
person may see sense in a slightly different way because it's 
not always the fact that they are lying, it's that they are 
bending the truth and adding their own actual thoughts about 
it. 
Ben Year 1 
Two things are apparent here. Firstly, Ben's responses confirm 
that he was thinking in testimonial terms: when faced with conflicting 
witness reports, historians have to decide who to believe and thus which 
`side' to 'take'. Secondly, Ben returned to the idea of distortion and 
95 The question was, as is apparent from the need to reformulate it, poorly phrased. 
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bias: different people may 'see sense' in different ways and for Ben such 
sense making amounted to distorting the record by adding 'thoughts' to 
it. For Ben, then, we can say that historical knowing was a process 
through which historians collected information from witness reports 
which they then simply collated in a 'scissors and paste' manner and 
variation in accounts and arguments, whilst ideally eliminable, was in 
practice inherent to historical knowing because it is very difficult to 
control two variables — bias and partiality in reports and bias and 
partiality in historians. As we have seen and in contrast to Ben's notions 
of 'seeing sense' through distortion, Mark developed sophisticated 
notions of what historians might do when reading archival materials. As 
has been noted, however, these comments of Mark's only appeared late 
in his response and only after prompt questions designed to see if he 
could offer any alternative to his initial response. Mark's initial response 
follows below. 
Why do historians disagree? 
What generally? Because it's retrospective. There are always 
going to be two angles and your subjective opinion might already 
be biased. Also the evidence that you look at because there are 
always two sides to the coin and different people have different 
perspectives on events and there are going to be different records 
of events depending on which you think are more reliable... 
Can you tell me about this retrospective thing? 
Because it's happened in the past therefore you've got to rely on 
other peoples' opinions and largely a lot of them are dead or they 
have been influenced by subsequent events, so you are going to 
have to take... You don't know the situation, you don't know 
what their influences are, you've just got a record of what they 
saw and you weren't there and there's no 100% proof of 
anything 
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So how does that lead to different versions? 
Because what you've got is records from different people with 
different views about things and their views are going to differ 
and depending on what evidence you read you are going to get 
different pictures of the event. 
Mark Year 2 
It is evident, from the above, that very similar ideas to those 
developed by Ben were articulated here. Mark's comments also echoed 
the phrasing of his written responses, as the following example shows. 
History is retrospective, we rely on reports and accounts from 
which we may interpret. It is often difficult to ascertain an 
author's views or obtain information about his social standing or 
political ideas. This means that an historical event or period often 
has differing accounts due to bias... This means that historians 
today are faced with differing interpretations of the same account 
and so they must decide which is to be believed. But even 
modern historians are subject to bias... which may lead to 
different interpretations from different historians. 
Mark Year 2 Ranters 
Mark clearly had a default position on historical knowing — a 
script even. According to this model, historians laboured under parallel 
disadvantages - limited and biased information and their own bias. Like 
Ben, Mark had an articulated theory of what historians do and the theory 
mirror's Collingwood's 'critical historian' who operates in a scissors and 
paste manner on testimony deciding which 'picture' to accept, which 
testimony 'to believe' and which side 'to take' : the meaning is 'out 
there' but hard, or even impossible, to find and, for both Ben and Mark, 
the historian is as much an impediment as a means 'finding' it. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that, in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, respondents' approaches to explaining account variation were 
consistent across both the interview and written tasks and thus supports 
the robustness of the ideal typical model suggested in Chapter 4. The 
analysis has also supported the suggestion of a master opposition 
between impositionist and non-impositionist explanatory moves. 
The chapter also supports the suggestions made in the conclusion 
to Chapter 4 about the links between these types and ideas posited in 
progression models about evidence and accounts. The suggestions that 
impositionism was closely linked to testimonial conceptions of historical 
evidence and that the hermeneutic respondents in this data set had 
limited understandings of historians' conceptual apparatus, and thus 
foregrounded the person rather than the criterion or concept relativity of 
accounts, are both supported here. Again, it is apparent that respondents 
who approximated to the impositionist type needed to think further about 
historical evidence and that the students who approximated to the 
hermeneutic type had a limited conception of paradigmatic aspects of 
historical practice. It is also apparent, in the data set as a whole, that this 
group of students had a limited conception of history as an interpersonal 
practice whose infrastructures put limits on the play of subjectivity and 
where traditions and research programmes shape interpretation. 
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In addition, two features of the interview data seem to me to be 
particularly striking. 
On the one hand, as the case of Kim's interview shows, highly 
sophisticated performance and understanding can, given unchallenged 
assumptions about evidence, remain structurally identical in key respects 
to relatively unsophisticated thinking. Conversely, as the case of Mark 
shows, highly sophisticated notions of what historians do can exist 
alongside less sophisticated understandings of why historians might 
chose to do the things that they do. 
The other very striking feature of the interview process relates to 
the interview as process. Mark's interview suggests that some 
respondents can deviate significantly from an initial script when pushed 
to develop initial or default positions by questioning. 
It seems probable that there is significant scope for targeted 
teaching interventions, informed by diagnostic thinking linked to what is 
known about progression, to move student thinking on and that the 
typology proposed here has heuristic value as a diagnostic tool. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion: Towards an Accounts 
Heuristic 
6.1 Evaluating the Typology 
The ideal typical model proposed above has evident limitations. 
Firstly, the model is developed from and grounded in a small and 
unrepresentative sample of students. Secondly, the model simplifies 
respondent thinking, which it models, in any case, on the basis of 
performance in discrete tasks, which may not capture it fully. 
However, and has been shown, the ideal typical model of 
explanatory moves clearly has heuristic value, not least as a way of 
operationalising key ideas about progression grounded by existing 
studies, and it seems probable that a revised model, developed in 
dialogue with a broader data set, would have similar heuristic value.96 
The typology appears to have analytical potential: it was possible to 
model what all students in this case study were doing using it, either in 
terms of respondent types or ideal typical moves. Furthermore, the 
majority of respondents fall on one or other side of the master opposition 
posited above, between impositionist and non-impositionist approaches 
to explaining account variation, which suggests that the typology has 
96 As has been noted in the conclusions to Chapters 4 and 5, the analysis offered here is 
consistent with many of the claims advanced in existing research literature: this study, 
therefore, adds further support to claims advanced elsewhere, for example, about the 
importance, in the development of understandings of accounts, of shifts from 
experiential or testimonial to inferential conceptions of evidence. 
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value in identifying broad as well as specific differences in 
understandings of historical accounts. 
Analytical potential is of limited interest, however, unless it has 
pedagogic application. We have seen, however, that the typology is 
likely to have diagnostic uses of at least two kinds. Firstly the types can 
be used heuristically to gauge progression in a general sense: it is likely 
for example that a student who tends to offer impositionist explanations 
for account variation is operating a testimonial model of historical 
evidence. Secondly, the typology can help identify specific blocks to 
progression: we have seen that some students operate at impressive 
levels of sophistication but also that particular aspects of their thinking, 
for example, relating to historical evidence or to historians' concepts, 
need to be challenged and developed. 
The typology foregrounds conceptual dimensions of historical 
practice, however, and, as Chapter 2 showed, although conceptual 
dimensions are essential to the understanding of accounts they are not 
sufficient to the task. 
6.2 Towards an Accounts Heuristic 
Joni Rtisen's 'disciplinary matrix' (Riisen, 2005, p.132) is much 
discussed in the literature. The "disciplinary matrix" is a "model of 
historical studies" that aims to think historical practice as a "cognitive 
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1. Interests 
(needs for orientation in 
the temporal change of the 
world) 
5. Functions 
of cultural orientation 
(temporal-direction of 
human activities, concepts 
of historical identity) 
3. Methods 
of treating the experience 
of the past 
Principles 
of historical sense 
2. Concepts 
of significance (theories, 
perspectives, categories) 
4. Forms 
of representation 
strategy for getting knowledge about the past" but also to show "how the 
work of historians is influenced by and related to practical life" (Riisen, 
2005, p.135).97 Figure 6.2 presents and simplifies a recent formulation of 
the "matrix". 
Figure 6.2 Jorn Riisen's " disciplinary matrix" 
(Adapted from Riisen, 2005, p.134) 
The matrix operates in a circular manner as the numbering in the 
figure indicates. For Rilsen, history arises from a practical human need 
(1. Interests) to deal with the temporal change (Rusen, 2005, p.10) and it 
answers the questions arising from the challenging experience of time by 
97 Riisen's work is discussed in Ankersmit, 2002, pp.262-280 and Megill, 1994 and its 
educational implications are explored in Chapman and Facey, 2004; Lee, 2002, 2004 
and 2005(b); Lee and Howson 2006; Seixas (Ed.) 2004; Seixas, 2005; and Seixas and 
Clark (2004). 
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providing orientation through narration (points 4 and 5 in the figure): so 
far history, like myth, is a form of 'time management'. For Riisen, 
disciplinary history is differentiated from other modes of dealing with 
time by methodological rationality (the 'concepts' and 'methods' 
identified in the figure), which Rasen understands very much in terms of 
the interpersonal norms of history as academic practice (Riisen, 2005, 
p.134). 
Rusen's model is a fruitful resource for history education, not 
least as a corrective to constructions of history that privilege the 
practical and represent history as a rhetoric of domination, or that, on the 
other hand, privilege the cognitive, constructing history as disembodied 
theoretical activity.98 It is also useful as a way of thinking about student 
thinking: students who model history, for example, as a form of 
positioned rhetoric are operating "below the line" (Lee, 2002) in the 
matrix and need to engage with theoretical dimensions of historical 
practice. 
The matrix can also serve as a heuristic, providing, as Megill has 
suggested, "a reminder of what sorts of metahistorical questions we can 
and ought to ask when we confront works of history" (Megill, 1994, 
p.58). 
98 The former stance is typical of many postmodernist historiographers (for example, 
Jenkins, 1991, pp.6-32) and is also apparent in Davies (2006). The latter stance is, 
arguably, apparent in the Olympian position that Oakeshott takes on the 'practical past' 
(Oakeshott, 1991 and 1999) and is characterised by Jenkins as `ownsalcism' (Jenkins, 
1997). 
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Metahistorical questions that the matrix can be used to scaffold 
include the following. 
How is this historian, in writing this work, influenced by his or 
her society and by his or her place within that society? What 
social agenda does the work implicitly or explicitly attach itself 
to? What overall vision of history informs the work? What type 
or types of method does the historian deploy? What forms of 
representation? (Megill, 1994, p.59) 
Again, it is apparent that the matrix has diagnostic value: how 
many students, after all, ask all of these questions? There is not space 
here to develop all the dimensions of the matrix and, in any case, there is 
no need, since existing approaches to interpretations pedagogy already 
sketch ways in which we might address a number of them. 
There has been significant pedagogic debate about how to 
develop understandings of interpretations since the introduction of 
`interpretations' as a key element of assessment in the 1991 National 
Curriculum and a number of approaches to interpretations have been 
proposed.99 A number of approaches focus, as it were, "below the line", 
locating interpretations as texts in contexts and treating them as 
`rhetorical' objects or historicizing them. The work of McAleavy (1993, 
2000 and 2003) is particularly associated with the first of these 
approaches and has been influential in shaping practice (for example, 
Banham and Hall, 2003). A number of creative practitioner strategies, 
" For example, Card, 2004; Banham, 2003; Davis and Williams, 1998; Fordham, 2007; 
Hammond, 2007; Haydn, et al. 2008; Howells, 2005; McAleavy, 1993, 2000 and 2003; 
Mastin and Wallace, 2006; Moore, 2001; Ofsted, 2004; Phillips, 2002(a); Sinclair, 
2006, Wrenn, 2001 and Ward 2006. 
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for example Card (2004) and Maston and Wallace (2006), illustrate an 
historicizing approach. There is much to recommend these approaches, 
however, as will be recalled from the discussion of authorial explanation 
above, students can grasp practical dimensions of account variation 
without engaging with the nature of accounts, as criterion relative 
theory-like structures offered in answer to delimited questions. It is 
possible, in other words, to have a developed sense of interpretations as 
texts doing work in particular historicized contexts and still to think of 
accounts, as Mark did, as reducing to "subjective ways of analysing... 
stuff' (p.168 above). 
A number of recent practitioner articles have focused on the 
historical logic of interpretations and, to cite the title of one of these 
articles, on historians' "theories and methods" (Hammond, 2007): these 
approaches clearly target cognitive dimensions of historical practice. 
Recent work has aimed to engage explicitly with historians' arguments 
as arguments and with the ways in which historians' claims are put 
together (Fordham, 2007)100 and to think about the ways in which 
choices of method reflect historians questions and decisions (Howells, 
2005; Hammond, 2008).101 In addition, Ward (2006) exemplifies an 
approach that focuses on 'aesthetic' or 'formal' aspects of historical 
practice by attending closely to historians' representational strategies. As 
100 My own work in this area has endeavoured to focus student thinking on concepts 
and claims (Chapman, 2003; Chapman and Facey, 2009; Chapman and Hibbert. 2009), 
on assumption and argument (Chapman, 2006(a); Chapman, 2009(b)), on evidence and 
research methods (Chapman, 2007) and on forms of historical consciousness 
(Chapman, 2008; Chapman and Facey, 2004). 
101 Advice offered by OCR, in support of teachers working on Specification B (see 
above p.18) also focuses on issues of this nature (OCR, 2007(b), pp.10-11). 
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Howells has observed, a focus on historians' questions and methods can 
focus students on "genuine historical controversy" and place "the 
process of historical research and evaluation at the heart of... 
investigation" (2005, p.33). Recent practitioner work on historical 
significance also has a similar intention, in the sense that it firmly 
focuses students' attention on the criteria of significance that are in play 
when judgments of significance are made, thus foregrounding the 
conceptual rather than the practical (Bradshaw, 2006; Counsell, 2004; 
Phillips, 2002(b)). 
There are potential dangers in focusing on methods and concepts, 
however, as Lee and Shemilt note, 
if students are taught these things before they recognise and 
understand the theory-like nature of historical accounts, they 
will simply assimilate what we teach them to ideas in which 
bias and ulterior motives distort the 'real past'. (Lee and 
Shemilt, 2004, p.117) 
As we have seen above, developing student thinking about 
interpretations entails challenging preconceptions about evidence and a 
focus on questioning and on the relationship between questions, the 
evidence adduced to answer them and their conceptual and criterial 
presuppositions (Lee 2001; Lee and Shemilt, 2004). 
The following questions, developed through recent online 
teaching activities and drawing on insights developed through this thesis, 
indicate how Rtisen's 'cognitive strategy' (points 2 and 3 on the matrix) 
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might be operationalised in practical teaching contexts in ways that keep 
students focused on the key questions that Lee and Shemilt argue are 
fundamental (p. 187 above).102 
Figure 6.2 Ideas for thinking about why interpretations might differ. 
(Adapted from Chapman, 2009(c), p.134) 
... It is important to read... interpretations very closely and to reflect 
on both evidence and argument. Here are some questions you might 
ask to help you do this. 
o Are the historians asking the same questions or are they in fact 
answering different questions about the past? (It is possible to 
set out with different aims - to set out to describe something in 
the past, to explain it, to evaluate it and so on.) 
o Do the historians examine the same source materials as they 
pursue their questions about the past? 
o Do the historians ask the same questions of their source 
materials? 
o Is there common ground between two historians — do they 
agree on basic facts for example? 
o Where exactly does disagreement arise — it might be about 
some basic facts or it might be that disagreement arises when 
conclusions are drawn from agreed facts. 
o Where different conclusions are drawn from similar facts or 
sources it may be because the historians disagree about what 
these things mean. There are many reasons why they might. 
Consider these possibilities (and others that you can think of!): 
o Do they have differing understandings of the 
context (the period, the background situation and 
so on)? 
o Are they defining concepts in different ways (if we 
disagree about whether a 'revolution' has occurred, 
for example, it may be because we are using 
different criteria to define the concept 
`revolution')? 
102 These are questions that I asked students, in the midst of their efforts to answer 
explanatory questions about variations in the Ranter Task in a recent experiment in 
online discussion (see pp.44-45 above). Preliminary analysis of outcomes is 
encouraging but not sufficiently developed to fully ground conclusions about the 
effectiveness of this approach. (Chapman, 2009(c)). 
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6.3 Conclusions 
This study builds on my previous work, which modelled 
progression in the understanding of accounts in terms of broad contrasts 
in student thinking about accounts but that did not engage in detailed 
conceptual consideration of the evidential understandings underlying 
,/ 
them (Chapman, 2001), by providing descriptive tools, in the form of a 
typology that allows student explanations for variations in accounts, and 
hence their underlying conceptualisations of interpretation, to be 
modelled with some precision. The study also provides a theorisation of 
historical practice, drawing on relevant literature in the philosophy of 
history and history education, to link the typology to key conceptual 
shifts central to progression in developing understanding of accounts, a 
linkage that gives the typology a diagnostic value. Recent work, 
emerging out of this thesis, has begun to explore teaching interventions 
focused on developing pupil thinking about the concepts necessary to the 
understanding of accounts and a sketch of the dimensions that a 
comprehensive accounts heuristic would need to address has been made. 
Future research could develop the analysis outlined in this thesis 
in a number of ways, for example through work: 
• that asks students to think about account conflicts of a 
broader variety of kinds than the three written tasks 
presented them with; 
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• that tests the diagnostic potential of the typology in 
contexts where follow-up interventions can be 
implemented and assessed; 1°3 and 
• that broadens focus to address the range of dimensions of 
historical practice articulated in Riisen's matrix and the 
kinds of metahistorical questions that Megill proposes in 
order to put the matrix to work. 
103 Such as discussion board environments (Chapman, 2009(c)). 
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8. Appendices 
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8.1 Written Task Instruments 
Note: 
The three written tasks are reproduced below in the order in which they 
were administered. 
Task questions and answer sheets were identical for each task and are 
reproduced here only in the case of the first task. 
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The Ranters: Myth or Reality? 
Thank you for taking part in this research. This exercise focuses on 
interpretations. The aim of this research is to explore the ways in 
which A and AS Level students approach historical interpretations. 
The pack contains two differing accounts of the same historical issue 
and four questions. This task should take about 50 minutes. 
Please: - 
(a) Fill in the box below 
(b) Read the two extracts 
and 
(c) Answer the four questions that follow in the 
boxes provided. 
Please give all of the questions equal attention. 
Personal Details 
Name: 
Gender: 
Other examination subjects: 
Are you a first or a second year student? 
Did you study History at GCSE? 
The data collected during this research will be kept confidential. 
If any of it is published at any time in the future names will be 
changed to ensure anonymity. 
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Background Information 
In the years during and immediately after the English Civil War (1642 
To 1648) there were numerous groups of religious radicals active in 
Britain. Many of these groups held beliefs that threatened the 
established order of things. There is controversy amongst historians 
about one of these groups in particular — a group called the Ranters. 
Line 
Num 
ber 
Account One 
Based on Christopher Hill's The World Turned Upside Down: 
Radical Ideas During the English Revolution published by 
Penguin Books in 1975. 
1 It is very difficult to define precisely what the Ranters believed. 
Most of the evidence is from hostile witnesses and the Ranters 
had no recognised leader or organisation. Nevertheless, for a 
brief period between 1649 and 1651 there was a group which 
5 contemporaries called Ranters. We hear constant reference to 
them in the years following the King's execution in 1649 and, a 
contemporary play announced in 1651, 'All the world is now in a 
Ranting humour!' 
10 According to Bunyan the Ranters denied the existence of sin. 
Some are described as atheists, denying the existence of God. 
Samuel Fischer stated that the Ranters denied 'that there is any 
second coming of Christ at all'. According to Ephraim Pagitt they 
argued that everything came from nature not from God and drew 
15 the conclusion that all things were pure including 'hideous 
blasphemy and continual whoredom'. John Holland quoted a 
Ranter as arguing that God was in every 'man, beast, fish, fowl, 
every green thing from the highest cedar to ivy on the wall' in 
`this dog, this cat, chair, stool, and tobacco pipe'. 
	 At one Ranter 
20 meeting of which we have a hostile report, the mixed company 
met at a tavern, sang anti-religious songs and partook of a 
communal feast. One of them tore off a piece of beef, saying 
`This is the flesh of Christ, take and eat.' Another threw a cup of 
ale in the chimney saying 'There is the blood of Christ.' Even 
25 their enemies expressed what is almost a grudging admiration for 
Ranter high spirits: 'they are the merriest of devils for songs, 
drinking, music, bawdy and dancing'. 
Ranter promotion of swearing and blasphemy was symbolic of 
30 their belief in freedom from moral restraint. Abiezer Coppe was 
alleged to have sworn for and hour on end at a church altar and to 
have concluded: 'a pox on God and all your prayers!' Swearing 
was an act of defiance, both of God and of middle-class society. 
It was a proclamation of equality and a protest against middle 
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35 	 class attempts to control the pleasures of the poor. Coppe's 1649 
pamphlet Fiery Flying Rolls made the Ranter challenge 
abundantly clear: 'Have all things in common, or else the plague 
of God will rot and consume all that you have!' he pronounced. 
40 
	
The authorities were not slow to respond to the Ranter challenge. 
Coppe's pamphlet was condemned to be publicly burned and the 
Blasphemy Act of 1650 was aimed especially at attacks on 
religion and morality. Ranters were expelled from the Army in 
1649 and 1650 and Cromwell declared of a Scottish Ranter that 
45 	 `she was so vile a creature as he thought her unworthy to live'. 
Ranters were not willing martyrs however, and the movement 
faded into obscurity from 1651. 
Line 
Num 
ber 
Account Two 
Based on J.C.Davies' Fear, Myth and History: The Ranters 
and the Historians published by Cambridge University Press in 
1987.104 
1 The Ranters are a fiction. The evidence for their existence as a 
group is minimal and that evidence comes, almost without 
exception, from persons writing against 'Ranting'. The direct 
evidence for the existence of Ranterism is almost non-existent. 
5 Historians who argue that the Ranters were a real phenomenon 
have only four direct Ranter sources from which to construct 
their arguments — and one of these sources is anonymous. What 
do these sources allow us to conclude? Certainly, there were 
authors, such as Coppe, who set out beliefs that could be called 
10 Ranter — in the sense that they denied religion, advocated 
sinning and so on. 
These texts do not prove the existence of anything resembling a 
Ranter movement, however. We have no evidence of any 
substance to suggest that Ranterism was anything more than a 
15 series of postures struck by a handful of writers. We do not even 
have compelling evidence that these authors themselves 
practised the beliefs that their pamphlets expressed. Coppe, for 
example, changed his name, became a physician and was 
eventually buried in 1672 in a churchyard in Barnes. 
20 Furthermore, there is no compelling evidence of an organised 
movement seeking to put into practice the beliefs expressed in 
these pamphlets. A movement needs adherents and followers to 
104 This text was based on Aylmer (1987): see n.14 on p.27 above. The publication date 
of Davies' book was in fact 1986. 
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deserve the name and there is next to no direct evidence of such 
25 	 adherents and followers in the case of the Ranters. 
It is true, however, that there was much talk about Ranters in 
1649-51 and for some years afterwards. Most of this talk comes 
from the lips of writers condemning Ranting. What can we 
conclude from this? There was a moral panic about Ranterism — 
30 	 collective fantasy and paranoia gripped public discussion and 
debate. In part this was fuelled by the gutter press: tales of 
Ranterism made good copy and amounted, in the hands of some 
of the more imaginative hacks, to a form of 'soft-porn'. In part 
tales of Ranterism were fuelled by opponents of the English 
35 	 Revolution and supporters of the King: it suited their purposes 
to present the new regime created by the revolution as one that 
spawned sinning, swearing, irreligion and depravity. Once the 
seeds of the Ranter myth had been planted by these sources, 
others pitched-in. The authorities had to be seen to respond to 
40 	 this new 'problem' and they were quick to condemn Ranting. 
Religious radicals and non-conformists condemned Ranterism 
also — since if they failed to do so they feared that they too 
might be branded as Ranters. 
45 	 Ranting disappeared rapidly not because it was suppressed but 
because it had never really existed. The government's grip on 
reality was never entirely lost. It is true that they enacted a 
Blasphemy Act in 1650 but, crucially, the Act made no direct 
mention of Ranters. 
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THE QUESTIONS 
Please give all of the questions equal attention. 
Question One 
How do the two accounts differ? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
219 
Question Two 
How is it possible for there to be two such differing accounts of the same 
issue? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
220 
Question Three 
Can both accounts be true? 
If they can, in what ways? 
If they cannot, why not? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
221 
Question Four 
Is it possible to decide between the two accounts? 
If it is possible, how can this be done? 
If it is not possible, why is it not possible? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
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Peterloo 1819 
Thank you for taking part in this research. This exercise focuses on 
interpretations. The aim of this research is to explore the ways in 
which A and AS Level students approach historical interpretations. 
The pack contains two differing accounts of the same historical issue 
and four questions. This task should take about 50 minutes. 
Please: - 
(a) Fill in the box below 
(d) Read the two extracts 
and 
(e) Answer the four questions that follow in the 
boxes provided. 
Please give all of the questions equal attention. 
Personal Details 
Name: 
Gender: 
Other examination subjects: 
Are you a first or a second year student? 
Did you study History at GCSE? 
The data collected during this research will be kept confidential. 
If any of it is published at any time in the future names will be 
changed to ensure anonymity. 
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Background Information 
"Peterloo" was a term coined to describe events that took place at St 
Peter's Fields in Manchester in 1819. A mass meeting was held by 
"Orator" Hunt, a political radical. The meeting's purpose was to 
demand political reforms. The meeting was dispersed by the 
Manchester Yeomanry (the local militia) and by the Hussars (regular 
cavalry) and casualties resulted. The term "Peterloo" was coined 
sarcastically by the radicals. It mocked the "bravery" of the army who 
had recently won a victory over Napoleon at Waterloo (1815). 
Line 
Num 
ber 
Account One 
Extract from E.P.Thompson's The Making of The English 
Working Class (published by Penguin books in 1968). 
1 There are two points about Peterloo which have, somehow, 
become lost in recent accounts. The first is the actual bloody 
violence of the day. It really was a massacre. The second point 
about Peterloo is the sheer size of the event, in terms of its 
5 psychological impact and repercussions. It was without question 
a formative experience in British social and political history. 
Whatever some of the marching weavers had in mind, Hunt had 
exerted himself effectually to ensure obedience to his request for 
"quietness and order" and a "steady, firm and temperate 
10 deportment". The leaders of the contingents had warned their 
followers to ignore all provocations. Many staves - or 'walking 
sticks' — had been left behind. The presence of so many women 
and children was overwhelming testimony to the peaceful 
character of the meeting. The attack was made on this multitude 
15 with the venom of panic. 
But the panic was not the panic of bad horsemen hemmed in by 
the crowd. It was the panic of class hatred. It was the Yeomanry 
— the Manchester manufacturers, merchants, publicans and 
shopkeepers on horseback — which did more damage than the 
20 regulars (Hussars). In the Yeomanry (a middle class reformer 
testified) "there are... individuals whose political rancour 
approaches to absolute insanity". These were the men who 
pursued the banners of the radicals, knew the speakers by name 
and sought to pay off old scores, and who cheered at the end of 
25 their triumph. We may get a feel of the confused field from such 
as passage as this: 
"When I got to the end of Watson-street, I saw ten or twelve of 
the Yeomanry Cavalry and two of the Hussars cutting at the 
people who were wedged close together. An officer of the 
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30 
	
Hussars rode up to his own men, and knocking up their swords 
said, 'Damn you what do you mean by all this work?' He then 
called out to the Yeomanry, 'For shame gentlemen; what are 
you about? The people cannot get away.' They desisted for a 
time, but no sooner had the officer rode to another part of the 
35 
	
field, than they fell to work again." 
There is no term for this but class war. But it was a pitifully 
one-sided war. The people, closely packed and trampling upon 
each other in the effort to escape, made no effort at retaliation 
40 	 until the very edges of the field, where a few trapped remnants — 
finding themselves pursued into the streets and yards — threw 
bricks at their pursuers. Eleven were killed or died from their 
wounds. That evening, on every road out of Manchester the 
injured were to be seen. By the end of 1819, 421 injured had 
45 
	 been identified and a further 150 cases awaited investigation. Of 
this overall total, 161 cases were of sabre wounds, the remainder 
were injuries sustained while lying beneath the crowd or 
beneath the horses' hooves. 
Line 
Num 
ber 
Account Two 
Extract from Norman Gash's Aristocracy and People 
(published by Edward Arnold books in 1979). 
1 On the 16th of August occurred the confusion, errors and 
bloodshed at St Peter's Field. The magistrates decided to arrest 
Hunt on the field before he could speak. The size of the crowd, 
probably about 60 000, made the use of the military for this 
5 purpose necessary. By accident the local Yeomanry arrived 
before the regular force of Hussars. The Yeomanry almost 
instantly got into difficulties from the denseness of the crowd, 
obstructions on the ground and their own indiscipline. They 
were believed to be under attack and the Hussars were sent in to 
10 extricate them. When it was all over about a dozen people were 
dead or dying, some hundreds badly injured. The country was 
shocked by the news; and within a week `Peterloo' had passed 
into the political vocabulary of the British nation. 
Peterloo was a blunder; it was hardly a massacre. Possibly half 
15 the deaths, probably even more of the non-fatal injuries, were 
trampled underfoot by horses and the crowd in the panic that 
ensued. The public indignation was a mark of the strong liberal 
feeling in the country and the general restraint normally 
exercised by the authorities in dealing with the large political 
20 assemblies. It was because Peterloo was uncharacteristic that it 
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achieved notoriety. The magistrates had made two mistakes: in 
endeavouring to arrest Hunt at the meeting, and in sending in 
the amateur, unpopular and politically minded Manchester 
Yeomanry, a raw volunteer unit formed two years earlier. The 
magistrates were men of only ordinary ability; they shared the 
alarms and credulity of their class. Their nerves had been 
stretched by the protracted disputes among the cotton weavers 
and the series of political meetings in 1819. The radicals had 
been using increasingly inflammatory language. Hunt had 
spoken in defence of defying the laws. 
There had been actions as well as words. The presence among 
the radical clubs of army veterans made their behaviour take a 
pronounced military form, even to the extent of marching, 
carrying sticks and clapping their hands to simulate musket fire. 
The day before Peterloo, in the small hours of the morning, a 
constable with a few companions came across a body of several 
hundred men marching on White Moss, some five miles from 
Manchester. He was attacked, beaten with sticks, and made to 
swear that he would never be a King's man. 
Given the atmosphere of panic and revolution in Manchester at 
the time, the conduct of the magistrates on the 16th of August 
was understandable. It was foolish but not vindictive. To have 
penalised the Manchester magistrates for an error of judgement 
committed in trying circumstances would have shaken the 
morale of magistrates all over the kingdom. As it was, the 
government was already finding considerable difficulty in 
getting magistrates to act. 
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Britain and the Holocaust 
Thank you for taking part in this research. This exercise focuses on 
interpretations. The aim of this research is to explore the ways in 
which A and AS Level students approach historical interpretations. 
The pack contains two differing accounts of the same historical issue 
and four questions. This task should take about 50 minutes. 
Please: - 
(a) Fill in the box below 
(f) Read the two extracts 
and 
(g) Answer the four questions that follow in the 
boxes provided. 
Please give all of the questions equal attention. 
Personal Details 
Name: 
Gender: 
Other examination subjects: 
Are you a first or a second year student? 
Did you study History at GCSE? 
The data collected during this research will be kept confidential. 
If any of it is published at any time in the future names will be 
changed to ensure anonymity. 
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Bac round Information 
During the Second World War, and particularly between 1941 and 
1945, the Nazis developed a policy of systematic genocide of the 
Jewish population of Nazi-occupied Europe. This policy has come to be 
known as the "Holocaust". The Nazis had followed policies of 
increasingly extreme discrimination against Jews in Germany between 
1933 and 1940. At least 5 million Jews died as a result of the 
Holocaust. In recent years a controversy has developed about British 
policy during World War Two and in the 1930s. The dispute focuses on 
British policy towards Jewish refugees and other matters. The key issue 
in the debate is the degree of British responsibility for the suffering of 
the Jews of Europe. 
Line 
Num 
ber 
Account One 
From an article by W.D.Rubinstein published in The Modern 
History Review in Britain in 19991'5  
1 Although it would be wrong to claim that Britain's priority in 
the 1930s was the Jewish question, it would be equally 
inaccurate to argue that Britain ignored this issue: Britain played 
a crucial part in wiping the Nazi regime off the face of the earth. 
5 However, this outcome was by no means clear in the early 
1930s. British policy towards Germany, like her policy towards 
Jewish refugees, evolved in reaction to events whose pattern is 
only obvious in hindsight. 
10 Many factors determined British foreign policy, the most 
important of which were her responsibilities as a centre of 
empire. Events in Europe were important but Britain had also to 
consider her interests in other parts of the world — in India and 
in Palestine for example. It is in the light of this fact that British 
15 policies in Europe should be judged. 
Most British leaders believed that an injustice had been done to 
Germany by the Versailles Treaty and that allowing Germany to 
incorporate other German-speaking areas of central Europe 
would remove the cause of another war. It was also widely 
20 believed that Nazi anti-Jewish rhetoric was simply rhetoric. 
Britain did not want a repetition of the First World War, in 
which 920,000 British troops had died. Once it became clear 
that Hitler wanted to conquer Europe, Britain turned against 
105 The journal was recorded erroneously here: The Modern History Review should be 
History Review. 
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Germany. Near-total British opposition to the increasing 
violence of Nazi anti-Semitism contributed to the growth in 
British hostility to Germany in the late 1930s. 
In the 1930s there were millions of refugees in the world. Very 
few were allowed to settle in Britain, although the lives of many 
were in danger. Britain's treatment of German Jews was 
relatively generous particularly in the last few years prior to the 
war when it became increasingly clear that the Nazis were 
pursuing a course of brutality towards the Jews. At least 55,000 
German, Austrian and Czech Jews were permitted to enter 
Britain, a larger number than any other group of refugees. Over 
100,000 others fled to parts of the Empire (including Palestine). 
Britain took in substantial numbers, especially bearing in mind 
that surprisingly few actually wished to leave until 1938. 
Furthermore, efforts on behalf of Jewish refugees were greater 
than those on behalf of any other group. Thousands of British 
people took Jewish refugees into their homes and after retiring 
as Prime Minister in 1937, Baldwin became head of a fund 
which raised £600,000 for Jewish refugees, despite the 
economic depression. This was the only charity of any kind 
permitted to use the Post Office Savings Bank network, 
allowing it to receive weekly contributions from hundreds of 
thousands of ordinary people. If the outbreak of war had been 
postponed for another year or two, it seems likely that virtually 
every German Jew would have fled to safety. Once the war had 
started it was not the democracies that stopped the Jews from 
emigrating: they were no longer refugees but the prisoners of a 
psychopath who was intent on killing them. 
In 1939, Britain turned against Germany with a vengeance, with 
Winston Churchill leading a united British nation, fighting alone 
against the victorious Nazis for a year between June 1940 and 
June 1941. There could no longer be any uncertainty about the 
nature of Hitler's regime, however, it is difficult to see what 
Britain could have done to rescue the Jews of Nazi-occupied 
Europe. Britain simply lacked the military power to be able to 
stop the Holocaust. 
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Line Account Two 
Num From David Ceserani's Britain and the Holocaust published 
ber 	 Britain in 1999106 
1 
	
The Holocaust is part of British History, yet Britain's 
involvement with the Jewish people during the Nazi period is 
poorly understood. After 1945 British people comforted 
themselves with the idea that they had had a "good war". There 
5 	 was little awareness that Britain's record towards the Jews was 
mixed. 
When Hitler came to power the Government was well informed 
about his world-view and objectives. Nevertheless, it continued 
to regard disarmament as the most appropriate foreign policy. It 
10 	 made no public protest against the early violence and 
discrimination against the Jews. British public opinion was 
disturbed by the conduct of the Nazis but it believed that it 
would blow over. Elements of British society sympathised with 
Hitler. Many politicians felt guilty about the peace settlement 
15 
	
imposed on Germany after the First World War, and others 
admired Nazi unemployment policies. The former Prime 
Minister Lloyd George's verdict was "Hitler is a great man". 
The persecution of Austrian Jews and The Night of Broken 
Glass in November 1938 provoked outrage, but public anger 
20 	 soon faded and only a few MPs tried to raise concern about the 
treatment of Jews. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was 
rigidly committed to appeasing Germany and the Government 
discouraged the expression of anti-German feeling. 
Britain had strict immigration controls. Ministers feared that a 
25 	 generous response to the refugee problem would encourage 
other countries to expel huge numbers of Jews. Between 1933 
and early 1938, only about 11,000 German Jews settled in 
Britain. Many more found refuge in France and Holland. 
Between 1933 and 1936 35,000 Jews were admitted to 
30 
	
Palestine, however, the British restricted access in 1936 as a 
result of Arab protests about the expanding Jewish population. 
Britain modified its stance on Jewish refugees between 1938 
and 1939 and allowed around 40,000 to enter the UK. This 
change resulted from outrage over German take-over of Austria 
35 	 and over the Night of Broken Glass. By 1940, the Government 
was supporting the Jewish refugee agencies. 
Throughout the war, the Government was worried about the 
level of anti-Semitism in Britain and feared that it could turn 
into anti-war and pro-Nazi sentiment. It ordered that the  
106 The publication date is in error: this pamphlet was published in 1998. 
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40 	 suffering of the Jews should not be highlighted in BBC 
Broadcasts. It wanted to avoid creating sympathy for the Jews 
as this might encourage Jewish emigration to Palestine. It 
instructed banks to freeze the assets of Jewish refugees from 
enemy countries. In 1940 it ordered the mass internment of all 
45 	 groups of refugees in case they might harbour spies. 
The amount of information that reached Britain during the war 
about atrocities was plentiful. Government officials treated such 
news with scepticism, particularly because atrocities had been 
exaggerated during the First World War. Some officials were 
50 	 prejudiced against the Jews. More often it was felt that the fate 
of the Jews should not be stressed more than that of other 
citizens. In the summer of 1941 Winston Churchill learned 
about the scale of the massacres but he could make few practical 
responses and to acknowledge what was happening publicly 
55 	 would have alerted the Germans to the fact that the British had 
broken their codes. It was not until December 1942 that the 
Government openly acknowledged what was happening and this 
was only as a result of pressure from Jewish and church leaders 
and after it had been exposed in the press. 
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8.2 Exemplar Written Task Answers 
Note: 
Two complete sets of written answers to all three tasks are reproduced 
below. 
The first set is by a Year 1 student and the second set by a Year 2 
student. 
As is explained, at pp.35-36 above, this thesis focuses on answers to one 
of the four questions (Question Two) only. 
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Ranter Task: Adam Year 1 
Question One 
How do the two accounts differ? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
The two accounts differ a lot as one argues that the Ranters were non-
existent made-up form and the other source states that they were an 
important part of history at that time. 
Both agree that there is a certain lack of evidence to prove the theories and 
existence of these people yet they both disagree completely upon whether 
they were a myth and was just heard about by word of mouth. 
Another difference is that, how valued the evidence they do have, is. 
Davies says that it is insignificant whereas Hill bases most of his writing 
upon it. 
Question Two 
How is it possible for there to be two such differing accounts of the same 
issue? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
Both sources have said that they have found little evidence upon the 
subject of the Ranters. When there is not much to go on, there would 
always be a question upon how and whether these people existed. This 
where the two conflicting views come from. 
Whereas Hill argues towards their existence, Davies argues against. This 
means that their views are always going to have the opportunity to clash. 
An example of this is that of the evidence they have got. Hill uses it to back 
up his evidence compared to Davies who decides to say it is useless and 
just dismisses it. 
Question Three 
Can both accounts be true? 
If they can, in what ways? 
If they cannot, why not? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
These two accounts can't be both true as they are too contradictory to one 
another. You cannot say that they are existent, yet they never existed. 
There is only a single part that maybe both parts agree on, this is the fact 
that pamphlets were made up. Whether, this is conclusive evidence, both 
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accounts can't be true but both agree there is a pamphlet. 
Question Four 
Is it possible to decide between the two accounts? 
If it is possible, how can this be done? 
If it is not possible, why is it not possible? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
I personally find it impossible to determine which is true as although there 
is a strong argument for their existence, there is too a strong argument 
against it. There is not a sufficient amount of evidence for either to have a 
defining case. 
Peterloo Task: Adam Year 1 
Question One 
How do the two accounts differ? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
Account one shows that there was an extreme amount of violence used 
during the event whereas account two says that violence wasn't used and 
that panic and accidents were the main cause of the deaths. This is 
compared to Thompson's account that says that violence was used by the 
horsemen. 
The clearest difference is the authors' use of language especially when they 
brand Peterloo. Account one writes that it was a "massacre" whereas 
account two writes that is was a "blunder". 
Question Two  
How is it possible for there to be two such differing accounts of the same 
issue? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
There are a few similarities of the two accounts which illustrate some truth 
is written. There points may have then been played upon by authors or 
story tellers creating two different accounts. This could happen or it may be 
the case that new evidence has been uncovered as one of the two sources 
was written eleven years after the first. This last possibility is unlikely due 
to both sources being written many years after the event took place 
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consequently making the chances of new evidence coming forward 
increasingly unlikely. 
Question Three 
Can both accounts be true? 
If they can, in what ways? 
If they cannot, why not? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
To a certain extent they can, as the few points that they pick up on such as 
the fact that there was a great deal of panic with people being trampled, 
being quite likely. Yet, the core reasons such as the idea of who was to 
blame and whether the violence was necessary, I don't think can both be 
true. These though seem to be matters of opinion rather than matters of fact 
and I think will always be scrutinised. 
Question Four 
Is it possible to decide between the two accounts? 
If it is possible, how can this be done? 
If it is not possible, why is it not possible? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
I don't think that it is possible as there is no real hard evidence that is 
shown in both these documents. The only evidence that is shown at all is in 
Account one with the quote. Yet, there is no information upon the quote 
and it isn't even that good at enlightening us with more information. 
With this lack of solid evidence and the two sources contradicting one 
another it is very hard to establish which source is more valid. 
Holocaust Task: Adam Year 1 
Question One 
How do the two accounts differ? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
The two accounts differ as within the first account it says that Britain was 
allowing many Jewish people to settle within Britain. This is compared to 
the second account which writes that the immigration was extremely strict 
and is criticised. 
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This is clearly demonstrated with the figures as they about 15,000 people 
out from one another. Yet there is a similarity as both accounts say that the 
Jews did not really want to leave until the late 30s. 
Question Two 
How is it possible for there to be two such differing accounts of the same 
issue? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
The two writers may have opinions themselves on the situation, of which 
would be reflected within their books. These opinions would change the 
approach of which they would say whether Britain could of or should of 
done more to help the refugees of that time. 
They may have also looked at different sources to fmd some figures. These 
may have then bee interpreted in a different way to that of the author. This 
therefore may have give us two slightly different accounts. 
Question Three 
Can both accounts be true? 
If they can, in what ways? 
If they cannot, why not? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
To a certain extent both accounts can be true but not entirely. It cannot be 
claimed that both sets of figures are correct and that the dates that are 
shown are also completely correct. Yet most of the other things that are 
written can be interpreted in a different way. This is because there is not 
much hard evidence within these articles and that it is very difficult to see 
what part of these accounts are based upon fact. When these things are 
taken into account it is clear to see that a valid conclusions cannot be taken 
out of these accounts. 
Question Four 
Is it possible to decide between the two accounts? 
If it is possible, how can this be done? 
If it is not possible, why is it not possible? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
I do not believe that it is possible to choose between these accounts as both 
differ so much. These differences are also not clearly backed by any solid 
evidence that isn't contradicted by the other account. When this is taken 
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into account it is clear that neither article provides any clear result on what 
happened to the British policy on Jewish refugees for the years in debate..  
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Ranter Task: Mary Year 2 
Question One 
How do the two accounts differ? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
The two accounts differ in belief of what the Ranters were and whether 
they actually existed. Account one is also written 12 years previously to the 
second account and therefore may have had less sources / hindsight to call 
on. However account 2 states on line 3 that the 'evidence'. for `Ranterism' 
is almost nonexistent. This differs and contrasts with the first account that 
begins with attempting to define what the Ranters believed and not whether 
they actually existed. The first account deals with a different issue than the 
second, a main difference between the two. Another difference between the 
two accounts arises with the issue of source depicting the Ranters. Though 
Account two states (line 5 + 6) that only four sources are available but 
account one draws on more than four people to back its argument. True, 
some would have been written at a later date but they still have enough 
relevance for Christopher Hill for him to include them. In conclusion the 
two accounts differ in issue, archive available and belief of whether the 
Ranters ever existed. 
Question Two 
How is it possible for there to be two such differing accounts of the same 
issue? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
It is possible for there to be two such differing accounts of the same issue 
because, as in all history, different opinions and viewpoints are being 
expressed. Any source can be interpreted in many different ways and it is 
only when cross-referenced with other relevant materials that a kind of 
truth can emerge. Reliability of sources is something that can be debated 
endlessly because there are so many elements that could have affected the 
writer that historians might not know about. In these examples the debate 
between the two accounts stems from the interpretations of the writers. The 
first account examines the beliefs of the Ranters and so therefore it has to 
be assumed that Hill believes they existed. The range of sources in the 
archive that have relevance to this issue have obviously been interpreted 
differently by Davis and though both accounts call on the Blasphemy Act 
of 1650 it is a clear example of their different interpretations. Hill sees it as 
linked to the Ranters whereas Davis sees it as a 'crucial' point that the 
Ranters were not named in it. It is therefore very possible for there to be 
two such differing accounts because of the fact that the human is an 
individual who interprets and sees things in a different light. 
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Question Three 
Can both accounts be true? 
If they can, in what ways? 
If they cannot, why not? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
It is not possible to answer the question can both accounts be true without 
siding with one or other account. It is not possible for them both to be 
completely true, it is the debate between the two that is interesting. They 
cannot both be completely true because one is a contradiction of another! If 
the debate centred around the groups of people, who may have been called 
the Ranters or then again maybe not, it would have been different. 
Returning to my first point, to decide if either account is true it would be 
necessary to investigate it singularly, before cross referencing it with other 
articles / sources / accounts. They cannot both be true because of the lack 
of sense it would make, elements of each account could be put together to 
form a third account which addressed the debate in full, and this would 
probably be nearer to the truth than choosing one or other account. 
However more sources etc would be needed to reach this decision as an 
informed choice. 
Question Four 
Is it possible to decide between the two accounts? 
If it is possible, how can this be done? 
If it is not possible, why is it not possible? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
It is not possible to decide between the two accounts with the amount of 
information supplied. What is displayed is two separate accounts, that 
contradict each other and so the basis of a debate. To conclude the debate 
and decide which of the two accounts has the most truth in it a lot of 
further study would be required. This is because both accounts present the 
viewpoint and argument of a single historian. Neither are the sources from 
the era, and though these are mentioned they would have been carefully 
done so to help the argument of the writer. For me to make an informed 
decision between the two accounts I would need to develop my own 
opinions and views which collectively would either link to Hill or Davies' 
account. Only then would I be able to decide between the two, though I 
suspect there is an element of truth in both accounts. 
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Peterloo Task: Mary Year 2 
Question One 
How do the two accounts differ? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
The two accounts differ in both their belief of what actually took place at 
Peterloo, and their own interpretations of the significance of it. Source A 
strongly believes that what took place was a "massacre" whereas Source B 
states it "was hardly a massacre", the two accounts also differ in opinion 
about the scale and importance of the event. Source A defines it as a 
"formative experience", Source B however calls it a "blunder" that only 
gained "notoriety" because it was "uncharacteristic". 
The two sources also differ in the 'side; with which the author sympathises. 
Source A takes the side of the 'people', placing the emphasis of violence 
and blame strongly on the 'Yeomanry' (and though less so) the 'hussars'. 
Source B however takes the opposite viewpoint stating the size of the 
crowd demanded military presence, and including a report within which 
`the people' had violently attacked a constable — without provocation. 
Question Two  
How is it possible for there to be two such differing accounts of the same 
issue? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
It is possible for there to be two such differing accounts because as with all 
historical events, inferences are made by historians. The person who is 
writing about the events will obviously be influenced by the kind of person 
they are. Their background interests and political views for example will 
affect the way that they view / interpret information & facts. 
E.P.Thompson's book The Making of the English Working Class is a clue 
to the fact that his interest lies within the working classes. He has chosen to 
specifically focus on them so it is fair to say they are his main interest, and 
this comes across in his extract which clearly favours the people and places 
them as the 'victims' of the event. Norman Gash's extract on the other 
hand is taken from his book Aristocracy & the People suggesting that it is 
the relationship between the two that he is focusing on. However from his 
extract we can infer he has more sympathy with the upper classes, 
especially in this case with the yeomanry & hussars used to defuse the 
situation. Another possible reasons for the fact that the two accounts differ 
so much is for the fact the two accounts differ so much is the possibility 
that not much reliable information is available on the event — so inferences 
have to be made in order to attempt to find out what happened. 
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Question Three 
Can both accounts be true? 
If they can, in what ways? 
If they cannot, why not? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
It is not possible for both accounts to be 'true' but it is possible for them 
both to have elements of truth within them. As it stands both have very 
different versions of what happened so it is logical to infer that the truth is 
somewhere between the two. It is unlikely that either author is completely 
right & the other completely wrong, as both will have (we assume) 
researched into the events, perhaps drawing on information taken from 
different archives. They cannot however both be true because they paint 
such different pictures of the events that day. Although different incidents 
reported in each, e.g. the officer of the hussars telling the yeomanry to stop 
(A) or the constable getting attacked (B) might very well have happened 
and be true it is the overall picture that needs to be concluded by drawing 
information from both sources, and any others relevant to the event. Cross-
referencing them together would provide a clearer, and perhaps more 
truthful account. 
Question Four 
Is it possible to decide between the two accounts? 
If it is possible, how can this be done? 
If it is not possible, why is it not possible? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
It is not possible to decide between the two accounts on the little 
information given here. As said in question 3 a more balanced conclusion 
could be formed with the help of more sources, relevant to their reliability 
etc. Through cross referencing these added sources, taken from both 
contemporary accounts of the event and other historians conclusions a 
more effective conclusion could be reached. As it is, it is not possible to 
decide between the two accounts as not enough information is given, 
however, with further sources etc it will still probably not be possible to 
decide between the two, as neither are balanced enough to properly 
consider the other 'side' with which they are not sympathising with. 
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Holocaust Task: Mary Year 2 
Question One 
How do the two accounts differ? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
The two accounts differ in their opinions about the extent to which Britain 
helped stop the Holocaust. Source One tends to take a more favourable 
view of the situation — preventing Britain in a stronger light. It states 
positive input and uses strong language to support this. It doesn't however 
ignore problems and facts about the number of Jewish refugees —
something Source Two does as well. Source Two also provides an outline 
of the British response and explanations about why the British government 
did as they did. The main difference therefore is the overall impression that 
the sources make — with the first differing from the second in its 
highlighting of positive action — such as the fund for Jewish refugees. 
Question Two 
How is it possible for there to be two such differing accounts of the same 
issue? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
It is possible for there to be two such differing accounts because each was 
written by a different historian. And each historian has a different approach 
which can be influenced by their (1) original ideas, e.g. what they were 
looking for when researching their accounts, in turn effected by their 
education, status, ethnic group, etc. (2) their evidence — which archive they 
have looked into — giving different evidence, and the amount of sources 
they have looked at — and cross referenced. 
(3) The fact that both sources are written with hindsight puts the accounts 
in a position where the only way to give an account is through 
interpretation. Interpretation of what happened, and how etc. Neither 
authors were there — experiencing it and so neither have had the same 
experience finding out about it (however I feel I must also note had both 
been there — accounts would still differ as both historians are individuals). 
Question Three 
Can both accounts be true? 
If they can, in what ways? 
If they cannot, why not? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
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Answer 
Both accounts can be true in the eyes of the historian. Just as any source 
can be — the source cannot be crossed off — or ignored as unreliable 
evidence because it may be a true representation of the feelings / 
experience of the person who wrote it. In this sense both accounts can be 
true accounts of the message that the historians are trying to convey. Both 
contain factual evidence that could be cross-referenced with other material 
in order to find out truth. 
It is therefore necessary as a reader to evaluate the material in the two 
accounts to form a third personal opinion about the truth of the subject 
matter. 
Question Four 
Is it possible to decide between the two accounts? 
If it is possible, how can this be done? 
If it is not possible, why is it not possible? 
(Please explain your answer as fully as you can) 
Answer 
It is not possible to decide between these two accounts with no other 
accounts / sources / evidence to compare them to. With further material 
cross referencing and comparing would be able to help form an opinion 
about which of the two accounts I would empathise more with. It is not 
possible to decide on this information alone because all that is provided is 
two peoples differing interpretations. I am sure if it was looked into there 
would be other further differing account / interpretations which could / 
should be taken into account. 
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8.3 Written Data Coding 
Note• 
The coding system developed to code the written tasks, described at 
pp.33-34 above, is exemplified in this appendix. 
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Written Data Coding: Codes and Code Categories 
1. Introduction 
The process of coding the written task data has been described in 
the Methodology Chapter. This appendix reports and exemplifies the 
coding system developed to code the written task data set. As was 
explained in the methodology chapter a system of thirty four codes was 
developed and these codes were then grouped under seven code 
categories, on the basis similarities in the explanations for variation that 
the codes identified. Respondents' responses were then re-coded in 
terms of the codes that were judged to have major and minor 
importance in their responses. 
The coding system is reported below in four ways: 
• Firstly, the codes and code categories are presented and 
exemplified; 
• Secondly, code counts and their incidence by task and 
year are presented in tabular form; 
• Thirdly, code category counts and their incidence by task 
and year are presented in tabular form; and 
• Fourthly two full sets of responses for two respondents 
are presented exemplifying coding and also, in the form 
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of a commentary after the responses, an explanation of 
the major and minor importance coding is provided. 
2. Codes and Code Categories: Presentation and 
Exemplification 
2.1 Code and Code Categories: Presentation 
The table that follows lists the thirty four codes developed to 
code the written data set. 
Codes Instances 
1.The authors are biased. 10 
2. The authors have interpreted material to support their 
preconceived views. 13 
3. The authors have simply presented material in ways that 
support their preconceived views. 11 
4. The authors take the side of one group in the past. 9 
5. The authors have simply selected material that supports their 
preconceived views. 6 
6. The accounts are one-sided / imbalanced. 3 
7. The authors look for different material to support their 
preconceived views. 1 
8. One could be lying. 1 
9. The sources have been interpreted in more than one way. 23 
10. The sources have been evaluated in more than one way. 11 
11. The facts have been interpreted in more than one way. 3 
12. One source is more factual and the other more inferential. 1 
13. They make different comparisons. 1 
14. All depends on the value and importance that is placed on the 
various facts. 1 
15. The authors classify things differently. 2 
16. They may have consulted different sources. 27 
17. The author's enquiry determines the selection of sources, 
which differ. 2 
18. The amount of sources available varies over time. 6 
19. One author may have better resources (institutionally). 1 
20. The authors have different backgrounds/beliefs/opinions 
which will have shaped how they interpreted sources. 20 
21. The authors are different people and will make different 
inferences and judgments. 1 2 
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22. Time changes how things are viewed — new ideas arise. 5 
23. The authors have filled in gaps in the record with opinion. 1 
24. Historians have differing views of the time period/context 
which impact their views. 2 
25. They are different texts with differing focus/scope. 22 
26. The authors take different perspectives. 7 
27. The sources are biased. 18 
28. There is very little evidence/thin evidence. 14 
29. The archives are a selective record and will have been 
shaped. 2 
30. The issue is complex, large or controversial and accounts 
differ because of this. 6 
31. One or both may have made mistakes. 5 
32. They are secondary sources — they did not experience the 
event and therefore their accounts vary. 4 
33. The accounts are tailored for different audiences. 7 
34. The differences are in narration - differences in detail / 
emphasis create different accounts. 2 	 _ 
The table that follows lists the code categories and indicates 
which codes were grouped under each code category. 
Code Categories Codes grouped under each code 
category 
Instances 
Author Bias 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 40 
Author Interpretation 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 32 
Author Background / 
Beliefs 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24 
31 
Variable Sources 16, 17, 18, 19 31 
Author Focus 25, 26 27 
Limited Sources 27, 28, 29 26 
Minor Codes 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 18 
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2.2 Codes and Code Categories: Exemplification and 
Explanation. 
The Author Bias Code Category 
The Author Bias code category identifies explanations for 
variation that suggest that account authors had preconceptions about the 
historical topics or personal or political agendas and that they imposed 
these preconceived meanings through their accounts by, for example, 
intentionally misrepresenting the record. 
Code Exemplification 
1. The authors are 
biased. 
Mark Year 2 Peterloo 
Bias is also a reason why the accounts may 
differ... on the part of the historian 
2. The authors have 
interpreted material to 
support their 
preconceived views. 
Edward Year 1 Holocaust 
Bias is really a large factor... the information is 
interpreted differently to fulfil a writer's views or 
feeling. 
3. The authors have 
simply presented 
material in ways that 
support their 
preconceived views. 
Mary Year 2 Holocaust 
... the 2 sources have different outlooks.... they 
are... simply manipulating the language they use 
and the figures to suggest their opinion. 
4. The authors take the 
side of one group in the 
past. 
Beatrice Year 1 Peterloo 
Source 1... is far more sympathetic to the 
working class. Source 2 — more sympathetic to 
the armed forces ... 
5. The authors have 
simply selected material 
that supports their 
preconceived views. 
Frank Year 1 Holocaust 
...neither account shows the whole story but 
shows aspects of it... in order to back up their 
own opinion... 
6. The accounts are one- 
sided / imbalanced. 
Jenny Year 1 Holocaust 
... neither historian has acknowledged the 
sources that do not support his / her opinion, so 
they have not argued their cases very well. 
7. The authors look for 
different material to 
support their 
preconceived views. 
Dan Year 1 Holocaust 
It may be that the author... was looking for 
evidence to support the view that Britain held 
little blame... 
8. One could be lying. Vicky Year 2 Ranters 
One of them could be lying... 
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The Author Interpretation Code Category 
The Author Interpretation code category identifies explanations 
for variation that suggest that the authors had made emergent sense of 
their archival materials in differing ways through processes of meaning 
construction. 
Code Exemplification 
9. The sources have 
been interpreted in more 
than one way. 
Beatrice Year 1 Ranters 
The two accounts occur due to the different 
interpretations made... the two historians... have 
looked at the evidence, and formulated different 
ideas. 
10. The sources have 
been evaluated in more 
than one way. 
Elizabeth Year 1 Ranters  
Both accounts agree that evidence is 'minimal' ... 
the two writers have interpreted this in different 
ways; one questioning the evidence, one cross-
referencing. 
11. The facts have been 
interpreted in more than 
one way. 
Stuart Year 2 Holocaust 
[T]he facts are just interpreted in different 
ways... just because... there were some anti-
Semitic sections of the public and government 
does not meant that there could not have been 
pro-Jewish feeling too. The discussion of the 
censoring of news broadcasting during the war 
does not rule out pro-Jewish feeling in Britain... 
the anti-Semitic element could have been limited 
to just a few. 
12. One source is more 
factual and the other 
more inferential. 
Edward Year 1 Holocaust 
Account two also seems to make less inferences 
than Account 1. 
13. They make different 
comparisons. 
Christine Year 1 Holocaust 
The situation can be seen in 2 very different 
lights... account one... concentrated more on 
comparing what Britain did to help in comparison 
to other countries. Whereas account 2 may have 
concentrated on what more Britain could have 
done and not what they did do. The accounts 
differ as they take 2 different perspectives.... and 
concentrate on the differing points which they 
feel are most important. 
14. All depends on the 
value and importance 
that is placed on the 
various facts. 
Ben Year 1 Holocaust 
For such an expansive subject, there is plentiful 
room for differing opinions based on how much 
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value and importance is placed on the various 
facts... Rubinstein uses facts like the fund raised 
for Jews and the lack of military forces. These 
facts are not used by Ceserani who instead uses 
the fact that the Jews suffering was not 
highlighted by the BBC, and the same vice-versa. 
15. The authors classify George Year 2 Ranters 
things differently. Both appear to confirm that Ranters as 
individuals existed so it is not as clear cut as one 
claiming that they existed and one claiming that 
they didn't. The confusions just come in whether 
they were a group a club or merely individuals 
with strong opinions. This subtle difference 
could be made just by the specific wording of 
texts being misinterpreted, people will always 
have differences of opinion. 
Author Background / Beliefs 
The Author Background / Beliefs code category identifies 
explanations for variation that suggest that account authors had differing 
backgrounds or differing beliefs and that this fact explained differences 
in their accounts. 
Code Exemplification 
20. The authors have George Year 2 Peterloo 
different backgrounds / It seems that Thompson is likely to have 
beliefs / opinions which will come from a lower class and therefore have 
have shaped how they less sympathy for the aristocracy... it seems 
interpreted sources. logical that he would read into this a struggle 
between the lower classes and the upper's 
"fierce oppression"... if Gash came from a 
family of higher standing then he would be 
likely to develop an argument that supports 
his beliefs. In any argument concerning 
divisions of this kind there is bound to be 
difference of opinions depending on who is 
arguing. It seems unlikely that if someone 
furtively believed in upper class dominance, 
they would argue that this was a case of 
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brutal repression of the lower class. 
21. The authors are different 
people and will make 
different inferences and 
judgments. 
Hannah Year 1 Ranters 
The two accounts are extracts from books 
written by two different Historians, different 
people have different opinions and the way 
that they interpret information may be 
different also. 
22. Time changes how things 
are viewed — new ideas arise. 
Trina Year 2 Ranters 
[T]hey are... written at different times... 
Perhaps, in this time...there was room for 
differing opinions to come to light that 
perhaps would have influenced...the author 
of Account Two, or not been accessible to 
the author of Account One. 
23. The authors have filled in 
gaps in the record with 
opinion. 
Edward Year 1 Peterloo 
[W]hen looking back on badly documented 
history a lot of guess / opinion will end up as 
a means to establish a conclusion or 
understanding. 
24. Historians have differing 
views of the time 
period/context which impact 
their views. 
Elizabeth Year 1 Ranters 
Both writers would have differing opinions 
on other events at that time that might have 
affected the way they interpreted the 
information, and their views on the topic. 
Variable Sources 
The Variable Sources code category identifies explanations for 
variation that suggest that differences in the accounts arose because the 
authors had based their accounts on different sources. As the examples 
show, in some instances this is simply presented as fortuitous and in 
other instances as following from decisions that the historians have 
made. 
Code Exemplification 
16. They may have 
consulted different 
sources. 
Hannah Year 1 Ranters 
[T]he two accounts are so completely opposite, I 
would say that the Historians used differing 
evidence and sources when researching the 
Ranters. 
17. The author's enquiry Vicky Year 2 Holocaust 
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determines the selection 
of sources, which differ. 
[T]heir books have different focuses... so the 
author will have examined a greater amount of 
evidence relating to this subject and so this could 
account for the difference... 
18. The amount of Trina Year 2 Ranters 
sources available varies [T]hey are... written at different times... Perhaps, 
over time. in this time difference, there was room for 
differing opinions to come to light that perhaps 
would have influenced... the author of Account 
Two, or not been accessible to the author of 
Account One... differing ranges of research may 
have been used to by the two historians that 
influenced their conclusions... Therefore, both 
historians would have perhaps had a range of 
different and contradicting evidence and research 
to draw on... 
Author Focus 
The Author Focus code category identifies explanations for 
variation that suggest that account authors had asked different questions 
and that this fact explained differences in their accounts. 
Code Exemplification 
25. They are different Frank Year 1 Peterloo 
texts with differing The two accounts focus on different issues. 
focus/scope. Account 2 writes about the atmosphere leading up 
to the event how a constable was attached by 
people who were against the king. 
Account 1 talks about the event itself and how the 
yeomanry attached a peaceful meeting. 
26. The authors take Alice Year 1 Peterloo 
different perspectives. [T]hey are written by different people with 
different perspectives. Account 1 is an extract 
from a book The Making of the Working Class 
from this we can conclude that the author would 
be sensitive and sympathetic to the abused 
working class, as he, in his books is evaluating 
and explaining the social class divide of the time. 
Therefore creating account that is more likely to 
emphasise the mistreatment of the lower classes 
by Upper and Middle Classes. Account 2 is an 
extract from Aristocracy and People. It was 
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obviously then written from a different 
perspective than the 1st Account, as he is 
concentrating on the lives of the Upper Class and 
not the injustices of the Lowers Classes, therefore 
it is very likely that it will not focus on the 
"violence" of the event. 
Limited Sources 
The Limited Sources code category identifies explanations for 
variation that suggest that differences in the accounts arose because the 
archive available was limited — unreliable or thin. 
Code Exemplification 
27. The sources are 
biased. 
Jenny Year 1 Ranters 
It is possible for there to be 2 such differing 
accounts of the same issue, because the 
reliability of the sources is questionable. 
28. There is very little 
evidence/thin evidence. 
Amy Year 2 Peterloo 
Another possible reason for the fact that the 
two accounts differ so much is the 
possibility that not much reliable 
information is available on the event — so 
inferences have to be made in order to 
attempt to find out what happened. 
29. The archives are a 
selective record and will 
have been shaped. 
Kim Year 2 Peterloo 
The events at Peterloo were created by fear 
and panic on the part of the aristocracy and 
upper middle class... Afterwards they 
would try to cover their actions and therefore 
we have two widely different sets of primary 
sources to work from, that of the upper class 
and that of the working class. 
Minor Codes 
The Minor Codes code category identifies a number of 
explanations for variation that figured in a small number of responses 
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only, such as the suggestion that author incompetence or error explained 
differences in accounts. 
Code Exemplification 
30. The issue is complex, 
large or controversial and 
accounts differ because of 
this. 
Dan Year 1 Holocaust 
Whilst, as I have mentioned previously, 
both historians should be strictly 
unbiased with such an important issue it 
would be hard not to be. The degree of 
responsibility for the death of over 5 
million people is not something to be 
taken lightly. 
31. One or both may have 
made mistakes. 
Vicky Year 2 Peterloo 
One historian could be incompetent and 
not have done thorough research. 
32. They are secondary 
sources — they did not 
experience the event and 
therefore their accounts 
vary. 
Christine Year 1 Holocaust 
Both accounts were written after the 
event at the same time, meaning neither 
is first hand evidence, which means it is 
easy for their opinions to be biased due 
to differing accounts they have heard. 
33. The accounts are 
tailored for different 
audiences. 
Jane Year 2 Ranters 
The most likely cause of inconsistency 
is the motivation of each source, in 
short the 'target audience' of each 
source... Account 1 is published by 
Penguin Books, had Christopher Hill 
denied the existence of the Ranters a 
large part of his narrative would not 
exist, and so may not have been 
published, while Account 2 in a sense 
has more freedom to be critical of the 
Ranters' origins as it is an internal 
release. 
34. The differences are in 
narration - differences in 
detail / emphasis create 
different accounts. 
Adam Year 1 Peterloo 
There are a few similarities of the two 
accounts which illustrate some truth is 
written. These points may have then 
been played upon by authors or story 
tellers creating two different accounts. 
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4. Written Data Coding: Exemplification 
Two examples of coding are provided here for two reasons: 
firstly to exemplify how individual answers were coded using the code 
categories and, secondly, to show how the relative importance of code 
categories in particular responses was determined (see p.34 above). 
Two examples of coded responses are provided below, one from 
the first and one from the second year students in the written task data 
set. In each case, Question Two answers from each of the three written 
tasks are exemplified. 
Coding is reported under the seven Code Categories. Text is 
colour coded to indicate the code category under which it was coded 
using the system explained in the following table. Six code categories 
group together explanations on the basis of similarity and these are 
colour coded as follows: 
1 	 6 	 on • uthor Back roun 
Belief 
• uthor Focu Limited Sources Variable Sources 
A number of codes were of minor importance in the data set as a 
whole and were grouped together under the code category Minor Codes. 
These are all colour coded also, as follows (code numbers are given 
because code titles are abbreviated in the key). 
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Topic (30) uthor Error (31) Seconda 	 Sources 
(32) 
udience (33) Sto 	 ,tellin 	 (34) 
4.1 Ben Year 1 
Ranter Task Question 2 
In both accounts, it is agreed that there is a shortage of sources from 
anyone other than hostile witnesses. Different historians can, therefore 
quite easily disagree with the value of the sources available. The author 
of Account 1 finds that the sources of these "hostile witnesses" to be 
proof enough of their existence, and manages to quote from arguing 
Ranters, stating their beliefs and reasons for their actions. No such 
quotes are evident in Account 2, but in its place, are examples, such as 
proof that not all writers actually practiced Ranterism, such as Coppe 
who became a physician and was eventually buried in a churchyard. 
This can raise the question of whether the two authors of the two 
accounts had any of the same sources, as they were written 12 years 
apart, so there is a strong possibility that the sources used were very 
different. 
Ben's response was coded as explaining variation by making 
reference ideas coded under three code categories. He explains variation 
in terms of Limited Sources, Author Interpretation and Variable Sources. 
Although these ideas are developed at variable length, the Limited 
Sources reference being the shortest, all ideas were deemed to be of 
equal importance in his response: the first two ideas are interlinked and 
therefore mutually dependent and the last idea is explicitly flagged as a 
strong possibility. 
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Holocaust Task Question 2 
re is plentiful room for differing 
op n ohs 	 - • bit ow Mite v tie and importance is placed on the 
various facts. The reasons for the two accounts is that totally different 
facts are used to illustrate their points. For example, Rubinstein uses 
facts like the fund raised for Jews and the lack of military forces. 
These facts are not used by Ceserani who instead uses the fact that the 
Jews suffering was not highlighted by the BBC, and the same vice-
versa. There is so much information on the subject as a whole that it 
[is] easily 
informati 	
simply gather v` Eck mix' of appropriate 
pport your vi 
For such an expansive subject 
Peterloo Task Question 2 
It is quite possible for differing accounts such as these to be made 
about the same issue. It is unknown what sources the writers have 
used to form such o einions. I t is also a matter of whether each 
author is pro or anti such case 
or instance, if Thompson was ve 
posed to such groups, it is likely that he would emphasize 
assacre" that took place without going into lying about events. 
Ben's response was coded as explaining variation by making 
reference ideas coded under three code categories. He explains variation 
in terms of Variable Sources, Author Background / Beliefs and Author 
Bias. The first idea was deemed to have minor importance: the idea is 
simply a suggestion and is not developed. The second two ideas were 
deemed to have major importance in his response: the two ideas are 
developed and they are inter-related. 
Ben's response was coded as explaining variation by making 
reference to ideas coded under three code categories. He explains 
variation in terms of Minor Codes (Topic), Author Interpretation and 
Author Bias. The first idea was deemed to have minor importance: he is 
simply noting the complexity of the topic here and the idea is not 
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Ranter Task Question 2 
Such differing sources could be explained by when each account wa• 
produced. Notably, Account 2 was written over a decade after Accoun 
ave been made durin thi 
esources available could also be accountable for th 
great difference between the two sources. It could be that J.C.Davies' 
account is better informed simply due to the resources available to him 
her through Cambridge. However this is unlikely as some of the 'facts' 
such as the 'Bias hemy Act of 1650' are consistent thou h the tw 
sources. he most likely cause of inconsistency is the motivation of 
each source, in short the 'target audience' of each source. Account 1 
is published by Penguin Books -a 	 1" op et 
of his narrati 
and 	 of h 	 blish 	 nt 2 i 
more freedom to be critical of the Ranters' on ins as it is an 
internal release. 
1 erha s renderin. it better informed, as o iscoveries over the nature • • 
f sources (such as Coppe) are lik 
`gap' period. I' 
settee t 
ld not exis.  
developed further. The second idea was deemed to have major 
importance in his response: he places emphasis on the fact that the 
authors have placed different weight on different facts and elaborates 
this point. The final suggestion (that authors have selected material in a 
biased way) was deemed to have minor importance: the idea is not 
developed further and is simply added at the end of the response. 
4.2 Jane Year 2 
Jane's response was coded as explaining variation by making 
reference ideas coded under four code categories. She explains variation 
in terms of Variable Sources, Author Background / Beliefs, Minor Codes 
(Audience) and Author Bias. In this case the idea that gets the most 
space (that variation is linked to sources) was deemed to have minor 
importance: the modality of Jane's language indicates that although she 
develops this as a possible explanation she does not deem it to be a 
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Peterloo Task Question 2 
oth accounts are secondary, therefore in this context they are o 
qual reliability ISo their differing accounts are likely to be due t 
• heir purp 
gr  	 e issue e ,, 	 ,s 	 i 
	  the social "position" or stance one adopts when 
eviewing the event is crucial to the interpretation of it 
nterestmg y account one is t en om 'the m mg o 'the ng is 
working class" and therefore was clearly adopted a pro-working class 
stance. Indeed the working class are presented with a "peaceful 
character" so clearly E.P.Thompson is implying the working class had 
no intention of escalating the meeting into the "cruelty" mentioned in 
account two. Account two is, therefore, adopting a pro-Yeomanry and 
so pro-Aristocracy stance, as revealed in the title "Aristocracy and 
People". This account places emphasis on the "restraint" 
and, MOT oyez, e "iacnaracwigic" na e "Peterl9o" herefore 
the differing accounts 	  
situation of each source. 
probable explanation. The reference to Author Background / Beliefs 
(that they may have had differential knowledge about sources due to 
developments in the scholarly community) was also deemed to have 
minor importance since this suggestion was linked to Jane's suggestions 
about sources which, as we have seen, she dismisses as improbable. 
Two linked ideas were deemed to have major importance in her answer: 
the proposition that the one author was biased (by vested interests linked 
to publishing and therefore to audience) to present their account in a 
biased manner. 
Jane's response was coded as explaining variation by making 
reference ideas coded under four code categories. She explains variation 
in terms of Minor Codes (Secondary Sources (32)), Author Focus, 
Author Bias and Author Background / Beliefs. The first idea was 
deemed to have minor importance: the idea is simply a suggestion and is 
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Holocaust Task Question 2 
It is difficult to determine why the two sources have such differin 
laaccounts. Iowever there is an evident manipulation of statis both. While source one considers the number of Jews 
wing in Britain from Germany, Czechoslovakia and Austria which 
ds up to a substantial total of 55,000 refugees, source two, on 
er hand, mentions only the number of German Jews w 
ounted to only 11,000 thus supporting the writers 
'Therefore 
source one is considering the Holocaust and its affects on Jews 
throughout the "Greater Germany" such as Austria and 
Czechoslovakia, whgergas„saurge tow limitk its_ eyidence 041  
German Jews.' oreover one must consider the motivations for each 
usions 	 tooldliliveild their manipulation 
not about explaining variation but about the reliability of the sources. 
The references to Author Focus were deemed to be minor references 
also since, as the rest of the answer demonstrates, the author's 
background is invoked here to explain biases rather than to develop 
observations about differential focus as such. Author Bias and distorted 
perspective taking gets the most attention here and, in this case, this was 
held to be the major explanatory move made in this response. The final 
lines simply refer to the personal backgrounds of the authors and thus 
reinforce the importance of the bias explanation: this reference was held 
to be minor in itself therefore. 
The opening line of this response was not coded, as it is not 
offering an explanation for variation. The remainder of Jane's response 
was coded as explaining variation by making reference to ideas coded 
under two code categories. Jane explains variation in terms of Author 
Bias and Author Focus: the former is clearly the key move here and this 
idea was coded as having major importance in her answer; the second 
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idea is integrated into Jane's explanation in terms of bias and was 
therefore deemed to have minor importance only in itself. 
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8.4 Exemplar Full Interview Transcript 
Note: 
This appendix reproduces a complete interview transcript. 
The main questions into which the interview was organised, explained at 
p.30 above, and the structure of the interview have been highlighted in 
the text by the use of bold type face and underlining and line breaks. 
As is explained, at pp.35-36 above, this thesis focuses on answers to one 
of the four questions (Question Two) only. 
Interviewer questions are identified by italics and interviewee answers 
are in normal type. 
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Interview Transcript: Edward Year 1 
01/07/2002 
Preamble 
Okay so i f I just explain what I want to do. It's just to ask you some 
really general questions very similar to, identical in fact, to those ones 
that were in those written tasks that you completed. 
Right. 
And then I have some other questions which. If I do have other questions 
they will just be picking up on what you said in reply to those questions, 
trying to clarify and whatever. 
Question 1  
So my question is really broad and it is Why do historians disagree? 
I think historians disagree mainly due to the fact that there are different 
motives behind maybe research or er an event. And certain historians 
have other purposes, like are there three types you could sort of say? 
One that goes for one opinion. No sorry two types. One that goes for one 
opinion. Like there's two opinions, there's always going to be more than 
one opinion to an event, so one historian will go to one opinion and the 
other one will go to the other. But then, or there could be the type that 
just takes a look at the facts from both sides maybe. I don't know that's 
why I think there's always going to be conflicting views on why 
historians may disagree. 
Right, erm, so i f I could just be clear about that you said that there were 
conflicting motivations and then you said behind research? 
Yeah behind maybe. The historians personal motivation could be say to 
prove a certain, er, disprove or prove a certain act. 
Okay so you are saying there are two kinds of mind out there. The one 
that goes for more than one opinion? 
Yeah say like it was something to do with I don't know the Nazi party if 
you had I don't know a Nazi sympathetic historian. 
Yeah. 
They are going to try their best to make the Nazis come out. 
Right. 
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It's like with the Holocaust thing isn't it? There's so much evidence 
saying that it happened but this y is saying it didn't happen because 
he's already a Nazi sympathiser. 
Right. 
So it's bound to get conflicting views depending on the historians' 
personal views. 
Right, so some people go for extreme views and other people try to 
balance all the evidence? 
Yeah, yeah exactly. 
And is it just about politics? 
Uhm. 
So you were saying that one reason you might be motivated to go for 
extreme views is that you have politically extreme views so you might 
want to go for the extreme version? 
Erm, well no there's also going to be the type of research no sorry the 
quality of the research could be and I suppose if you've got, if you are a 
lazy historian you might not look at every single individual bit. I 
suppose you could say that one skill of the historian is to say what is 
important and what is not important but if you don't look at everything 
then how can you get the whole picture, how can you start to say what is 
important and what isn't important and yeah it may matter on how this 
person is researching. 
So is it. Stop me if I am getting this wrong, so far it's basically your 
political views may drive you to take an extreme stance? 
Yeah. 
And lack of research? 
Or quality of. 
Right. 
So the evidence you could be using could be pretty poop. 
Ok. 
Compared to somebody else. 
107 This is a reference to David Irving (Evans, 2001; Guttenplan, 2001). 
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Okay. Let's imagine if you have balanced historians with no particular 
political views? 
Right. 
If that's possible. 
[Laughter] 
And imagine a group of people who are very balanced in their approach 
and also extremely hard working quality researchers, could they 
disagree about things? 
Erm. 
Let's say 'event X' or something, they are all students of this event like 
your proposed idea of the fall of communism.'°8  
Right. 
If you have a pretty non-biased, hardworking researchers, could they tell 
different stories about that event? 
Ideally no, they shouldn't but they probably would. 
Uhuh. 
Maybe, I don't think it would necessarily be a different erm. I'll start 
that again. Now what am I trying to say? Basically they will all come to 
the same conclusion but they will probably get there in a different way. 
No basically the same way but I reckon they might get more sympathetic 
to certain angles of a, er, of the subject. 
Right. 
Like when we do the class discussions like when we were doing "why 
did the BUF fail" and we wrote out those big sort of brainstorm things 
erm some people would argue, you know the two guys who would sit 
there, they would always argue a certain point more than the other side 
of the group even though we all took into consideration. It's just 
personally what you think. I think it just comes down to in a way maybe 
the person's gut feeling. That doesn't sound very professional but do you 
know what I mean it's like what that person thinks is more viable as 
compared to another. 
108 This student had proposed to study aspects of the fall of communism for their 
Personal Study (a component of students' courses started in the second half of the 
summer term in their first year and completed in the first half of their second year 
studies). 
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So does that... Are you saying that ultimately an element of all this is 
just very personal? 
Yes. 
Because people are all different persons? 
Yeah. 
Okay. Why is that then? What is all this. Why must there be gut feeling? 
Ifyou see what I mean. 
I think it's just more useful because people are personal. Perhaps they're 
trying, perhaps some historians are out there to make this claim for 
themselves, to make themselves famous maybe or, I don't know, that's 
one idea! 
I am sure that's true. 
But. 
Because a book makes your career so. 
Yeah exactly, but I think a lot of it at the end of the day does come down 
to again to the politics of it all to your way of thinking. And because 
history being quite an argumentative subject. It's also perhaps the need 
to get clarity about something. So this is it, this happened, I say this 
happened, look at my example, everyone learn from that and you are 
always going to get. That's why you get conflicting views maybe. Does 
that make sense? 
Er. I think so, yeah. So it's a combination of different things. 
Yeah. 
Question 2  
Erm, okay so my next question is about the implications of the fact that 
you get different opinions. If you have two different versions or 
accounts that disagree in a number of ways can you just accept that or 
do you have make some kind of a choice? Can they both be true if they 
conflict? 
Yes they can both be true because if, say all the research all the evidence 
being used, all the sources and whatever being used is good, erm, and all 
the researchers are relatively unbiased then it, you are going to get. What 
you. What they've found out must be true. It cannot be disputed that it's 
not if all these, if all the checks. Let's say. 
Right. 
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Have been done. So, perhaps in a way that actually would show you 
better why events happen like if you've got two sides to a certain event 
like the Cuban Missile thing you know, something like that, the Russians 
didn't know what the Americans were thinking, the Americans didn't 
know what the Russians were thinking so who was to know what the 
other one group were feeling. 
Right. 
Because you're always, you're going to get. If you are talking about 
something where there are two hostile parties and then some event 
happens. 
Yes. 
The other group doesn't know what the other group's doing so if you 
were trying to point the finger of blame at someone maybe in a similar 
type of situation you couldn't really do that until you knew exactly what 
the other group were trying to do, were wanting to do. And if you do and 
if you do, and if through research you will find that when historians do 
research so if we can actually sort of sit down and say well this group 
did this, which was bad, but this group were doing this and this, so it, not 
cancels each other out but. I'm not really making much sense 
No I think I. Correct me i fI am wrong but I think you are saying that you 
can have different versions of it that are perfectly true by historians 
because there are different perceptions of it? 
Exactly yes. 
So as long as someone has done good research. You know I might have 
done research on the Russians, I might have a really good book on the 
Russian perception of this, the Russian version of events, whereas 
someone else might have done an equally scholarly book on the 
American version of events. 
Yes and then you could always pick out bits and say well that 
corresponds to that and if they knew about this then you know would the 
same thing have happened and it would cause you to ask more questions. 
What about if you have. Can you have two books about the American 
view? 
Yes. 
That say different things but that are nevertheless both credible good 
books? 
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Well yes if you can have them for the large issue then definitely for the 
same reasons. 
Right. So they would be different aspects to that as well? 
Yeah. You just keep on going down and down and down I suppose. 
Okay is there any situation in which you can't have that? 
[Laughter] 
Until someone says "stop" maybe I don't know, not that I can think of. 
So basically there always are different perspectives on events? 
Yeah. But event like with whole groups of people who agree with each 
other there's always going to be someone sort of saying "Well actually 
we'll do it this way". They are all going for the same goal but it's just 
the way people want to go about doing it I suppose. 
Question 3  
Okay, my next question only makes sense if you have to choose. 
Okay. 
If you had to make a decision between two accounts of something, for 
whatever reason, how mij'ht you do this?  
Erm, I think reliability would be the key one erm, and perhaps, perhaps 
the only one because admittedly I'd probably want to find something 
that automatically backs up what I want to hear erm, but then you'd have 
to get rid of that. But I think reliability, because, reliability would effect 
everything else erm. 
Could you explain what it means, this' reliability' idea? 
Erm. Firstly the opinion behind the research, if it's going to be biased to 
one person. The actual, maybe the timing or the usefulness of the 
evidence used. Whether it's you know something that's just so 
unimportant or something that's, because you know you may have a 
cartoon of the time you were looking at so I don't know when we were 
doing the Nazis stuff you have a cartoon of the time but that's only, that 
was like maybe only one group's personal opinion on that matter, 
whereas, if you take a look at an analysis of a few year's later of the 
event that might, that could in some way be a bit more useful 
Yes. 
So you would have to look at that. 
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So it would be a judgement about the quality of the evidence? 
Yes I think that would be a definite criteria, er. 
So basically ask yourself questions about what motivates the author? 
Yes. 
And also look at the kind of quality of the evidence that they have? 
And I know you don't, I mean you don't particularly want to read 
something that will just leave you with no real answer. You do want 
something that, actually that goes back to one of the earlier questions 
you were asking. People don't want to read an article saying, that 
doesn't answer a question. They don't want it to sort of flounce around 
they want a definite answer and maybe that puts pressure on historians to 
actually, "Ah well yes it definitely happened because of this", or, to 
what extent, you know you get the question to what extent can this be 
done to or whatever. Just by putting that on makes, you are being certain 
but ambiguous at the same time to compensate maybe. 
That's the problem with a lot of human life isn't it. That you want the 
world to make sense but it doesn't. 
Exactly, so. 
So history has to make sense even though it doesn't? 
Yes. How philosophical. 
So evidence and motives of historians? 
Yes. I think they are the ones. 
Question Four 
Okay. Just a question about history and the other subjects that you do 
and history. Do you ,'et the same sort of issues in other subjects in the 
same way about different accounts, different interpretations? 
In Politics we. It. Because a lot of the stuff we do is recent, erm, I think 
people already have their opinions on it and we do have certain accounts 
like certain things. When we were doing the 80s we were looking at like 
Thatcherism. 
Yes. 
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And we were looking at videos by Margaret Thatcher where she was like 
commenting on her time in office and of course the majority of it was 
her saying how good it was and everything. 
Surprising! 
And then you would have interjections from other people in the class, 
also on the video and different texts we were reading but basically with a 
thing like politics it's just base facts, particularly in the first year, they 
don't expect you to do any more analysing of your own opinions. 
Right. 
Only a little bit. It's more just base facts — what happened and how it 
happened so not that much. That's only in classroom discussion we get 
to look at stuff like that. 
Right 
In Theatre Studies not really because it's just group work and working 
with the text. 
Right. 
And English Language, I do that as well. 
Right. 
When maybe analysing text and stuff like that you have to look at the 
purpose which ties in with looking at sources and evidence and stuff and 
looking at historians. 
Okay so why do you think it... Why is it so important in history then? 
Basically you are saying this whole business of different accounts and 
interpretations and so on is more prominent in history than in other 
things 
Because you need to be sure of your past in a sense. You need to know 
why you are doing what you are doing now, why you are here. That's 
why people want to know how true. 
Don't you need to be sure what the government is doing if you see what I 
mean? 
Well you do. I definitely agree with that but people don't necessarily 
care about that type of. Not care but it's not something that they can 
really influence. 
Right. 
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Because if you are not in a position of power you can't really influence 
that whereas you can look back at history and sort of say "Well that 
happened for that reason and I can say why it's like this now". 
Right. 
And in a way maybe pointing a finger to blame. 
So interpretation is to do with human motivation then? 
Yes. 
It's that. Can you give me an example of that? I just want to make sure I. 
Or maybe perhaps explain it a bit more? 
I can't think of one example, erm. With what we know about Nazi 
Germany, for a long time it was always based on, for a long time it was 
thought that the German people never really went along with the bad 
side of the Nazi way of life, erm, but now we are starting to find new 
evidence after the fall of communism to suggest that actually a lot of 
people went along with it, and in fact not enjoyed but took part in the 
sort of more violent aspects of the Nazi regime. 
Uhuh. 
Er, why didn't we know about this before? Because of the political 
situation of the Cold War. 
Right. 
We don't want to condemn the people of West Germany, or the people 
who were under the control of the Nazis and say "you were all mean 
people". You don't want to do that because you don't want to start 
another war, you don't want your new allies to put their backs up and go 
to the communists. 
Right. 
So I reckon yeah, that's an example of motivation of historians. 
Right. 
Of people saying "We don't want to rock the boat so we had better come 
to this conclusion" and then when everything's settled and it doesn't 
matter anymore that's when the conclusions come. 
Can you relate it to any of the ideas you might have for your study? This 
idea of motivation, interpretation? 
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Erm, yeah, you could say. I could imagine a lot of the books saying that 
these are popular peoples' revolutions. 
Uhuh. 
That got rid of communism and stuff like that, er, because we live in a 
growing globalised world where capitalism doesn't want to go back and 
they want their power. 
Okay. 
So perhaps these books that I am going to start reading are influenced. 
Ideological? 
Yeah 
Yeah. Well I think that was what I was going to ask so thank you for that. 
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8.5 Interview Data Coding 
Note• 
The system of coding used to code the interview task, described at 
pp.34-35 above, is exemplified in this appendix. 
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Interview Data Coding: Code Categories 
1. Introduction 
The process of coding the interview task data is described in the 
Methodology Chapter. As is explained there (at pp.34-35), the interview 
data was coded using the Code Categories developed in the coding of the 
written task data. This is exemplified below and examples of data coded 
under the Code Categories are presented. The Code Categories have 
been defined at pp.247-254 above. The definitions are not reiterated 
here. As noted at p.34 above, two additional minor codes were 
developed in the interview data coding process: these codes are 
presented and exemplified below. 
No data tables summarising the data are presented here. As noted 
above at pp.34-35 and p.142, the interview data was coded ordinally, in 
terms of the order of appearance in the interviews of ideas coded by the 
Code Categories. A data table summarising this coding has been 
presented above (at p.147). 
2. Code Categories: Presentation and Exemplification 
The Author Bias Code Category 
The following exemplify transcript segments coded under this 
category. 
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Er, there might also be bias and there might be like a reason 
for trying to, erm, have, to put their view across. There might 
be, like, a reason why. 
Elizabeth Year 1 
Like the historian will look at things like events in the way 
they perceive it and quite often they can like distort the 
information or you know get what they want from the 
information to suit their way of thinking. 
Ruth Year 2 
The Author Interpretation Code Category 
The following exemplify transcript segments coded under this 
category. 
[P]eople don't interpret sources in the same way... And so 
they pull out different ideas from the sources. 
Elizabeth Year 1 
Yes, I guess that's like... Well evidence can be interpreted in 
different ways, for example the Gestapo in Germany was very 
short numbered and some people could say they could still 
terrorise because there's people in camps, but Gellately said 
well they can't because it's structurally impossible. People 
have different opinions and will interpret evidence in different 
ways. 
Peter Year 2 
Author Background / Beliefs 
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The following exemplify transcript segments coded under this 
category. 
Well if it's about two different sides of an event then they 
could just have come from two different sides or they could 
have been educated in the manner of the two different sides. 
Jenny Year 1 
Some people may have different beliefs and therefore they 
look at things and someone may look at things a different way 
to another person and so they need to. 
Peter Year 2 
Variable Sources 
The following exemplify transcript segments coded under this 
category. 
I think some people give their different interpretations from 
different sources. 
Adam Year 1 
If you go and study Nazi Germany a lot of the new Gestapo 
reports that have just been made public and things and also 
especially in American history because a lot of stuff remains 
classified for 30-40 years before it gets available for things, so 
work that's released straight away after the event is less likely 
to have less access to government files and stuff, so your point 
of view can vary depending on what information you have 
access to I think. 
George Year 2 
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Author Focus 
As was noted, at pp.149-150 above, there was only one example 
of an Author Focus explanation in the interview data set. This example 
is reproduced below. 
[I]t's the very nature of a document that you can interpret it 
differently, because different people are looking for different 
things. 
Stuart Year 2 
Limited Sources 
The following exemplify transcript segments coded under this 
category. 
Well if the source is quite general and isn't specific enough 
then they may think that in a different way another historian 
would. 
Adam Year 1 
And we can't go and count the number of Gestapo there are in 
Germany. So a historian has limited evidence... Whereas an 
economist can count the number of people who don't like 
Wembley Stadium in Germany now... So the limited evidence 
means that you have to take what you can. 
Peter Year 2 
Minor Codes 
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The table below counts the ideas that were coded under Minor 
Codes in the interview data set. The second and third columns identify 
new minor codes developed during the coding of the interview data set. 
All three minor codes are exemplified below. 
Year Respondent 
Author Error 
/ Competence 
Author 
Psychology 
The 	 Climate 
of the Time 
1 Ben 1 
1 Edward 1 1 
1 Jenny 1 
2 George 1 
2 Ruth 1 
2 Stuart 1 
The following exemplifies the suggestion that historical 
disagreements may result from author error or differences in author 
competence. 
[A] historian can easily misinterpret something that is false to 
be true. 
Ben Year 1 
The following exemplifies the suggestion that historical 
disagreements may result from author psychology. 
People have always got like their own needs and desires and 
they are going to want to satisfy that in the way that they 
examine things. 
Ruth Year 2 
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The following exemplifies the suggestion that historical 
disagreements may result from the climate of the time in which accounts 
are produced. 
Political, social pressures, the society you are living in... or is 
that the same as bias? I don't know you might interpret 
something differently if there is a different climate of feeling at 
that time towards something, so, if you... if there's an anti-
communist feeling you might just be predisposed to that then 
kind of follow that feeling 
Stuart Year 2 
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8.6 Progression Models: Evidence and Accounts 
Note: 
Two progression models were presented in summary form in Chapter 3. 
These models are presented in full below. 
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Progression in Ideas about Evidence 
(Adapted from Lee and Shemilt, 2003, p. 114) 
1 Pictures of the past 
The past is viewed as though it were the present, and students treat potential 
evidence as if it offers direct access to the past. Questions about the basis of 
statements about the past do not arise. Stories are just stories. 
2 Information 
The past is treated as fixed and known by some authority; students treat 
potential evidence as information. Given statements to test against evidence, 
students match information or count sources to solve the problem. Questions 
arise about whether the information offered is correct or incorrect, but no 
methodology is attributed to history for answering such questions beyond an 
appeal to books, diaries or what is dug up. These, although sometimes seen as 
being connected with the past, provide transparent information that is either 
correct or incorrect. 
3 Testimony 
The past is reported to us by people living at the time. Like eyewitnesses today, 
they do this either well or badly. Questions as to how we know about the past 
are regarded as sensible: students begin to understand that history has a 
methodology for testing statements about the past. Conflicts in potential 
evidence are thought appropriately settled by deciding which report is best. 
Notions of bias, exaggeration and loss of information in transmission 
supplement the simple dichotomy between truth-telling and lies. Reports are 
often treated as if the authors are more or less direct eyewitnesses: the more 
direct, the better. 
4 Scissors and Paste 
The past can be probed even when no individual reporter has told us truthfully 
or accurately what happened. We can put together a version by picking out the 
true statements from different reports and putting them together. In one 
student's words: 'You take the true bits out of this one, and the best bits out of 
that one, and when you've got it up, you've got a picture.' Notions of bias or 
lies are supplemented by questions about whether the reporter is in a position to 
know. 
5 Evidence in isolation 
Statements about the past can be inferred from sources of evidence. We can ask 
questions of sources that they were not designed to answer, so that evidence 
will bear questions for which it could not be testimony. Many things may serve 
as evidence that do not report anything. (Nineteenth Century rail timetables 
were not constructed for the benefit of historians.) This means that historians 
may 'work out' historical facts even if no testimony survives. Evidence may be 
defective without questions of bias or lies. Reliability is not a fixed property of 
a source, and the weight we can rest on any piece of evidence depends on what 
questions we ask of it. 
6 Evidence in context 
A source only yields evidence when it is understood in its historical context: we 
must know what a source meant to those by and for whom it was produced. 
This involves the suspension of certain lines of questioning and a provisional 
acceptance of much historical work as established fact (a known context). We 
cannot question everything at once. Contexts vary across time and place and 
thus a sense of period is important. 
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Progression in Ideas about Accounts 
(Adapted from Lee and Shemilt, 2004, p.30) 
1 Accounts are just (given) stories 
Students treat accounts as stories that are just 'there'. Competing stories 
are just different ways of saying the same thing. If two stories are 
`about' the Romans, then they are both about 'the same thing'. We can 
say 'the same thing' in different ways, just as at school we sometimes 
have to tell the same story 'in our own words'. 
2 Accounts fail to be copies of a past we cannot witness 
Accounts cannot be 'accurate' because we were not there to see the past 
and therefore cannot know it. If accounts differ, this is because they are 
just a matter of opinion, where 'opinion' is a substitute for knowledge 
we can never have. 
3 Accounts are accurate copies of the past, except for mistakes or gaps 
The past determines accounts: the latter are fixed by the information available 
so that there is a one-to-one correspondence. (This is the positive correlate of 
the previous position.) If we know the facts, there is just one proper account. 
Opinion is a result of gaps in information and mistakes. 
4 Accounts may be distorted for ulterior motives 
Accounts are copies of the past that can be more or less distorted. The past is 
reported in a more or less biased way. Where accounts differ, this is not just a 
problem about our knowledge of the past, but about the role of the author as an 
active contributor and therefore also and necessarily as a distorter of the past. 
Opinion takes the form of bias, exaggeration and dogmatism (and also lies that 
stem from partisan positions). These all 'twist' stories. Ideally a story should be 
written from a position of perspectiveless neutrality (or no position at all). 
5 Accounts are organised from a personal viewpoint 
Students who think like this have made a major break with previous ideas by 
abandoning the idea that accounts should have a one-to-one relationship with 
the past. Accounts are not just copies of the past, but arrangements of 
significant parts of it. A viewpoint and selection are legitimate features of 
accounts. Opinion re-appears here as something controlling the selection that 
historians make; it is a matter of personal choice, but this does not mean that it 
is partisan. A historian may, for example, answer a question about housing or 
about work and education, because he or she is interested in that question. 
6 Accounts must answer questions and fit criteria 
Differences in accounts are not just a matter of authors deciding to make 
choices; accounts are necessarily selective, and are necessarily constructed for 
particular themes and timescales. The past is (re-) constructed in answer to 
questions in accordance with criteria. There can be no complete account. It is in 
the nature of accounts to differ 3/4 legitimately 3/4 from one another. Accounts 
are assessed against criteria in order to determine their admissibility and 
relative worth. The aim of this process, however, is not to select a single best or 
most valid account of a given topic or period of history. Contrary accounts of 
the same topics and periods may be accepted because they address and answer 
different but equally worthwhile questions about that topic or period. The 
criteria of the discipline, the 'rules of the game' for doing History, knock out 
many possible accounts of the past but do not prescribe a fixed number of 
admissible accounts. The latter depends upon the sorts of questions that we 
deem to be worth asking and to which valid answers can be given. 
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